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“Estrellita Monkey” case
“Estrellita Monkey” Case (253-20-JH)
Facts
On 27 January 2022 the Constitutional Court of Ecuador handed down its judgment (253-20-JH) in the case of Estrellita, the woolly monkey. The case concerned whether, and to what extent, an individual animal falls within the scope of the constitutional rights of nature framework established by Ecuador’s constitution, and the corresponding rights of wild animals as subjects of rights.
Estrellita was taken from the wild as a baby and raised in a human home as a pet for 18 years. In 2018, she was anonymously reported to the authorities, who in 2019 seized her and transferred her to a zoo on the grounds of possession of a wildlife specimen without authorisation [140].
In 2019, the claimant, who describes herself as the ‘mother and caregiver of Estrellita’ [24], filed a habeas corpus action, a legal order requiring Estrellita to be brought before a judge so the court could decide if it had been lawful to remove Estrellita from her custody [51]. Shortly after being transferred to the zoo, Estrellita died [46]. Upon finding out about Estrellita’s death, the claimant changed the writ of habeas corpus to request the delivery of her body [45]. Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the claimant’s habeas corpus action [47]; [49].
The case was then brought before the Constitutional Court, which selected it for consideration in order to establish binding jurisprudence on how Ecuador’s constitutional rights of nature framework applies to animals [2]. This represents a distinction in the Ecuador courts, where under paragraph 6 of Article 436 of the Constitution, cases do not need to be appealed to the Constitutional court but rather are selected by the court for review for the purpose of issuing a judgment that constitutes binding case law on a novel constitutional question. Ecuador was the first country in the world to include a rights of nature provision in its national constitution, and the court wanted to establish how this provision related to the individual rights of wild animals.
In its judgment the court sought to answer three questions:
(i) What is the scope of the rights of nature and is it possible for them to encompass the protection of a wild animal, such as a woolly monkey?
(ii) Were nature’s rights violated in the case of Estrellita?
(iii) What constitutional actions or guarantees are suitable for the protection of the rights of nature in general and for the case of Estrellita in particular?
Law
In 2008 Ecuador promulgated a new constitution that for the first time in any nation’s constitutional tradition recognised the rights of nature. In particular, Article 71 stated that:
Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. Any person, community, people or nationality may demand from the public authority the fulfillment of the rights of nature.
Critical to Estrellita’s case, therefore, is the fact that the Ecuadorian Constitution goes beyond classical anthropocentrism, instead embracing a ‘socio-biocentrism grounded in [Ecuador’s] ancient roots and the contributions of the pluralism and interculturality of the diverse peoples who make up Ecuador’ [56]. Consequently, under Ecuador’s constitutional law, nature is viewed as a subject of rights possessing intrinsic value; that is, ‘an end in itself, rather than merely a means to achieve the ends of others’.
Decision
(i) What is the scope of the rights of nature? Is it possible for them to encompass the protection of a wild animal, such as a woolly monkey?
Applying the rights of nature constitutional framework to wild animals, the court found that ‘it is evident that animals in Ecuador enjoy special constitutional and legal protection, given the value that the Constitution places on nature shares a common axiological foundation with animal rights’ [94].
Importantly, the court held that these rights extend not only to nature as the ‘universality of beings, phenomena and biotic and abiotic elements that coexist’, but also to nature in each of its singular elements, such as a forest, a river, or a wild animal whose species is threatened, which may each also be an individual rights holder [66]. Further, the court affirmed that the rights of nature in Ecuador not only protect general species but also particular animals, since ‘it would not be possible to recognise the intrinsic value of nature as a whole and neglect to give the same value to its elements’ [125].
As a result, the court determined that, among other rights, wild species and individual animals of a wild species, have the right not to be hunted, fished, captured, collected, extracted, kept, retained, trafficked, traded or exchanged. Likewise, they have the right to the free development of their animal behavior, which includes the guarantee not to be domesticated and not to be forced to assimilate human characteristics or appearances, including the ability to behave according to the instincts and behaviours characteristic of their species and to develop their biological cycles, processes and interactions freely [112]. The court made clear that the rights to which it referred are not exhaustive, and may be developed over time [96]. As a result, the court held that the domestication, humanisation and pet-keeping of wild animals may directly interfere with the rights of nature [116]–[119].
