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Advocates for Animals represented a coalition of animal groups challenging any curb on judicial review. Our submission was as follows: Introduction Advocates for Animals (AfA) is the UK’s first law firm dedicated to ensuring that animals are given the protection intended by the legislature. This Response is written on behalf of animal protection organisations and concerned individuals named in the Annex. The Response focuses on those parts of the terms of reference of most relevance to the signatories. The review follows that conducted by the Ministry of Justice in 2013 (the 2013 consultation). That led to some legislative changes, in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (the 2015 Act) – for example, with regard to unmeritorious cases, protective costs orders (PCOs) and interventions. Some have expressed surprise that the Government is conducting another root-and-branch review of judicial review so soon. General remarks Judicial reviews are brought in the High Court. Their purpose is to enable one arm of our tripartite Constitution arrangements – the judiciary – to ensure that another arm, the Executive, acts lawfully. Contrary to the impression sometimes given by critics, its function is to ensure that the will of Parliament, the third arm, is respected, not thwarted. It is self-evident that judges cannot perform their constitutional duty – and the rule of law cannot be vindicated – if in practice appropriate cases are not brought before them. Without the right to petition given by many countries with a written constitution, judicial review provides a vital safeguard for citizens. Judicial review is therefore the means by which decisions of public bodies, including Ministers, can be challenged. ‘Decision’ is interpreted broadly, such that (for example) a failure to make a decision may be challenged, as may guidance and secondary legislation if falling outside the ambit of an act of Parliament. Judicial review essentially looks at the process by which a decision has been arrived at, including proper application of legislation and caselaw and procedural fairness. Judges do not substitute their own views on the substantive merits of a matter for those reached by decision-makers entrusted with the task by Parliament. Is inappropriate use made of judicial review for political or campaigning purposes? Many assume that the review is driven by a belief that judges sometimes trespass onto political territory. If this is the belief, it does not represent our experience. Judicial review deals with the relationship between citizen and State. Even before Covid-19, the State had a say in huge swathes of our lives. It is inevitable, therefore, that judges will be asked to adjudicate in sensitive and politically controversial areas. There will almost inevitably be policy context to disputes. But that does not mean that judges are being political if they rule against a public body. A claimant has to identify an error of law in the decision in question and will get short shrift from the judge if they fail to do so. The permission stage provides more than adequate means for judges to screen out any political cases masquerading as legal cases. Similarly, some have suggested that judicial review is sometimes inappropriately used for campaigning purposes, and even that campaigning organisations should not be allowed to bring cases. In our view, the premise is wrong. Certainly, as far as we are aware the charge has not been made about animal protection judicial reviews. The process is too slow, too expensive and too all-consuming to be considered an effective campaign tool. Care needs to be taken with the word ‘campaigning’. Campaigning for NGOs means seeking to promote the interests of their constituencies, including by ensuring that the law is properly applied. Seeking to address unlawful action by public bodies via judicial review is a legitimate role for NGOs, as the Charity Commission accepts. But as already noted it is the sine qua non of any judicial review that a claimant must establish unlawfulness. A claimant would not be allowed to use the proceedings simply as a way of generating publicity for a cause, and nor should they. Judges are well able to deal robustly with any attempt to dress up what is in truth a vehicle for publicity as a legal complaint. They would not give permission for the case to proceed . Where there is a genuine legal complaint, suitable to be aired through judicial review, there can be no objection to an NGO claimant drawing public attention to the case, particularly if it is successful. Indeed, it is the function of the media more generally to shine a light on challenges to abuse of power. But that is very different from claimants misusing the court process simply to gain publicity. There are, in fact, much cheaper ways of gaining publicity. The erection of higher or even insuperable obstacles for campaigning organisations to bring a case would be both unnecessary and dangerous. It would be unnecessary because campaigning organisations, like any other claimants, have to identify an error of law. It would be dangerous because it would inevitably mean that some unlawful decisions would go uncorrected. This is particularly so with animal protection where, by definition, human agency in the form of a concerned third party is needed to ensure that the law is being applied properly. We say more about the importance of animal protection NGOs having access to judicial review under Standing. More generally, any suggestion that Administrative Court judges have a predisposition to find against Ministers and other public bodies is in our view wide of the mark. Indeed, our experience is that, in animal protection cases, if anything the opposite is the case: judges often show considerable deference and latitude to public bodies. Use made by animal protection organisations of judicial review The role of animal protection organisations is to give voice to their constituencies, which might otherwise have no means of challenging unlawfulness by public bodies. Their constituencies are the many members of the public concerned about animal welfare and, of course, the animals themselves. Animal protection organisations have, in fact, used judicial review sparingly. Indeed, that is true of NGOs more generally. The 2013 Ministry of Justice consultation paper noted that judicial reviews brought by NGOs and similar organisations have a higher success rate than other judicial reviews, indicating that cases are carefully chosen. A judicial review can only be brought as a last resort. Other avenues have first to be explored. We believe that that is appropriate. Our clients use a range of other legal techniques – including obtaining information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and using bodies such as Ombudsmen – before considering judicial review. Examples of judicial reviews brought by animal protection NGOs in the public interest include in the areas of animal experiments (by Cruelty Free International (CFI)), intensive farming (the RSPCA and Compassion in World Farming (CIWF)), the badger cull (by the Badgers Trust), the exotic pet trade (Animal Protection Agency) and the protection of other wildlife. Numerous categories of animals can be the victims of unlawful regulatory action by public bodies – for example, farmed animals, circus animals, zoo animals, wild animals, companion animals, marine animals, animals used in experiments, exotic animals traded to and from the UK, fur-bearing animals and so forth. There is a plethora of law and therefore legal duty on public bodies. Various international treaties and conventions, and governmental guidance and codes of practice, are often in play. Indeed, the welfare of over a billion animals every year in this country is regulated by various public bodies. There is a consensus that there is a real public interest in ensuring that the regulation is lawful and that animals receive the protection intended by Parliament. It is also important to appreciate that success is often achieved in judicial reviews by concession by the public body in the course of a case, followed by a change of practice. Just two examples: CFI brought a judicial review against the Home Office based on its routine failure to assess, before a particular type of safety testing on animals took place for particular substances, whether there was a non- animal alternative which could be used. The Home Office changed its practice without the need for a final hearing. Very recently, the Scottish Government has put a halt to live animal exports in the context of a judicial review brought by CIWF. Equally, a warning, explicit or implicit, that a judicial review may follow is often enough to achieve a change to unlawful practice, such as the prohibition of the notorious Lethal Dose 50 poisoning test. Needless to say, these successes are not reflected in the statistics. Were judicial review not an option, systemic unlawfulness would have gone unchecked. It is well recognised that even the possibility of a judicial review challenge – ‘the judge over your shoulder’ – acts as a real incentive for officials to make sure they stay within the law. Clearly, that incentive is removed if appropriate challenges cannot be brought. Substantive issues Should the amenability of public law decisions to judicial review by codified in statute? Judicial review has a legislative basis: section 