Menschen für Tierrechte Baden-Württemberg e.V. v State of Baden-Württemberg

Link to judgment: https://www.bverwg.de/230426U3C2.25.0

Factual background 

‘BVerwG 3 C 2.25’, the judgment of 23 April 2026, was handed down by Germany’s Federal Administrative Court, the highest federal court in Germany for administrative matters. 

The claimant was a German animal rights organisation, Menschen für Tierrechte Baden-Württemberg e.V., which literally translates to People for Animal Rights Baden-Württemberg.  The defendant was the State of Baden-Württemberg. The interested party was the operator of a turkey-fattening farm (“the turkey farm”).

The claimant applied to the animal welfare authority for an order prohibiting the turkey farm from keeping turkeys, either entirely or in respect of particular breeds, alleging that the farm had committed serious violations of animal welfare law. The defendant rejected this application on 10 November 2017, finding that no serious violations of animal welfare law had occurred. The claimant subsequently challenged this refusal before the Stuttgart Administrative Court, challenging the defendant’s refusal to intervene.  By a judgment of 31 October 2018, the Administrative Court dismissed the claimant’s claim as inadmissible [3]. 

The claimant then appealed the Administrative Court’s decision to the Higher Administrative Court, which ruled in an interlocutory judgment of 3 November 2021 that the claim was admissible. In its subsequent judgment of 7 March 2024, the Higher Administrative Court partially upheld the claimant’s appeal, setting aside the defendant’s refusal and ordering it to reconsider the claimant’s application for animal welfare intervention in accordance with the court’s legal findings, and to and to take appropriate enforcement action to remedy the identified breaches of section 2(1) of the German Animal Protection Act. However, it refused to order a prohibition on turkey keeping [4], [13]. 

The defendant then appealed against the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment to Germany's Federal Administrative Court, with the claimant also bringing a cross-appeal.

The defendant’s grounds were that:

(i) The Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the claimant's claim was admissible because the claimant lacked standing to bring the proceedings [6].

(ii) The Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm [6]. 

The claimant's cross-appeal sought to overturn the Higher Administrative Court's refusal to order a prohibition on turkey keeping at the farm, rather than merely requiring the defendant to reconsider what enforcement action to take [4], [45].

The law 

Tierschutzgesetz (Germany’s Animal Protection Act, “APA”)

The APA is Germany’s principal legislation governing animal welfare, establishing general obligations for the protection, care and keeping of animals, as well as powers for the competent authorities to enforce those requirements.

Section 2 of the APA establishes general animal welfare obligations for anyone responsible for keeping or caring for animals. Section 2 No. 1 (“section 2(1)”) specifically requires anyone who keeps, cares for or is responsible for an animal to feed and care for it appropriately according to its species and needs, and to house it in a manner appropriate to its natural behaviour.

Section 16a(1), sentence 1 (“section 16a”) of the APA states that the competent authority must issue the orders necessary to remedy established violations of animal welfare legislation and prevent future violations. 

Section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 1 separately empowers the competent authority to order, in individual cases, the measures necessary to ensure compliance with section 2.

Section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 3 empowers the competent authority to prohibit a person from keeping or caring for animals of a particular species or any species where that person has repeatedly or seriously breached section 2, an order made under section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 1, or regulations made under section 2a, thereby causing significant or prolonged pain or suffering, or significant harm, to animals in their care. Such a prohibition may be imposed where there are grounds for believing that further violations will occur. Alternatively, the authority may make the keeping or caring for animals conditional upon obtaining an appropriate certificate of competence.

Section 2a(1) of the APA authorises the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture, with the consent of the Federal Council, to make secondary legislation specifying the animal husbandry requirements imposed by section 2, insofar as necessary for the protection of animals. In particular, section 2a(1) No.2 empowers the Ministry to prescribe requirements concerning the premises, cages, enclosures and other facilities used to house animals, as well as the design and construction of tethering, feeding and watering equipment. 

Judgment

(i) Whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the claim was admissible 

The Federal Administrative Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the Higher Administrative Court’s finding that the claimant’s claim was admissible [12]-[13].

In its interlocutory judgment of 3 November 2021, The Higher Administrative Court had ruled that the claimant's claim was admissible under Baden-Württemberg's legislation granting recognised animal welfare organisations the right to bring proceedings [13]. 