As a result, the court found that it was possible for an individual animal such as Estrellita to be protected by the rights of nature, because her life and physical integrity may be seriously harmed by humanising treatment or interference with her habitat [120]. The court further held that the rights of wild animals such as Estrellita are fully justiciable [121].
ii) Were the rights of nature violated in the case of Estrellita?
The court found that Estrellita’s rights, and consequently the rights of nature, were violated at three stages: (i) when she was removed from her natural habitat and kept in a domestic environment [134]; (ii) when she was seized by the authorities [145]; and (iii) when she was subsequently placed in a zoo [145].
The court found that the claimant’s humanisation and keeping of Estrellita over an 18-year period was incompatible with her right to life and integrity, particularly given her species-specific needs and the circumstances in which she was found [134]. The court further held that the seizure and transfer of Estrellita also violated her right to integrity because the authorities failed to assess her individual circumstances, including the effects of her prolonged captivity and humanisation [142]-[143].
The court decided that while the precise cause of Estrellita’s death was disputed [153], the physical conditions that contributed to her death – including malnutrition, body conditions resulting from an inadequate environment, stress levels, etc. – were the result of the actions or omissions of both the claimant and the state entities involved in her seizure and captivity in the zoo [154].
(iii) What constitutional actions or guarantees are suitable for the protection of the rights of nature in general and for the case of Estrellita in particular?
The court did not order Estrellita’s return to the claimant because returning Estrellita to the claimant’s house meant continuing to subject Estrellita to captivity and therefore to deprive her of freedom [172]. Further, the court also held that the habeas corpus was inadmissible because it revolved around the recovery of the corpse of a wild animal, which requires phytosanitary treatment carried out by authorities and competent persons [177]. Notwithstanding the habeas corpus being inadmissible, the court also held that the lower courts should have referred the apparent rights violations to the Ombudsman for appropriate action, particularly given that the sequence of events ultimately led to Estrellita’s death [178].
Instead of ordering Estrellita’s return, the court ordered the Ministry of Environment to develop a protocol to assess the circumstances and needs of captive wild animals to guarantee their protection. Furthermore, the court ordered the Ombudsman and National Assembly to prepare and approve a bill on the rights of animals, based on the rights and principles developed in the judgment. [182]-[183].
Commentary
While the Constitutional Court chose to decide the merits of the case, this was done under an exception to usual procedure because the court considered that the scope of the review was sufficiently limited to the facts of the selected case and that the procedural record was sufficient [22]. The main objective of the court’s decision was to issue rulings that constitute binding jurisprudence in the constitutional proceedings selected for review [20].
Most countries, such as the UK, protect wild animals primarily through animal welfare and conservation legislation rather than by recognising animals as holders of constitutional rights in their own right. Some jurisdictions have gone further in recognising the legal status of animals: for example, courts in Argentina, India and Colombia have recognised forms of non-human personhood or individual legal protection for particular animals. However, Ecuador's judgment is distinctive in that its Constitutional Court expressly recognised individual animals as subjects of constitutional rights under the country’s rights of nature framework, rather than limiting constitutional protection to animals collectively, their species or the ecosystems of which they form a part.
The ruling is further significant because it not only elevated the legal status of non-human animals under Ecuador’s existing constitutional rights of nature but it also led to the creation of new legislation in Ecuador being drafted to protect the rights of animals, building on and expanding Ecuador’s rights of nature framework to make clear that its protections extend to animals. The court directed the Ministry of Environment, with the support of the Ombudsman’s Office, to develop legislation implementing the rights recognised in the judgment.
Internationally, the judgment has also been identified as an important precedent in the developing dialogue concerning animal rights and the rights of nature, as well as a significant development in the constitutional recognition of individual animal rights.
Getting Advice
This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact: info@advocates-for-animals.com.