31 Senior Courts Act 1981 (the 1981 Act). There are detailed rules of court and practice directions. Rules about protective costs orders and interventions are set out in the 2015 Act. We see no advantage in further codification. The great merit of judicial review, as with other parts of the common law, is its flexibility. It evolves to meet changing societal needs. Any further codification is liable to constrain that flexibility. Grounds and remedies Again, flexibility is the key. We see no warrant for narrowing either the grounds on which judicial review may be sought or the remedies available. Any narrowing is likely to lead to an increase in unchecked unlawfulness by public bodies. Procedural matters The review asks whether various specified procedural reforms are necessary ‘to streamline the process’. Having appropriate procedural rules is key to ensuring that appropriate cases can be brought and prosecuted, and the rule of law therefore vindicated. Procedural rules should ensure fairness to all concerned but not act as a barrier. Standing Standing – or locus standi – refers to who may bring a judicial review. Under section 31(3) Senior Courts Act 1981, a claimant must have ‘sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates’. Over the past three decades, judges have applied a liberal test, such that NGOs and other bodies may be granted standing where they have a legitimate claim to relevant expertise and to represent the constituency affected by the alleged unlawfulness. Individuals have on occasion been granted standing in public interest cases, too. The MoJ 2013 consultation document recognised: ‘Judicial review is a critical check on the power of the State, providing an effective mechanism for challenging the decisions, acts or omissions of public bodies to ensure they are lawful’. As already noted, it goes without saying that judicial review cannot fulfil this crucial role unless it is, in practice, possible to challenge decisions of public bodies which may be unlawful. Standing is the most important aspect of access, certainly with animal protection. Put simply: the rule of law cannot be vindicated unless there is someone who can facilitate the vindication. The Aarhus Convention recognises that, with many environmental challenges, it is unrealistic to expect that any individual will bring a case and standing has therefore to be accorded to NGOs. The principle is all the more important with animal protection because no human being concerned about animals being protected as Parliament intended will be directly affected by a decision. Caselaw has identified the likely absence of any other responsible challenger as a factor pointing towards the grant of standing. Only an NGO with relevant expertise can facilitate the upholding of animal protection law. Users of animals in various settings are hardly likely to complain that animal protection standards are not being complied with. They would, however, as directly affected persons be able to bring a judicial review in relation to regulation of their activities. There is a recent example of this with the challenge by manufacturers of so-called ‘shock collars’ to the Government’s proposal to bring in a ban. Similarly, the NFU and a licence applicant recently challenged DEFRA’s decision not to grant a badger cull licence in Derbyshire. If NGOs could not bring cases on behalf of animals there would be a fundamental imbalance of access to the courts. The rules for standing before the EU courts are far more restrictive: it is all but impossible for NGOs to bring challenges there, save where a decision is directed to them (as with a refusal of a request for information). The result is that unlawful decisions taken by the European Commission and other EU bodies often go unchecked. That is inimical to the rule of law. The UK should not make the same mistake. In short: the legal basis for standing should not change. Judges are well able to assess whether an organisation has a legitimate claim to bring a case. Protective costs orders PCOs give NGOs bringing a judicial review in the public interest some protection against costs should they eventually lose the case. The 2015 Act now sets out the criteria. It uses the term ‘costs capping order’ and defines it as ‘an order limiting or removing the liability of a party to judicial review proceedings to pay another party’s costs in connection with any stage of the proceedings’. In our view, PCOs are a vital mechanism for ensuring that appropriate animal protection cases can be brought, and the rule of law therefore vindicated. They are more or less obligatory in environmental cases (under the Aarhus Convention), to which animal protection cases can be closely analogous. Their importance is highlighted by an important CFI judicial review about the Home Office’s approach to assessment of suffering when deciding whether to grant licences for animal experiments. The department was projecting costs of £150,000 and, but for the PCO, CFI would have had to abandon the case. Indeed, there is a good argument that the criteria for granting PCOs are now too strict. For example, section 88(6)(b) and (c) provide that a PCO cannot be granted unless (inter alia) the court is satisfied that the applicant would withdraw the case, and be acting reasonably in doing so, if the application was rejected. No doubt this should be a factor going to the exercise of discretion but it is unnecessarily restrictive to make it a precondition which has to be satisfied in every case. The overriding test for a PCO should be one of reasonableness: is it reasonable to expect an NGO, which is motivated by concern for the public interest, to be exposed to a full adverse costs order, in light of its financial position, the relative financial position of its public body opponent, the public importance of the interests at stake and the apparent strength of the legal arguments? If the issue is of great importance to the NGO’s constituency and to the rule of law, it may feel obliged to struggle on even if does not obtain a PCO. That should not be a bar to its being granted a PCO. The potential legal costs associated with seeking a PCO are themselves a deterrent to frivolous applications. In short: for the rule of law to be vindicated, judicial review must not be so expensive as to be out of reach of those who need to access it and PCOs are a vital tool in ensuring this in public interest cases. In addition, we believe that, where PCOs are not applied for or granted, judges should exercise more freely the discretion they have at the end of a case not to award costs against an unsuccessful NGO bringing a case in the public interest. The test should be whether clarification of the issue was reasonably called for. Interventions The courts have often welcomed interventions by third parties such as NGOs to help them understand the policy and factual context in which the decision under challenge was made. They are designed to lead to more informed judgments by the court: intervention is not there for the benefit of the intervener but for the court. In fact, the Government and other public bodies often apply to intervene in judicial reviews. A judge may decide that an intervention should only be permitted by written statement, thereby keeping costs down for all parties. Nevertheless, under section 87(5)-(7) of the 2015 Act the court must, on application, order an intervener to pay the additional costs incurred by the applicant where (inter alia) (i) the intervener’s evidence and representations, taken as a whole, have not been of significant assistance to the court; or (ii) a significant part of the intervener’s evidence and representations relate to matters that it is not necessary for the court to consider in order to resolve the issues. There is an exceptional circumstances get-out but the provision nevertheless unfairly and unnecessarily trammels the court’s discretion. The intervener may have acted perfectly reasonably and will probably have been acting on advice in deciding on its contribution to the proceedings. By definition, in granting permission to intervene the judge must consider that an intervener would add value and it is not fair that interveners should bear the risk that a case should then take a different course from that anticipated. Time limit for bringing claims Under CPR Part 54.5(1), planning cases aside judicial reviews must be brought promptly and in any event ‘no later than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose’. The court can extend or shorten the time limit. Section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 then provides that, where there has been ‘undue delay’ in making an application for judicial review, the court may refuse to grant permission or relief ‘… if it considers that the grant of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration’ – in other words, even if the claim would otherwise have been successful. The need for alacrity is reasonable, given the uncertainty which the bringing of a case may represent for good administration or for third parties. However, the critical words in CPR Part 54.5(1) are ‘after the grounds to make the claim first arose’. It may not be obvious when this is. A claimant, including an NGO, may not know that grounds have arisen for some time. This is particularly so with animal protection, where secrecy of both activity and regulatory practice is pervasive. It is not reasonable to expect the claimant to