Although the defendant continued to contest the claimant’s standing to challenge its refusal to take enforcement action against the turkey farm, the Federal Administrative Court held that the question had already been conclusively determined. Neither the defendant nor the turkey farm had challenged the refusal of permission to appeal against the 2021 interlocutory judgment. Consequently, that judgment had become final and binding on the Federal Administrative Court, which could not reconsider the claimant’s standing [13].

(ii) Whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm

In considering whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm, the Federal Administrative Court considered a number of arguments put forward by the defendant: 

• whether there was an adequate legal basis to require enforcement action; 

• whether section 2 applied differently to intensive farming systems; 

• whether the court was prevented from determining the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys in this context; 

• assessment of the evidence and interpretation of the applicable husbandry requirements;

• Whether the housing conditions breached section 2(1);

• Whether, following the finding of a breach, the defendant was legally obliged to intervene or retained discretion not to do so; and

• Whether the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was enforceable and compatible with the farm operator’s constitutional rights.

(a) Whether there was an adequate legal basis to require enforcement action

Section 2 of the APA establishes general animal welfare obligations concerning the keeping and care of animals, while section 2a authorises the adoption of secondary legislation specifying the requirements necessary to comply with those obligations. 

The defendant argued that, in the absence of regulations made under section 2a specifying the husbandry requirements applicable to fattening turkeys, section 2 alone was insufficiently precise to establish that the farm’s housing conditions were unlawful or to provide a sufficient legal basis for enforcement action. Accordingly, it contended that the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to intervene against the farm [6]. 

The Federal Administrative Court rejected this argument, holding that section 2(1), read together with section 16a of the APA, provided a sufficiently precise legal basis for enforcement action against the farm. The court emphasised that, although secondary legislation made under section 2a could clarify those statutory requirements, the absence of such legislation did not prevent the obligations imposed by section 2 from applying or being enforced [16]-[17]; [19]. 

(b) Whether section 2 applied differently to intensive farming systems 

The court made clear that the statutory obligations under section 2 applied equally to intensive livestock farming and that the widespread use of particular husbandry practices did not prevent their lawfulness from being assessed against those obligations [20]–[21]. 

The complexity of the matter and the need to balance differing interests, as cited by the defendant, also did not change the way in which section 2 applied to the turkey farm[21].

(c) Whether the court was prevented from determining the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys in this context

In order to determine whether the turkey farm had breached section 2(1), the Higher Administrative Court assessed the evidence concerning turkeys’ species-specific needs and determined whether the farm’s housing conditions satisfied the general statutory requirements.

The defendant argued that the court could not itself determine the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys because there is not a scientifically recognised assessment criteria for conventional turkey farming. In response, the court referred to the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 23 October 2018 ( 1 BvR 2523/13 et al. – BVerfGE 149, 407) which determined at [19] that ‘if no delegated legislation exists to specify how legal requirements are to be assessed, authorities and courts must directly make use of findings developed by scientists and experts to clarify these specialist elements’ [21]. 

(d) whether the court erred in how it came to its decision about the husbandry requirements 

The court looked at both the validity of the factual findings and legal interpretation adopted by the Higher Administrative Court in reaching its conclusion. 

The Federal Administrative Court concluded that the Higher Administrative Court's factual findings were legally sound. In particular, it was entitled to rely on an independent expert report and the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, rather than treating the 2013 Turkey Standards or the assessments of official veterinarians as conclusive [25]–[30]. 

The court also clarified the proper interpretation of section 2(1), specifically how the word ‘appropriately’ should be interpreted within the provision’s requirement that animals should be housed ‘appropriately’.

The Federal Administrative Court held that the requirement to house animals ‘appropriately’ under section 2(1) of the APA means that housing must be appropriate to the animals’ species-specific needs. Restrictions on the fulfilment of those needs are permissible only where they serve a legitimate human interest, such as the keeper’s interest in minimising the effort required to meet the animals’ needs, and that interest outweighs the animals’ welfare needs. 

The court explained that this would be the case where the costs or effort associated with alternative housing arrangements would be so substantial, and the resulting welfare improvements so limited, that implementing those alternatives could not reasonably be expected of an average animal keeper [34].

