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Deblase v Hill
- ediebowles
- Jun 19
- 3 min read
Updated: Jun 25
Deblase v Hill, Index No. 521147/2023 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, June 14, 2024)
Background
The case of Deblase v Hill was filed in Kings County Supreme Court, New York. It centres on the emotional and legal ramifications of a dog’s death after being struck by a car. The plaintiffs, Trevor Deblase and his mother, Nan Deblase, brought claims against Mitchell Hill, the driver involved in the incident. The case presents a novel legal question: whether New York’s 'zone of danger' doctrine can be extended to allow emotional distress claims arising from the death of a companion animal.
Facts
On July 4, 2023, Nan Deblase was walking her son’s dog, Duke, across a marked crosswalk in Brooklyn. Mitchell Hill, operating a vehicle, failed to stop at a stop sign and made an illegal turn, hitting and killing the dog. Nan, who was holding the dog’s leash at the time, was within physical proximity to the danger. She witnessed Duke’s death and claims to have feared for her own safety.
The plaintiffs assert:
Trevor Deblase suffered emotional distress and property loss due to the death of Duke.
Nan Deblase experienced emotional distress from the event, which occurred while she was in the 'zone of danger'.
Law
Under New York law, dogs are traditionally treated as personal property. Emotional distress claims for witnessing harm are generally restricted to plaintiffs who are:
Within the 'zone of danger' and
Immediate family members of a human victim (see Greene v Esplanade Venture).
The plaintiffs argue for an evolution of this rule, asserting that companion animals hold a special familial role and emotional value.
The defence moved to dismiss the claims, stating the current law does not permit emotional damages for the loss of a companion animal, nor does it recognise companion animals as qualifying victims under the zone-of-danger doctrine.
Decision
Nan Deblase was entitled to recover emotional distress damages under New York’s zone-of-danger doctrine after witnessing her son’s dog, Duke, being fatally struck by a vehicle while on a crosswalk. The court recognised that dogs may, in certain legal contexts, be considered as immediate family members.
Trevor Deblase’s claim remains pending; the decision did not yet finalise his recovery, pending a trial on damages.
Reasoning
Justice Maslow emphasised evolving societal and legal appreciation for companion animals. He found that treating Duke as mere personal property failed to reflect modern views 'based on facts and reason, not outdated legal fictions'.
The court acknowledged that Ms. Deblase was within the zone of danger and suffered foreseeable emotional harm.
It departed from older precedents, opting instead for a more flexible, compassion-driven approach consistent with amicus briefs supported by the Nonhuman Rights Project
Commentary
Whilst a very narrow holding; this case stands at the frontier of evolving tort law, addressing the growing public view of companion animals as family members rather than mere property. It also significantly broadens the scope of emotional distress claims in New York and influences national jurisprudence.
The outcome of Deblase v Hill is a landmark decision determining whether the legal system should adapt its treatment of non-human companions in personal injury and emotional distress contexts.
Getting advice
This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.