bring a claim until they know, or should have known, about the ‘decision’ in question. Similarly, where what is being attacked is the validity (the vires) of secondary legislation or the lawfulness of either guidance, a policy adopted by a public body or a code of practice, it is not reasonable to expect a claimant to bring a case until the legislation etc affects them or those they represent. These are often termed continuing illegality cases. Until that point, the claimant does not have standing to bring a case. The courts have not always been consistent in the way they have approached continuing illegality cases and clarity would be welcome. Disclosure and the duty of candour The review refers to (a) the burden and effect of disclosure in particular in relation to policy decisions in government; and (b) the duty of candour, particularly as it affects Government. These are closely related. The duty of candour comes first chronologically. On receipt of a pre-action letter under the judicial review protocol, public bodies must consider whether there are documents or other information which they should disclose to the putative claimant. This is explained in guidance issued by the Treasury Solicitor. Sadly, in our experience the duty is often not honoured, but it is vitally important. Claimants are at an obvious disadvantage because public bodies have access to information which they do not. It is therefore difficult to be confident whether unlawfulness has taken place. As importantly, judges cannot perform their role unless they have the full picture. In our view, there should be no watering down of the duty of candour. Of course, if there is strong reason to suspect that someone is misusing the judicial review protocol to obtain information (to which perhaps they would not be entitled under FOIA), without any real intention of bringing a judicial review, the duty should not apply. Orders for disclosure are rare in judicial review, even where the duty of candour has not been honoured. The legal test is whether disclosure appears necessary in order to resolve the matter fairly and justly. In our view, whilst disclosure should not be routine (as it is in litigation between private parties), the court should not hesitate to order it where appropriate. In R (National Association of Health Stores and another) v Department of Health, Lord Justice Sedley said that the Court should not simply rely on summaries of documents provided by officials: ‘… The best evidence rule is not simply a handy tool in the litigator's kit. It is a means by which the court tries to ensure that it is working on authentic materials. What a witness perfectly honestly makes of a document is frequently not what the court makes of it. In the absence of any public interest in non-disclosure, a policy of non-production becomes untenable if the state is allowed to waive it at will by tendering its own précis instead’. We respectfully agree. Conclusion Judicial review is a precious safeguard against the abuse of power (however inadvertent) by Ministers and other public bodies. Anything which limits the rights of individuals or organisations to bring judicial reviews, or makes it more difficult for them in practice, would be a seriously retrograde step in a democracy such as ours. Because judicial review is a discretionary remedy, judges have the flexibility they need to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between vindication of the rights of the claimant (or those they represent), on the one hand, and the interests of third parties and good administration, on the other. There is no warrant for legislative intervention limiting that flexibility. Unmeritorious cases can be, and are routinely, weeded out at an early stage. Responsible public bodies often welcome the clarification of the law which judicial review can facilitate. Judicial review improves decision-making, to everyone’s benefit. Judicial review is particularly important with animal protection, where animals used by human beings in various settings are dependent on NGOs to bring cases to ensure that they are indeed accorded the protection intended by Parliament. Annex Marc Abraham, veterinary surgeon and broadcaster Karl Ammann, wildlife photographer and campaigner Animal Aid Animal Defenders International Animal Equality Animal Free Research UK Animal Interfaith Alliance, an umbrella organisation for: --- The Anglican Society for the Welfare of Animals Animals in Islam Bhagvatinandji Education and Health Trust Catholic Concern for Animals Christian Vegetarians and Vegans UK The Christian Vegetarian Association US Dharma Voices for Animals The Institute of Jainology The International Ahimsa Organisation The Jewish Vegetarian Society The Mahavir Trust The Oshwal Association of the UK Pan-Orthodox Concern for Animals Quaker Concern for Animals The Romeera Foundation The Sadhu Vaswani Centre The Young Jains ---- Animal Justice Project Animal Protection Services Animals Save UK ltd Born Free Foundation Caged Nationwide/Sighthound Welfare UK Compassion in World Farming Cruelty Free International Four Paws UK Freedom for Animals Greyt Exploitation Humane Being League Against Cruel Sports Leicester Animal Rights Leicestershire Animal Save One Kind Open Cages Respect for Animals RSPCA Save the Asian Elephant The Donkey Sanctuary The Humane League UK The Vegan Society Tracks Investigations Wild Welfare World Animal Protection Viva!

As the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ('RSPCA') announces plans to transfer its animal welfare prosecuting role to the Crown Prosecution Service ('CPS'), we outline what this might mean for animal protection and other animal protection groups. The RSPCA steps back as prosecutor Since 1824, the RSPCA has been a leading organisation in the prosecution and enforcement of animal welfare offences. Over the years it has established itself as the primary prosecuting body for animal welfare in England and Wales. The RSPCA did not do this by virtue of any special status as compared to other charities: it became the go-to prosecutor for animal offending simply by exercising its right under Section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 . This is the right of all private individuals, organisations and bodies (including charities and NGOs) to institute and conduct private prosecutions . By exercising this right, In 2019 the RSPCA secured 1,432 convictions relating to animal welfare offences, with a 93.7% success rate. This is significantly higher than what the CPS achieves for prosecutions generally, indicating that the charity chooses its cases carefully. The RSPCA’s past successes illustrate some of the advantages of private prosecutions by specialist organisations. As well as high success rates, private players are able to instruct specialist lawyers, investigators and forensic experts. However, the RSPCA operates in a delicate and controversial political landscape. For some time, there have been calls for the charity to step back from acting as a prosecutor of first resort. It is widely recognised that prosecutions should normally be brought by state prosecutors. Reasons for this include impartiality and funding, but also that it is the state’s responsibility to enforce the laws that it creates. The 2021 RSPCA Strategy sets out the charity’s plan for the coming decade. It seems the RSPCA has heeded to the concerns about its role and has set out to 'review [its] role as a prosecutor and look at the potential to transfer this responsibility to the Crown Prosecution Service'. The strategy states: 'We believe the time is right to explore moving away from the ‘end-to-end’ role the RSPCA provides by investigating and prosecuting animal welfare offences, and look towards separating these responsibilities. This would mirror the arrangements on animal welfare in other jurisdictions such as Scotland and Ireland, and would enable the RSPCA to concentrate on its investigatory role, transferring investigation files to the CPS to make decisions on prosecutions.' In a recent statement, Chris Sherwood (chief executive of the RSPCA) noted two interesting factors that have influenced the move: Firstly, Sherwood alluded to promised legislation that would see some animal welfare offences move from the magistrates’ courts (where the maximum penalty is 6 months on summary conviction) to the Crown Court where custodial sentences as high as five years could be imposed following conviction on an indictment. Sherwood acknowledged the responsibility involved in trials on indictment and suggested that the RSPCA believed that that responsibility should sit with the CPS. Secondly, Sherwood noted the changing nature of animal crime: 'trends with cases with hardened criminal gangs involved in puppy farming, dog fighting, cockfighting or hare coursing, sometimes with millions of pounds changing hands. We're an animal charity and our concern is welfare but these complex cases can involve serious offences such as fraud or weapons. We've already seen puppy farming reports to us increase five-fold in a decade and with the increasing demand for puppies during lockdown we believe more of these complex cases will come our way.' Although the RSPCA is stepping back from its role as prosecutor, Sherwood insisted that this did not mean it would not be involved in prosecutions entirely, promising that inspectors would still be rescuing, investigating and collecting evidence of cruelty and abuse before handing