(e) Whether the housing conditions breached section 2

Applying this interpretation to the turkey farm’s husbandry system, the Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court’s finding that the housing conditions of the interested party breached section 2(1) of the APA. The court emphasised the combined effects of stocking density, group size and inadequate housing structures on the turkeys’ fundamental resting and social behaviours, finding that these conditions significantly impaired their ability to meet their species-specific needs [39].

The court further held that, although the necessity of beak trimming did not, in itself, establish that the housing conditions were inappropriate under section 2 No. 1, it was a relevant consideration when assessing their lawfulness. The court emphasised that priority should be given to improving housing conditions rather than adapting animals to commercially convenient husbandry systems through amputation [39]. 

The court also concluded that the turkey farm’s economic interest in minimising the effort required to meet the animals’ needs did not outweigh the significant impairment of the turkeys’ welfare needs. It considered that improvements could be achieved through economically reasonable measures,  such as better housing structures, additional resting and hiding opportunities, and reduced stocking densities [40]. 

(f) Whether, if there had been a breach the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm

After concluding that the turkey farm’s housing conditions had breached section 2(1), the court then considered whether this meant that the defendant had been required to intervene against the turkey farm, or if the defendant still retained a discretion not to do so. 

The Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court's finding that the defendant was required to intervene against the turkey farm. Given the established breaches of section 2 No. 1 APA, the defendant was not entitled to remain inactive. However, it retained discretion to determine the appropriate enforcement measures under section 16a(1) APA [41]–[42].

The court explained that neither the administrative nor judicial proceedings had established the costs and benefits of the available enforcement measures. It was therefore for the defendant to determine which measures should be imposed to remedy the unlawful housing conditions, in accordance with the Higher Administrative Court’s findings [42]. 

(g) Whether the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was enforceable and compatible with the farm operator’s constitutional rights

Finally, the Federal Administrative Court considered two further arguments advanced by the defendant. Firstly, it rejected the argument that the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was insufficiently precise to be enforceable, holding that it clearly established the authority’s obligation to intervene while leaving the choice of enforcement measures to its discretion [43]. Secondly, it held that requiring enforcement action did not unlawfully interfere with the farm operator’s constitutional freedom to pursue an occupation under Article 12(1) of the German Basic Law, as the authority retained discretion to take the operator’s legitimate interests into account [44]. 

The claimant’s cross-appeal

The Federal Administrative Court also dismissed the claimant’s cross-appeal seeking an order requiring the defendant to prohibit turkey keeping at the farm, rather than merely reconsider its decision on enforcement action, as inadmissible. This was because the claimant had previously unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of permission to appeal  [45]-[46] and the claimant had failed to provide adequate grounds for its cross-appeal, largely repeating its earlier arguments without sufficiently identifying any violation of federal law [47]. 

Outcome 

The Federal Administrative Court therefore dismissed the defendant’s appeal and rejected the claimant’s cross-appeal as inadmissible. The Higher Administrative Court’s judgment therefore remained in force, requiring the defendant to take enforcement action to address the unlawful turkey housing conditions while retaining discretion over the particular measures to be imposed. 

The court ordered the claimant to bear half of the judicial costs of the appeal proceedings, with the defendant and the turkey farm each bearing one quarter.  

Commentary 

The judgment is relevant to the development of animal welfare law interpretation and enforcement. 

Although the decision is not binding on UK courts, it provides a useful comparative perspective on the interpretation and enforcement of broadly expressed statutory animal welfare obligations. This is particularly relevant given that aspects of the farmed animal welfare regimes in both jurisdictions have been influenced by common EU requirements. 

It is also relevant that the court found that the APA applied equally to intensive farming systems as to other farming systems, notwithstanding the commercial and economic interests in those systems. Further, the court’s insight that just because a particular husbandry practice is standard or widespread, this does not prevent them from being found to be unlawful.   

Finally, the approach of the court in this decision to the scientific evidence on turkey husbandry systems is also interesting when compared with the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal in The Humane League UK v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2024] EWCA Civ 1560 (“the Humane League”). In The Humane League, the court accepted that the question of whether fast-growing chicken breeds could lawfully be kept under paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 depended on contested scientific evidence which was not appropriate for determination in those judicial review proceedings [2]-[3]. By contrast, the German Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court’s reliance on independent expert evidence to establish the welfare needs of turkeys and determine whether the particular housing conditions breached the APA. This comparison illustrates the different procedural contexts in which scientific evidence may be examined by courts in different jurisdictions.

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