this over to the CPS. Is the CPS ready to step in? This move would see the CPS become the main body for animal welfare prosecutions in England and Wales. The CPS is already responsible for the vast majority of prosecutions in England and Wales. It therefore certainly benefits from vast experience in dealing with Crown Court trials, complex cases, serious or organised criminality and tracking and recovering the proceeds of crime. It is also a key role of the CPS to make impartial decisions on whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute a given case, and whether it is in the public interest. However, this is not the first time that a transfer of the RSPCA’s prosecuting role to the CPS has been considered. In 2016 an Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee found that the CPS was not 'suitably resourced and trained in the area of animal welfare' to take over the RSPCA’s work load. The CPS is already overburdened. In terms of general crime, BBC reported that in 2018 less than one in ten crimes led to anyone actually being charged. Transferring the RSPCA’s caseload into the hands of overwhelmed state prosecutors risks asking them to do the impossible with their strained resources. The RSPCA has made it clear, however, that it will only hand over its prosecution role if it is satisfied that the CPS will prosecute appropriate cases. It remains to be seen whether animal offences will be properly prioritised by state prosecutors, but unless the CPS has suddenly been the beneficiary of a significant influx of resources, there is a real risk of an enforcement gap. Animal crime is simply not the primary mandate of police or the CPS. Whilst many animal advocates would see human and animal suffering treated equivalently, the law as it stands plainly does not. The ongoing dog theft crisis illustrates the potential risks of leaving animal crime to state prosecutors in a system that systemically undervalues animals and their importance: only one in 100 dog theft cases in 2019 resulted in the thief being charged and prosecuted, according to figures obtained under Freedom of Information laws. Another example is wildlife crime: of 1,300 reported crimes involving bats, marine mammals, badgers and raptors in 2016 , only 22 were successfully prosecuted. In an ideal world, we could and should count on the state alone to provide protection to animals. Hopefully one day this ideal world will materialise but it seems divorced from the reality of the criminal justice system in England and Wales in 2021. As mentioned above The RSPCA has stressed that it 'will reserve the right to prosecute in an individual serious case if government agencies will not'; but with the charity having made clear its intention to step back as prosecutor, other animal charities, organisations and advocates may need to be gearing up to step in. For information on how animal protection groups can bring private prosecutions for animal welfare and wildlife crime, see our previous blog post . A brief statement from our Co-Founder Responding to the RSPCA’s announcement that it plans to transfer its animal welfare prosecuting role to the CPS, animal protection solicitor and Advocates for Animals Co-Founder Edie Bowles gave the following statement on behalf of the firm: 'The duty to prosecute any offence, including animal offences, should generally fall on a public body. The state needs to take its responsibility and crimes against animals seriously. Whilst much valuable work has been done by charities such as the RSPCA in filling gaps in enforcement, animal crime has too long been left to private players to deal with. There have been concerns raised in the past about resources and expertise at the CPS so what will be key is the RSPCA working with the CPS to ensure they have the necessary resources and expertise to prosecute the offences as successfully as the RSPCA. If the CPS and RSPCA can give those assurances, then the transfer would be a positive development'. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Advocates for Animals represented a coalition of animal groups challenging the proposed changes to protest and trespass law. Our submission was as follows: Dear Members of Parliament and the House of Lords Introduction Advocates for Animals (AfA) is the UK’s first law firm dedicated to ensuring that animals are given the protection intended by the legislature. This Response is written on behalf of animal protection organisations and concerned individuals named in the Annex. The Response focuses on the parts in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 (the Bill) of most relevance to the signatories. Areas of concern in the Bill Protest Protests already have rigorous requirements placed on them, the police can impose conditions on marches and demonstrations and can even ban a demonstration or march with the approval of the local authority and the Home Secretary. The police also already have a range of powers they can rely on to ensure a protest is kept under control. For example, it is already an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour or to display any sign which is threatening or abusive under the Public Order Act 1986. Further, those who organise a march must give at least seven days’ notice to the police, unless it is 'not reasonably practicable' to do so, although you should still give as much notice as possible. The notice should include the name and address of at least one of the organisers and the route and it is an offence not to provide this. The new law proposes significant changes that could see protests prevented and stopped for minor and trivial reasons. Currently any restrictions on a static protest (as opposed to a march) are limited to location, duration, and limits on the number of people present. There is also no requirement to notify the police of a static protest. The new law will allow the police to impose more conditions on static protests such as: start and finish time, setting noise limits. These rules can be applied to a demonstration by just one person. Currently, if the police want to place restrictions on a protest, they normally have to show it may result in 'serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community'. It is being proposed that protests, both marches and static, will now be conditioned on whether they involve noise that may cause 'serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the procession' or if the noise has a 'relevant impact' on persons in the vicinity that 'may be significant'. Under The Bill the noise generated in a protest could amount to a relevant impact on persons in the vicinity if it 'may result in the intimidation or harassment of persons of reasonable firmness' or if 'it may cause such persons to suffer serious unease, alarm or distress'. Through the Home office, the Government is given the power to define what the phrases 'serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity' and 'serious disruption to the life of the community' mean for the purposes of the Public Order Act. This can be done without thorough parliamentary scrutiny. Nuisance Further, the new proposal for nuisance is also of concern and could have implications for those who protest in various ways against animal cruelty. The offence of public nuisance is interpreted under the common law (ie judge-made law) and is understood as: A person is guilty of a public nuisance who (a) does an act not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, if the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects. The Bill aims to change the offence as follows: (1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person— (i) does an act, or (ii) omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law, (b) the person’s act or omission— (i) causes serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or (ii) obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and (c) the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b) or is reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) an act or omission causes serious harm to a person if, as a result, the person— (a) suffers death, personal injury or disease, (b) suffers loss of, or damage to, property, (c) suffers serious distress, serious annoyance, serious inconvenience or serious loss of amenity, or (d) is put at risk of suffering anything mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c). (3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for the act or omission mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection. This is a vast broadening of the previous law. Firstly there no longer needs to be intention to commit a nuisance, just recklessness. It is also enough to prove an offence has been committed if you simply cause serious annoyance or inconvenience or damage to property that does not need to be serious. In addition, no one has to suffer anything, there just needs to be the risk of suffering it. Its scope has also been broadened to include nuisance to 'a section of the public' rather than the current requirement of 'the public.' This offence carries a maximum sentence of ten years. General remarks It is trite but true to say that animals cannot speak for themselves. As such any progress to the welfare and protection of animals is made possible by individuals and organisations speaking out on their behalf. Animals already do not have standing in our courts, so to muffle their mouthpiece in a public arena only puts these vulnerable beings further at risk. The role of animal protection organisations is to give voice to their constituencies, which might otherwise have no means of challenging unlawfulness by public bodies. Their constituencies are the many members of the public concerned about animal welfare and, of course, the animals themselves. The United Kingdom is a nation of animal lovers and from experience most citizens of this country are horrified to learn of some of the abuse that animals face in our society. Protest helps facilitate information and idea exchange. There are many examples of protests leading to important and necessary progress for animals, these include the ban on fur farming and the ban on hunting wild mammals. In addition, the protests that have taken place at docks and outside Parliament have led to the proposed ban on live exports. Every animal activist and group, no matter how moderate, could think of how any of their protest activities may lead to unease or distress; after all explaining what animals go through can be distressing to hear. It is also true that many activists' activities are seen as a serious inconvenience or annoyance, especially to those who wish to hide what is going on. The serious concern with the nuisance provision is that the terms are so vague; we imagine any controversial animal industry or abuser is 'seriously annoyed' by the activities of animal groups and activists. The activities the signatories are concerned with losing are peaceful protest in all its forms without the risk of being guilty of an offence for causing offence. Unlawful curtailment The proposed changes run a serious and real risk of falling foul of the Human Rights Act 2008 which puts into domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The most notable risks include a threat to freedom of expression (Article 10), a threat to freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 11) and for some animal groups and activists a threat to freedom of belief (Article 9), where the manifestation of a belief is also protected. The recent case of Alexei Navalny v Russia stated: Freedom of assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. And: Any measures interfering with freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it. It is unlawful for any public body in the United Kingdom to act contrary to the ECHR. Further, acts of Parliament can be deemed incompatible with the ECHR by the courts. Request For the above reasons we ask that you vote against the current version of the Bill until the offending provisions relating to protest and nuisance are removed. Kind regards Edie Bowles Solicitor Annex Animal Aid Animal Equality UK Animal Justice Project Animal Protection Agency Animal Rebellion Catholic Concern for Animals Christian Vegetarian Association Compassion in World Farming Cruelty Free International Crustacean Compassion Four Paws UK Freedom for Animals Greyt Exploitations Hunt Saboteurs Association Jay Mehta Mahavir Trust League Against Cruel Sports Dr Simon Brooman, Senior Lecturer in Law, Liverpool John Moores University OneKind Open Cages People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) Respect For Animals The Shellfish Network Surge Dr Steven McCulloch, Senior Lecturer in Human Animal Studies, University of Winchester The Animal Advocacy Project The Animal Interfaith Alliance The Humane League UK Viva! Whale and Dolphin Conservation Wild Welfare World Animal Protection

First UK Animal Law Firm issues legal complaint about large dairy farm in BBC Panorama investigation UK animal law firm Advocates for Animals has sent a legal complaint, on behalf of its client Animal Equality UK, to Carmarthenshire County Council, urging it to investigate the farm covered in a Panorama episode aired on 14 February. The farm involved is a dairy farm that supplies the UK’s largest independent dairy processor and wholesaler: Freshways. Freshways, based in London, distributes dairy products to a number of established retailers and businesses, including Costa Coffee, British Airways, Londis, Budgens and P&O Cruises. Freshways also supplies Morrisons’ wholesale operation, which supplies products to restaurants, cafés and Amazon Fresh. During late 2021, Animal Equality sent an investigator to covertly film the farm over several months. During that time a culture of violence towards the cows and neglect was witnessed, including workers kicking and punching cows in the face and stomach and hitting them with sharp, metal shovels. Sick and injured cows were also left to suffer. On one occasion a cow was left in excruciating pain after her unborn calf had died inside of her. Despite a veterinarian recommending prompt euthanasia, the on-site manager opted to delay action. The veterinarian was recorded saying that 'this is one place where they’d rather just save the money'. The cow died overnight. The treatment shown in the undercover footage reveals widespread suffering. The distressing footage was revealed to millions of viewers on BBC One’s Panorama last night. The programme scrutinised the abuse and neglect taking place on the farm. Abigail Penny, Executive Director of Animal Equality UK, says: 'We are urging the authorities to use the full force of the law to hold this farm accountable for its abusive actions towards animals. A conviction of cruelty won’t help those cows who were brutally beaten or left to die in agony overnight, but it will send a strong message to this industry that the UK will not tolerate such cruelty.'

Last week, The Humane League UK, represented by law firm Advocates for Animals, was in court fighting for justice for the one billion chickens that are reared and slaughtered in the UK each year.  Our argument is clear: the breeding of fast-growing chickens breaches the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 - which states farmed animals can’t be kept if their genes cause them detriment to their health or welfare. We argue these breeds of chicken suffer from painful health and welfare issues due to their speed of growth . The two days in court were for the history books. We witnessed some of the most advanced legal brains in the country acknowledge the importance of this case and engage with each issue with curiosity and competence. The panel of three Lord Justices recognised the impact on chickens and public policy, but did not shy away from carefully examining what the law means when it prohibits the keeping of farmed animals that suffer a ‘detriment’ as a result of their genes.   We say it means detriment suffered when kept in standard farming conditions. The government says it means detriment that is inevitable after all improvements to the environment chickens are raised in are made.  The difference may seem subtle, and on the face of it of little consequence when all the evidence suggests that fast growing chickens cannot be kept in any environment without suffering. However, contrary to how it appears, these different interpretations will produce very different results for chickens. Without underpinning the ‘detriment’ to the reality, we exist in a world of hypotheticals, where a breed could never be banned if an individual farmer could in theory create environmental conditions to remove any detriment. This case comes down to banning breeds prone to detriment versus an obligation to create environments where breeds prone to detriment can be kept without detriment.  The issue with the latter interpretation is that how could it ever be scientifically researched in a world of countless hypothetical scenarios? How could it ever be policed when dealing with one billion animals per year? And how could it be fair on farmers to create this environment to remove the suffering of a chicken, when that suffering has been bred into them? How can a farmer even be expected to find this environment by themselves, far beyond what the law and official guidance tells them to do, with those farmers exposed to prosecution should they not create that environment? We hope the judgment is in our favour and brings clarity, for our sake, for the farmers’ sake and most importantly for the chickens’ sake.  Edie Bowles, Solicitor, Advocates for Animals:  'When I first started working on the case against the fast growth imposed on chickens the first goal was to get us to where we were last week, sitting in a courtroom having the legal protections for farmed animals being taken seriously. Something which should happen as a default, but so seldom does. In fact I overheard someone say with bemusement to a group of people outside a different courtroom ‘have you seen them chanting justice for chickens outside’ with the group responding in laughter. But why shouldn’t there be justice for chickens too? Why don’t their legal protections matter? I refuse to accept that animal legal protections are performative, I believe that the law should work for them too.'  Sean Gifford, Managing Director, The Humane League UK:  'This case represents a groundbreaking opportunity to end one of the greatest animal welfare crises of our time: the farming of fast-growing chickens. These so-called ‘Frankenchickens’ are bred to grow at such unnatural rates that their own bodies fail them—all for profit. Their lives are plagued by suffering, and we believe the law is clear: breeding animals with suffering hardwired into their DNA is illegal and has no place in our food system. We hope the judgment reflects this urgent need for change.'

On 8 November 2024, The Donkey Sanctuary, represented by Advocates for Animals, attended the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) Committee meeting in the Ugandan Parliament. EALA is the legislative arm of the East African Community, a trading bloc of eight countries in East Africa.   The meeting was the first EALA Assembly following  the commitment from the African Union in February this year to implement a continent-wide moratorium on the slaughter of donkeys for their skins. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the issues associated with the trade in donkey skins with the agriculture and trade committees and to explore solutions so the East African Community can honour and implement the AU commitment.  Donkey skins are traded at an alarming rate to produce a gelatine product called ejiao, which is used as a Chinese medicine that is claimed to cure a variety of ailments. The trade originated from China; however, after decimating its own donkey population to meet the demand for the product, Chinese manufacturers have turned to other countries, which includes several countries in East Africa, primarily Kenya and Tanzania.  Donkey farming is often claimed to be a way to meet the demand and to create a sustainable trading opportunity; however, this is not possible due to donkeys' long gestation periods, the high likelihood of one foal at a time, and the significant risk of abortion when donkeys are in a stressful environment. It is telling that no successful farming programme has been set up, including in China. Unable to farm donkeys in order to meet demand, agents for ejiao industry are targeting vulnerable donkey populations around the world. Escalating demand is rapidly outweighing the supply, which in turn is putting East Africa’s donkey populations and the communities that rely on them at risk.  The trade is riddled with legal issues, including widespread non-compliance with animal welfare, disease and environmental laws.  EALA recognises the issue in its two reports on the skin trade in 2021 and 2022 and is now exploring the most suitable way forward.  Quotes Hon.Dr Woda Jeremaih Odok (Ph.D Animal Nutrition/Animal husbandry), EALA  member 'East African Community needs to legislate and regulate donkey's skin business /donkey slaughter for the welfare of the communities which depend on donkey's in their livelihood and to prevent donkey's extinction in EAC because of the high demand of the donkey's skin by other regions . Our donkeys are being slaughtered, skinned in an inhuman way  and sold.out with very minimal price yet the products (Eijao) from their skin are being sold at price of USD 780 per Kg. As I've been  granted leave of the Assembly to introduce a private member bill on Prevention and control of animal transboundary and zoonotic diseases. This bill has part ix which is about Animal welfare This will grant the rights of Animals to be treated and handled well.' Edie Bowles, Solicitor, Advocates for Animals  'I have been working with The Donkey Sanctuary to tackle the donkey skin trade for several years. During that time I have observed widespread illegality at every stage of this cruel industry. Whilst The Donkey Sanctuary continues to  have success with its campaign, with more and more countries questioning and banning the trade, we are working with the East African Community, a key player in this challenge, to bring about a robust regional solution to the problem.'  Dr Otieno Mtula, Regional and Advocacy Campaigns Manager for The Donkey Sanctuary:   'This year has been one of great progress toward ending the cruel and devastating donkey skin trade. When every Member State of the African Union made the commitment in February to ban the slaughter of donkeys for their skins and implement national plans for their welfare, it was a unified decision to protect one of the continent’s most precious resources.   It is therefore with great faith and optimism that we are here in Uganda, among the leaders and decision-makers of East Africa, who now have the opportunity – and the responsibility – to see this commitment become a reality across the region. This is a critical time for donkey-reliant communities here in Africa and promises to be the start of a new era for donkey welfare.' Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

We have now been in operation for almost six years.  Everything we have done over those years is to help our clients help animals and we are immensely proud of the progress we have made.   As always it is hard to pick our top achievements from 2024, but below are some highlights. Our goal of having a physical office was finally achieved this year. We are now in the heart of legal London, just by the Royal Courts of Justice, but more importantly we are together as a team, with a place to meet our wonderful clients.  We lost, but on some important points won, our significant Court of Appeal case challenging fast growing chickens on behalf of The Humane League UK. Whilst the appeal was dismissed, it is our clients view that the interpretation the court gave on the law means fast growing chickens can no longer be kept .We will be considering next steps with our client to ensure this happens.  We were granted permission to judicially review the grant of planning permission for the first onshore fish farm on behalf of our client, Animal Equality. The case includes some important legal principles regarding animal welfare in planning decisions and will impact millions of fish. It will be heard in early 2025.  We won a judicial review challenging the planning permission for a new zoo on behalf of Freedom for Animals, we were delighted with the outcome and applaud our client’s tireless efforts.  We continue to spread the word of Advocates for Animals and our work, which in addition to helping our law firm grow also raises awareness of animal law and animal legal protections, something we believe is a vital part in the puzzle to improve the lives of animals. You can see some coverage here and here . We are proud of all our work, which helps two incredibly deserving groups: our hardworking and compassionate clients and the animals who so desperately need the support. Thank you to all of those who continue to support us, we could not do it without you. 2025 here we come!

This week guest writer Daphne Ng, briefly discusses notable differences between Prevention of Cruelty of Animals Ordinance (Cap. 169) ('Cap. 169') and the Animal Welfare Act 2006 ('AWA'), the two main legislations in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom respectively that govern animal welfare. Scope of cruelty offences Section 3 of Cap. 169 penalises specific offences that relate to (1) animal abuse (in the form of torture, kicking or terrorising an animal); (2) neglection of an animal (by failing to provide such animal with food and water); (3) transporting an animal with little space so as to cause them unnecessary pain and suffering; and (4) causing, procuring, or assisting fighting between animals. Conversely, section 4 of the AWA provides a more general prohibition on 'unnecessary suffering' of an animal thereby widening the forms of animal cruelty which amount to an offence. Reasonable knowledge of animal suffering While under section 3 of cap. 169 a person commits an offence if he/she fails to exercise 'reasonable care or supervision' of the relevant animal, section 4 of the AWA states that people who 'knew, or ought to have reasonably have known' their act or failure to act would cause unnecessary suffering to the animal also commit an offence. This creates a wider offence in the UK to cover what the offender reasonably should have known. Positive duty of care In addition to penalising offenders who actively commit animal cruelty, section 9 of the AWA imposes a positive duty of all persons who are responsible for animals (including pet owners) to provide, among other things, a suitable environment and suitable diet for the animals under their care. This positive duty of care however does not currently exist under Cap. 169. Reforms of Cap. 169 Although in 2006 Hong Kong took a step forward in animal welfare protection by increasing the sentences under Cap. 169 from six months imprisonment (perhaps modelled after section 32 of AWA) to 3 years imprisonment and increasing the maximum fines from HK$5,000 to HK$200,000, Hong Kong could still widen the scope of animal cruelty under section 3 of Cap. 169. By amending Cap.169 in line with the AWA it would bring Hong Kong one step closer to advancing its protection of animals to be paralleled to the United Kingdom’s animal welfare system. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This week's guest writer, Nisha Cardoza, discusses animal protection law in Switzerland. When were animals recognised as 'not-things'? Switzerland could be considered one of the leading countries when it comes to animal welfare in Europe. Under Swiss law, animals were formally recognised as 'not-things' in 2003 ([1]) (Civil Code, Art. 641a). Thus, according to Swiss legislation, animals should be cared for in harmony with their breed and specific needs. The Netherlands and Germany made similar changes in 2011 and 1990, respectively. The European Union formally recognised animal sentience in 2008 with Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU ). What follows is a brief overview of the Swiss Federal Law on the protection of animals and five statutes relating to their protection at different stages of life and the regulations put in place concerning the keeping of animals for consumption. The Animal Welfare Act and its statute The Animal Welfare Act was enacted in 1981 together with the statute on the protection of animals (OPAn). This act was subsequently revised and the current Animal Welfare Act was enacted in September, 2008. The Animal Welfare Act (LPA) aims to protect the dignity and welfare of vertebrate animals, reptiles, amphibians, mammals, birds and fish. Under this act, animals are protected from unnecessary suffering (LPA, Art. 4.2). The keeping of animals is allowed, provided a number of regulations are respected. Animals that are being kept have to be fed, cared for, and guaranteed an environment in which they are free to move (LPA, Art. 6.1). The LPA prohibits the slaughter of mammals without prior stunning (LPA, Art. 21.1). Exception is made for the religious slaughtering of chickens. Therefore, except for poultry, kosher and halal meat, from animals who’ve been killed without prior stunning, can only be purchased in Switzerland if it has been imported. As a result of the Animal Welfare Act, controls are carried out by the respective Cantonal authorities and a trained veterinarian is responsible for the enforcement of the law in each canton (LPA, Art. 32a, 33). The maximum stocking density on a farm is limited to 300 veal calves, 1500 pigs and 18000 hens. The statute on the protection of animals ( OPAn ) came into force at the same time as the Animal Welfare Act. The statute concerns vertebrate animals, cephalopods (mollusks, cuttlefish, octopuses, squids, nautiluses) and decapods (crayfish, crabs, lobsters, prawns, shrimp) and provides more specific information about which practices are permitted to ensure their well-being. Firstly, social animals such as guinea pigs, budgerigars and goldfish are not allowed to be kept alone (OPAn, Art. 13). Secondly, animals are not allowed to be constantly kept on a leash (OPAn, Art. 3). It is illegal to cut piglet's tails off (OPAn, Art. 18), farrowing crates for sows are only allowed to be used during gestation for a maximum of 10 days (OPAn, Art. 48) and a few days before the sow gives birth. Straw or other appropriate material also has to be available so that she can make a nest (OPAn, Art. 50). Lastly, the place in which domestic animals spend the most time, has to let daylight enter (OPAn, Art. 33). What specific guidelines exist for domestic and farmed animals? In 2008, another statute came into force which concerned domestic and farmed animals. Veterinarians and other relevant experts gave their input into this law. This statute concerns topics such as perforated floors, adequate shelter and fodder requirements when the animals are outside and regulations relating to the keeping of calves. Perforated floors are allowed for cattle, pigs, sheep and goats but have to be adapted to the animals’ size (Art. 2). The same year, the Department of the Interior enacted a statute relating to people whose work in some way involved animals (eg.: a farmer, a slaughterhouse employee, or a truck driver transporting animals). The main purpose of the statute was to ensure that people dealing with animals would receive appropriate training regarding correct treatment. Certain training courses were made compulsory and ongoing training was encouraged to enhance animal protection. How must farmed animals be slaughtered? Concerning the slaughter of animals, a statute came into force in December, 2010. This statute concerns the same types of animals as the statute on the protection of animals (OPAn). Within four hours of their arrival at the slaughterhouse, animals such as cattle, sheep, goats and pigs must be slaughtered (OPAnAb, Art. 4 455.110.2). Chickens have to be stunned between twelve and sixty seconds after being hung upside down (OPAnAb, Art. 14). How is the breeding of animals regulated? Lastly, in 2015, a statute came into force that regulated the way in which animals were bred. This statute, however, does not apply to laboratory animal husbandry. The statute stipulates the level of suffering that is deemed acceptable, which animals are not allowed to be bred (including dwarf dogs which, when they reach adulthood, weigh less than 1500 g, cats whose front legs are extremely shortened (kangaroo cats), reptiles with enigma syndrome) (Art.10), and what characteristics and symptoms can lead to moderate or severe constraints on an animal’s wellbeing (deformation of skeleton, skull impacting teeth, eyes and respiratory capacities, among others). What loopholes exist? Although Switzerland has enacted many legal documents to ensure animal protection, the enforcement of these laws has not been sufficient. The Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office found that some slaughterhouses did not fully comply with the rules, especially in small-scale abattoirs. It is also important to note that state employed veterinarians depend on farmers for their job, and therefore find themselves in an obvious conflict of interest. Due to a lack of resources, some stages of the required procedure are not checked properly, especially during slaughter. Moreover, controls carried out by cantonal authorities are scarce (OPAn, Art. 213, Art. 215). Pet shops, for example, only have to be checked once a year, and if, after two consecutive years, no misconduct has been reported, the establishment can go unchecked for three years. Conclusion In conclusion, despite the substantial progress Switzerland has made from a legal perspective relating to the treatment of animals, it appears that there is still much room for improvement, in particular, when it comes to the transparent and effective implementation of protective laws and regulations. There are several ways the system could be improved to ensure the better treatment of animals. This might involve cantons carrying out controls with independent officials who visit farms frequently and always unannounced. Like the U.K slaughterhouses could put in place mandatory CCTV. Furthermore, if something is deemed unethical and illegal in Switzerland it should also not be permitted to be imported, this would include foie gras, frog legs and meat from animals not stunned before slaughter. Tier Im Recht (TIR) is a Swiss non-profit organisation, dedicated to helping animals through better animal welfare legislation. You can find more information about their work on their website . Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

The UK has been a pioneer of animal protection laws. In 1822, it passed the world’s first legislation, a limited measure protecting cattle, and protection has progressively increased since then. This week Advocates for Animals’ David Thomas summarises the centrepiece legislation in England and Wales. Protection now extends to animals in all sorts of situations – in the home, on farms, in entertainment, in the wild, during transportation and in laboratories. However, protection is piecemeal and is often limited by what is perceived to be in humankind’s interests. The law is no animal rights charter. England and Wales The Animal Welfare Act 2006 (AWA) covers vertebrate animals, essentially if they are of a domesticated species or under the control of humans. It therefore extends to farm animals, although they have separate legislation too. The authorities can extend protection to sentient invertebrates species. There are two main offences in AWA. The first is causing unnecessary suffering, or allowing it to be caused. Section 4 sets out non-exhaustive criteria of what is meant by ‘unnecessary’, such as: could the suffering have been reduced or avoided; did it benefit the animal or protect a person, property or another animal; was it proportionate given its purpose; and ‘was the conduct … in all the circumstances that of a reasonably competent and humane person’? The offence covers omissions as well as positive acts. Under section 9 , a person commits an offence ‘if he does not take such steps as are reasonable in all the circumstances to ensure that the needs of an animal for which he is responsible are met to the extent required by good practice’. This creates a positive duty to look after animals properly, not simply a negative one not to cause them harm as with section 4. An animal’s needs include a suitable environment and diet; ability to exhibit normal behaviour patterns; housing with, or apart from, other animals; and protection from pain, suffering, injury or disease. Similarly to section 4, the lawful purpose for which an animal is kept or used is relevant. In practice, that may diminish the protection, because other legislation restricts the extent to which an animal can exhibit natural behaviour or be free from pain. Section 9 does not prevent the humane destruction of an animal. Because the law regards animals as property, there is nothing to prevent an owner from (humanely) killing their perfectly healthy companion animal. Similarly, if someone deliberately injures someone else’s animal, as well as animal cruelty offences they commit criminal damage, a property offence. The maximum term of imprisonment for these offences is 6 months, although the Government has committed to increasing this to five years. A fine may also be imposed. The court can deprive a convicted person of ownership of an animal and disqualify them from involvement with animals. The authorities are given various other powers, for example to seize animals in distress. The authorities can also make regulations to promote welfare and issue codes of practice. Codes have been issued, for example, for farm animals, cats and dogs. Breach of a code is relevant to, but not determinative of, whether one of the main offences has been committed. In addition, the authorities can require particular activities involving animals to be licensed or registered. So, the Animal Welfare (Licensing of Activities Involving Animals) (England) Regulations 2018 require the keeping or training of animals for exhibition, the breeding of dogs, the boarding of cats and dogs and selling animals as companion animals to be licensed in certain circumstances. AWA does not apply to anything lawfully done to animals in laboratories under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. Similarly, it does not apply to ‘anything which occurs in the normal course of fishing’. Scotland and Northern Ireland Scotland and Northern Ireland are beyond the scope of this blog; however, in summary the nations have their own legislation, which is broadly similar to AWA. This is the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 and the Welfare of Animals Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 respectively. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This week, guest writer, Marine Baptista Rosa, explores animal protection laws in Finland. Despite its modest population of 5,5 million people, Finland is home to a vibrant animal protection advocacy movement. Animal justice is an increasingly present topic on university curriculums and in the political agenda. Finnish animal protection law Due to its membership in the European Union (EU), Finland’s national law on animal protection is bound by EU treaties and EU animal law. It also has its own domestic legislation. The most important national legislation on animal protection is the Animal Welfare Act , which applies to all animals. The Animal Welfare Act contains provisions on a variety of specific topics ranging from animal competitions, the keeping and care of animals in performances, circuses, and zoos to inspection rules. In addition to the Animal Welfare Act, Finland has special rules on hunting, fishing, veterinary medication, animal breeding, artificial propagation of animals, animal testing on vertebrates, animal transportation, gene technology, and nature conservation. For some examples, check out the Animal Transport Act , the Act on the Use of Animals for Experimental Purposes , and the Hunting Act , all of which have specific animal welfare provisions. Relevant authorities In Finland, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is the highest authority steering and controlling the enforcement of animal welfare legislation. Operating right under the Ministry, the Finnish Food Authority is the central government authority responsible for monitoring the wellbeing of animals used in agriculture. The Regional State Administrative Agencies oversee the compliance of the law in their respective regions. Finally, the main authorities controlling animal welfare control at the local level are municipal veterinarians, veterinary officers, animal protection supervisors, and the police. The future However, despite these protections, the active community and the fact 74% of Finnish citizens being opposed to fur farming activities , the country remains the world’s largest fox fur producer . The good news is that, in August 2020, the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), which is the largest political party in the country, and current Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s party, committed to working towards ending fur farming and fur sales in Finland within a reasonable transition period. Further to this, a group of Finnish lawyers and legal scholars - The Finnish Animal Rights Lawyers Society – has submitted a legislative proposal on fundamental animal rights to be included in the Constitution of Finland. The proposal aims at strengthening the legal status of animals in the Finnish Constitution. Social pressure proved effective on the historic stand against fur farming, although that was only a first step. Hopefully, civil demand might ignite even further strides for a better future for animals in Finland. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

600 million pigs are killed in China each year. If this number represented the average sized pigs, snout to tail, they would cover the distance between London and Beijing. And that’s just pigs, never mind the countless other animals slaughtered for the meat industry. This week’s guest writer who is located in China, will look at what legislation is in place to protect the welfare of animals in the People’s Republic. The overall picture China ranks Class E on the Animal Protection Index (API) , along with Ukraine, Pakistan and Nigeria. To put this in context, Belarus and Algeria are in class F and Iran and Azerbaijan are in the bottom ranking Class G. The UK is Class B. Chinese law does not recognise animal sentience. Farm animals The majority of China’s farm animals live in horribly overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. There are laws that were brought in for public health reasons that contain some welfare provisions, such as the Animal Husbandry Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended in 2015), but these largely focus on the protection of genetic resources rather than safeguarding individual animals. As the demand for meat continues to rise, according to Peter J. Li, ‘China has embraced intensive farming with associated practices that are being restricted or banned in other countries’ such as the EU. Fur farms Following coronavirus outbreaks on European mink farms, there has been at least passing discussion on how these animals are kept in countries including Denmark and Italy – and many farms have closed for good. In China, few regulations on fur farms exist , despite it being the world’s biggest fur producer. Perversely, the closure of European mink farms may well increase the demand from China. Wild animals In response to the outbreak of COVID-19 earlier this year, the National People’s Congress introduced a full ban on the trade of wildlife for the purpose of consumption . However, wild animals continue to be used and abused in the entertainment industry, as pets and as ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine, the latter being legitimised through a permit system. When the practice of extracting bear bile generates more than 10 billion Chinese Yuan profit every year, it comes as no shock that the practice has not yet been prohibited or any restrictions placed on how the animals are kept. That said, in a landmark decision which came into effect at the end of 2017, China banned the domestic ivory trade (a worldwide multi-billion yuan industry). So, perhaps there is hope for the bile-bears yet. Domestic animals As more and more people are choosing to keep pets, China’s Ministry of Agriculture recently reclassified dogs as ‘companion animals’ rather than livestock. Moreover, in April, 2020, the city of Shenzhen banned the sale and consumption of both cat and dog meat . Animal testing Also in 2020, the Chinese National Medical Products Administration put an end to mandatory animal tests on imported cosmetics, having already done so for domestically produced products. The future So long as China fails to recognise animal sentience the future looks bleak for the way animals are kept, transported and slaughtered. The coronavirus epidemic brought unsanitary conditions in Chinese wet markets to the world’s attention and it may be that outside pressure will result in legally sanctioned change – particularly following the in-country investigation WHO have been permitted to carry out post-epidemic. On the other hand, we’ve been here before with SARS in 2003 and the issues were forgotten as the epidemic faded. On a more positive note, however more young people in China are recognising animal sentience and some are pushing for change. Only time will tell whether pressure from gradually changing public opinion and fear of further epidemics will prove sufficient to force new legislation. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .