The agricultural industry is a key pillar of New Zealand’s economy and this industry benefits from the perception that the country has rigorous and effective animal welfare regulation. This week guest writer Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere of the University of Otago will explore the main piece of legislation that governs animal welfare in New Zealand. Introduction The Animal Welfare Act 1999 (AWA) is at the centre of that regulatory framework, and imposes duties of care on all those who own or are in charge of animals, as well as prohibiting their ill-treatment, providing a framework for the use of animals in testing, teaching and research. The act operates alongside other legislation, such as the Dog Control Act 1996 and the Wildlife Act 1953, but by far is the most important legislation relating to animals in New Zealand. In addition to its general provisions (outlined below), the AWA also provides for the creation of supplementary regulations such as the Animal Welfare (Care and Procedures) Regulations 2018 which creates offences involving the use, care and protection of specific animals. It also provides for codes of welfare, which impose minimum standards and best practices for certain animals, practices, or industries. While regulations are directly enforceable, evidence of failure to meet the standards in relevant codes may only be used to support prosecutions under the act, with evidence of following codes also being a defence. What animals are protected under the act? Animal is defined widely in the act, as encompassing all mammals, birds, reptiles, certain fish, octopus and squid, lobster, crab, and crayfish. Animal extends to any unborn animal in its last half of gestation. This definition can be extended by the Governor-General. What does the act cover? The AWA operates in two main parts. Part 1 sets out obligations of those who own or in charge of animals to care properly for their welfare. Part 2 sets out general provisions relating to ill-treatment against animals. Persons in charge of animals is defined in s 2 as anyone who has an animal in their possession or custody, or under their care, control, or supervision. This broad definition helps to ensure accountability where several persons are supervising an animal. What is an ‘owners’ responsibility towards an animal? Section 10 in part 1 of the AWA creates a duty for all owners and persons in charge of animals to ensure that animals physical, health and behavioural needs are met in accordance with good practice and scientific knowledge. Physical, health and behavioural needs is defined in s 4 as including proper and sufficient food and water; adequate shelter; the opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour; appropriate physical; and protection from, and the rapid diagnosis of, any significant injury or disease. These needs mirror those articulated in the Five Freedoms, and the requirements vary depending on the species, environment, and circumstances of the animal. Owners and all persons in charge of an animal must also under s 11 ensure that animals receive treatment to alleviate any unreasonable or unnecessary pain or distress. There is no requirement that an animal is kept alive, only that it is killed without unnecessary pain or distress, reflecting animals’ status as chattel property in New Zealand. What ill treatment is prohibited under the act? Ill- treatment is defined in s 2 as any act or omission causing pain or distress that is in its kind, degree, or object, or in the circumstances as inflicted, unreasonable or unnecessary. Part 2 has a hierarchy of offending involving ill-treatment of animals. Section 28 prohibits wilful ill-treatment and resulting in permanent disability, death, or serious injury or impairment requiring veterinary attention. Section 28A prohibits reckless ill-treatment in the same manner. Section 29 prohibits ill-treatment simpliciter, a strict-liability offence requiring no mens rea but with a series of statutory defences available in s 30 of the act. Section 30A expressly extends these penalties to the wilful and reckless ill-treatment of wild animals and animals in a wild state. The punishments for ill-treatment mirror the hierarchy of seriousness, with a conviction for wilful ill-treatment being punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment and/or a fine. Is animal testing covered under the act? Part 6 of the AWA details the regulations for animal testing, teaching and research. Animal testing, teaching and research requires an approved code of ethics and an ethics committee to oversee the project, in accordance with the 3Rs. The use of animals in testing, teaching and research is not limited by parts 1 and 2 but failing to comply with part 6 enables liability under parts 1 and 2. How is the act enforced? Finally, the AWA also provides for the appointment of animal welfare inspectors with powers to investigate animal welfare and enforce the AWA. Inspectors’ powers include being able to enter certain land, take steps to mitigate animal suffering, and apply to the district court for enforcement orders and serve notices to comply with the act. The current appointed inspectors are the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI), the RNZSPCA and the Police, although enforcement is, in practice, undertaken by the MPI for agricultural animals and the RNZSPCA for companion animals. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Saint Lucia has a long-standing reputation for being a luxurious holiday destination; boasting breath-taking landscapes and diverse marine ecosystems, visitors are promised the experience of a lifetime in this small corner of the Caribbean. This week, guest writer and postgraduate law student, Jenna Green will consider whether the established rhetoric regarding Saint Lucia’s status as a paradise coincides with its approach to animal protection laws. Animals Act At present, animal rights laws in Saint Lucia are governed by the Animals Act 2005 (AA 2005), also contained within the Revised Laws of Saint Lucia (2019). The act has a predominant focus on 'the prevention of cruelty to animals, the seizure and impounding of stray animals, the proper control of animals and for related matters'. Dog specific legislation A key focus of the act is the governance of obligations pertaining to the ownership, importation, breeding, and registration of dangerous dogs. Such regulations include the prohibition of persons under 18 years of age owning or transporting a dangerous dog, and that such dogs must be securely fitted with a muzzle when away from their place of residence. The listed attributes of these animals include, but are not limited to, dogs over 20kg, fighting dogs, Dobermans, Ridgebacks, German Shepherds, and any other dog deemed dangerous by the Minister of local government. Upon assessment of this, it is apparent that the qualifying conditions are arbitrary, with an apparent bias against larger breeds. Much like with the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 of England, Wales and Scotland, breed-specific legislation could be argued as negating the importance of responsible dog ownership. Furthermore, sections 31-33 AA 2005 regulate the ownership and registration of fighting dogs, despite the prohibition of ‘encouraging’ the baiting or fighting of dogs and bulls contained within section 6 AA 2005. Upon registering a fighting dog, the assigned registration number is branded onto the pinna of the animal’s ear; a particularly sensitive area of a dog’s anatomy, owing to the multitude of nerve endings contained within them. This directly contradicts the purpose of Part 2 of the act: the prohibition of cruelty to animals. General protections Animals found wandering around or on public highways may be seized and impounded, or even shot. Unfortunately, the reality is dogs, cats, goats and many more animals are regularly seen on highways and in public spaces. Furthermore, rather than the Government providing adequate solutions to Saint Lucia’s overpopulation of strays, there is a heavy reliance on organisations such as Helpaws ; a charity that rescues, adopts, and offers neutering for the abundance of dogs and cats. Saint Lucia’s status as a tourism hot spot has encouraged the provision of horse-riding experiences around the island. Whilst section 3(1)(b) prohibits the overloading of animals, many businesses offering such experiences fail to implement appropriate weight restrictions. Additionally, section 7 establishes that utilising animals in emaciated conditions for work purposes is an offence, and persons found guilty will be liable to a fine of $1,000. It is standard practice to tether horses around the island, with many relying solely on the grasses, herbs, and weeds for nutrition; something that may be considered substandard for their workload. Unfortunately, it is apparent that whilst there are restrictions pertaining to the maltreatment of animals in place, enforcement appears to be relatively lax. Finally, section 3(1)(b) establishes that any person who inflicts torture upon an animal is in direct violation of the act, and is liable to a fine of $1,000. Conclusion Whilst Saint Lucia has an established framework for animal protection laws, both enforcement mechanisms and sanctions need to be developed in order to generate an effective response to the maltreatment of animals. Additionally, there is considerable scope for addressing the root of the problem, be it overpopulation of stray animals or the reasons a dog may become dangerous. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Introduction Mongolia, population 3.27 million, is an East Asian country known among other things for its natural beauty, not least that of the Steppe. Guest writer James Hone will explore the legal framework for animals in one of the most sparsely-populated nations in the world and home to Earth’s coldest capital city, Ulaanbaatar, and many of the most endangered animal species. Mongolia has yet to be given a rating by the Animal Protection Index (API); however, World Animal Protection has developed a programme in Mongolia through collaboration with the IFRC and the Red Cross. Contextual and recent historical overview Before getting into some of the laws in detail, it should be said as background that Mongolia’s Constitution (which entered law in 1992) states under Article 6 that fauna “are subject to national sovereignty and state protection” and that “game is the property of the State”. Game in Mongolia includes wild boar, Siberian roe deer, grey wolves, blacktail gazelles, white gazelles, various birds (such as geese, ducks, pochards, grouse and cormorants) and various “Asian big game”, of which the main three are the Mongolian elk, Ibex, and Argali (a type of wild sheep). Fishing is also common in Mongolia, and the country’s various large fish species make it a popular destination in the international angling community. This makes regulation of hunting a core aspect of Mongolian animal protection law, as there is much to regulate. Two factors exacerbate this: (1) the large range of endangered and rare animals in Mongolia and (2) the emphasis on farmed animals to the Mongolian economy . The majority of animals farmed in Mongolia are “camels, horses, cattle (of which yak are considered to be a part), sheep and goats”. Forms of protection which came in in the late 20th Century include: The designation of various environments as “Strictly Protected”, meaning that hunting and development are prohibited; The designation of some environments as “National Parks”, thereby limiting access to ecotourists in some small areas and to local nomads for fishing and grazing otherwise; The creation of “National Reserves” or “National Monuments”, where development is prohibited so as to preserve endangered species and archaeological value. In 1995 the Law on Environmental Protection imposed state obligations to “prohibit the hunting and trapping of very rare animals”, “register and protect very rare animals and rare animals in the Red Book of Mongolia”, “conduct ecological education programmes” and “establish hygienically sound areas to ensure the protection of sources [of water]” (Article 19.2). In 2000 the Law on Hunting set out key permissions with respect to hunting (Articles 6-16): Game are permitted to be hunted all year round for specified purposes. Other animals are hunted only by special state licence or during a specified hunting period. Should these rules be violated, sanctions can be imposed (both civil and criminal ). In 2001 the Law on Animal Genetic Resources and Health Protection introduced regulations on “animal genetic resources, animal reproduction and animal health protection”. This covered pets for the first time. The 2001 law also dealt specifically with a series of ongoing administrative issues with respect to animal health, such as the proliferation of veterinary care and breeding services, with a view of upholding high standards. Key recent legislation Law on Animals 2012 The 2012 law can be viewed as both an update and a codification of much of what came before. With respect to which species can be hunted and when, it says that “very rare animals may be hunted or trapped with permission of the State central administrative body with the purpose of conducting scientific work only” (Article 7.1), that “rare animals may be hunted or trapped … with the licence issued by the SCAB for research, cultural, arts and treatment purposes, where citizens of Mongolia or foreign countries [have] paid special fees, and for the purposes of regulating herd structure of animals in certain territories and disinfecting focus areas of communicable diseases” (Article 7.2). As in the 1995 Law, hunting of certain kinds of animals is permitted only during specified seasons (an example is that badgers must be hunted between the 15th November and the end of January) (Article 9.1). With respect to how animals may be hunted, it bans various methods and weapons (Articles 10 and 11), most of them for reasons of not being designed for hunting specifically or being unduly cruel. Outside of hunting, the 2012 Law also lays out a great many other forms of protection. Article 6(1) includes: The setting of sanctions and restrictions for animal use The registration of rare and very rare animals in the Red Book and Appendices The retention of normal growth of animals and their range The protection of free migration paths for animals The protection of animal gene pools The determination of animal resources and regulation of their use The reintroduction of some animals and the prevention of extinctions due to commercial activity such as industrial development The taking of biotechnical measures The caretaking of sick animals, or animals who have endured disasters and other phenomena The conducting of scientific work designed to justify further measures The education of citizens and key stakeholders about the need for animal protection Law on Animal Health 2017 Whilst not an animal protection measure, it is included to provide insight into provisions that affect animals, such as a growing animal export trade. The 2017 law came in the aftermath of a prolonged collaboration between the FAO and the Mongolian Government in which the former set a series of goals with respect to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Later, in 2019, the FAO reported the 2017 reform as an overall success. The measures it took, which the EDA called “an important step towards compliance with international standards and a precondition for increased exports of livestock products”include: Veterinary services and legal framework both improved to support the development of the farmed animal sector. Consultation workshop on animal and veterinary public health and genetic resources. Five year action plan produced on controlling animal disease and a report produced on key measures to implement. Ascertaining from stakeholders the level of capacity of vets to handle their workload and what needs to be done to improve the situation. On-site visits of veterinary centres to understand functionality. The future Continued International Collaboration Catherine Arnold CBE has written for the FCDO about how the Mongolian authorities and UK government have been working together with ZSL to combat illegal animal trade in Mongolia, and in particular in the country’s capital, Ulaanbaatar. Such attempts are crucial to tackle the widespread nature of the problem in the country and may help to identify why it is that legal attempts to discourage the practice so far have been ineffective . This will be crucial if Mongolia is to tackle the areas in which the practice is growing, rather than merely continuing . Expanding Protection To More Animals Protection for farmed animals and companion remain extremely limited and so some organisations have focused on campaigning for them to have their own protections the way endangered animals do. Similar calls have come from those who advocate for assistance animals . Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

As a federal republic, the laws that protect animals in Mexico vary widely from state to state. Guest writer Kitty Tench will explore what this has meant for animal protection and whether there are any plans to improve standards. The current position The Federal Criminal Code of Mexico applies to all the states and the Federal District (Mexico City). There are no existing animal welfare stipulations here, and Mexico’s Federal law does not recognise animal sentience. However, there are some provisions in the law regarding animal care. The Federal Animal Health Act (2007) provides basic principles on animal welfare, with provisions referring to the Five Freedoms , although this is only in relation to preserving animal health, largely for the purpose of regulating goods of animal origin for human consumption. The General Wildlife Law (2000) contains some welfare provisions for wild animals. The Official Mexican Standards at Federal level also include some animal protection provisions. For example, the Official Mexican Law Norm-033-Zoo-1995 Humane Killing of Domestic and Wild Animals (' Norm-033 ') provides federal standards for the humane slaughter or anaesthesia of farm, domestic and wild animals, including the stipulation that farm and wild animals (used for human consumption) must be stunned before slaughter. As a Federal Republic, each state and the Federal District (Mexico City) has its own constitution and legislation, and most states have their own legislative provisions on animal welfare, although this varies widely . Some states have legislated extensively on animal welfare, such as the Federal District (Mexico City); following amendments in 2017, the Constitution of Mexico City formally recognises all animals as sentient beings . World Animal Protection considers recognising animals as sentient in legislation to set an important standard for animal welfare considerations in a jurisdiction. The state of Michoacán de Ocampo have also explicitly recognised all non-human animals as sentient beings under the Law of Rights and Protection for Animals (2018) , which also enshrines the Five Freedoms in law, so that cruel treatment such as deprivation of food and water is prohibited. Other states recognise animal pain and provide protections to varying degrees. The state of Campeche’s Animal Protection Act (1997) suggests an understanding that animals are capable of feeling pain, although these protections exclude invertebrates, and do not explicitly include wild animals. The state of Chiapas is even more limited in its protection of animals, as animal cruelty is not a criminal offence in any capacity in the state’s Penal Code. Why are animals in Mexico vulnerable? The absence of animal welfare stipulations in the Federal Criminal Code of Mexico (Código Penal Federal) leave animals vulnerable to abuse in states that have not produced comprehensive legislation that prohibits animal abuses. Currently, the only protection afforded to these animals lies in limited Federal provisions. The Federal Animal Health Act (2007) only considers animal welfare in relation to animal health provisions, so the requirements of the act are not comprehensive regarding the needs of animals in accordance with their capacity for physical and psychological pain. Also, overall responsibility for animal welfare in Mexico has not been assigned to a Government Ministry. The 2007 Act is overseen by the Ministry of Health, the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food; the General Wildlife Law (2000) is implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. There is therefore a lack of clarity, consistency and commitment to animal welfare issues in the implementation of legislation at the Federal level. Animal protection regulations under the Federal Standards, including Norm-033, are also limited. Federal Standards are not carefully constructed legislation based on principle and reason , and usually only provide regulations for specific circumstances. This does not provide a wide scope of protection to animals. Compliance to regulations is also unreliable due to the limited enforcement of the Federal Standards. Breaches to Norm-033, as well as breaches to the animal welfare stipulations of the Federal Animal Health Act (2007) are implemented by the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food, and are only punishable as an administrative offence. Punishments include the suspension of licences, closure of premises and a financial penalty. A breach to these regulations does not amount to a criminal offence. Violations to the General Wildlife Law (2000) are also punishable with fines and the suspension of licences. For some offences under the act, punishments available also include an administrative arrest of up to 36 hours, and community service relating to wildlife conservation. This act, however, only protects wild animals. While most state criminal codes contain animal welfare provisions prohibiting abuses to animals, penalties for such abuse are absent in Chiapas’ criminal code. While Chiapas has passed the Law for the Protection of Fauna (2014) which defines some acts of cruelty relating to pain and suffering, these acts of cruelty are not criminalised in the state’s Penal Code. Welfare considerations for animals in Chiapas are therefore only enforced according to Secretariat regulations, and the only deterrent for perpetrators of animal cruelty would be the punishments attached to administrative offences. Proposed changes In Mexico, Animal Equality has proposed a constitutional reform to grant the Congress of the Union the power to legislate on animal welfare issues. The legislation, presented by Animal Equality together with Federal Deputy Fausto Gallardo García of the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico, was approved on January 25th 2023 by the Constitutional Points Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. The Plenary of the Chamber of Deputies went on to approve the proposal on March 30th 2023, after Animal Equality presented 100,000 petition signatures in support of the changes to the Congress in the Union. The reform now awaits approval from the Senate of the Republic of Mexico. The proposed reform would amend Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States, specifically Fraction XXIX-G . This article currently grants Congress the power to legislate on environmental protection, preservation and restoration; the reform would manifest legislative separation of the environment and animals as different entities that require individualised consideration. This amendment would give Congress the express power to create a General Animal Welfare Law, which would mandate standards of animal welfare that must be applied across the Mexican states, regardless of state legislation. State law would be permitted to expand upon the points of animal protection within the General Law in their own legislation, but not to restrict these points. Animal Equality is also working on presenting a proposal to amend Article Four of the Mexican Constitution to the Senate. This article would be reformed to recognise any non-human animal with a complex nervous system as a sentient being. This is undoubtedly progress in favour of animals, which will lay the foundations and be an example for the entire country. This reform to the [Constitution] supports the idea that animals are sentient beings and we have obligations towards them. Dulce Ramírez, Animal Equality Vice President of Latin America Will animals be protected following the proposed constitutional changes? The key reform proposed by Animal Equality and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico is to change the Mexican Constitution to specifically grant Congress the express power to legislate on animal welfare issues. This change would make it possible for a General Animal Welfare Law to pass under federal jurisdiction, providing a foundation for animal welfare that would be obligatory at all legislative levels. This would allow for a new legally enforceable standard of protection for animals, consistent across all Mexican states. Animals living in states such as Chiapas, that currently provide no or very little welfare enforcements, would be protected by new welfare regulations. General laws originate in constitutional clauses, so once enacted, must be applied by federal, state and municipal authorities. General laws will also distribute powers to these three levels of government, establishing which authorities must regulate, monitor and apply various elements of the law. The Animal Protection Index (' API '), formulated by World Animal Protection, has given Mexico’s animal welfare policy and legislation a C ranking. The API report recommends, among other suggestions, that the Federal Government of Mexico creates a national multi-stakeholder committee to guide the country's policies and strategies on animal welfare to fall in line with international standards. A General Animal Welfare Law could allocate responsibility for such a committee to be created, and therefore improve animal welfare standards in Mexico as the API suggests it would. Animal Equality’s proposal to amend Article Four of the Mexican Constitution to recognise all animals with a complex nervous system as sentient beings in Mexico’s Constitution is significant, because, as a constitutional principle, law-makers would be obligated to consider the specific needs of animals according to their capacity to suffer when formulating animal welfare legislation. Enshrining the recognition of animal sentience also fulfils another one of the World Animal Protection’s API recommendations. Conclusion While amending Article 73 of the Mexican Constitution will not guarantee that a General Animal Welfare Law will be passed by Congress, the reform will provide the essential structure required to enact a General Law on animal welfare issues. Additionally, recognising animal sentience in the Mexican Constitution would create a constitutional principle that should improve animal welfare considerations in future legislative decisions. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Austria is an EU Member State, but its existing animal welfare legislation goes beyond that in many other member states. This week, guest writer Veronika Jancikova will provide an overview of the laws in Austria. National law The basis of animal welfare legislation in all nine individual states of Austria is the Animal Welfare Act 2004 , which defines animals as 'fellow creatures' (in the main applicable to all vertebrates, cephalopods and decapod crustaceans) and implicitly recognises animal sentience and prohibits the infliction of unjustified pain, suffering or injury to an animal. This act defines animals as 'fellow creatures' as those other than humans. The government has offered its support for the Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare (UDAW) and has incorporated the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) animal welfare standards into the country’s legislation. Additionally, the Austrian Constitution was amended in 2013 to include the protection of the life and well-being of non-human animals, adding that ‘the state protects the life and well-being of animals due to the special responsibility humans have for their fellow creatures’. Animals used in farming As an EU Member State, Austria must comply with EU law in relation to farmed animals. The duty of care provisions of the Austrian Animal Welfare Act 2004 apply to farmed animals, in addition to the general anti-cruelty laws of EU law. The Austrian government has also produced various other provisions in regards to the protection of animals in farming. Secondary legislation made under the Animal Welfare Act 2004, the First Regulation on Keeping Animals 2004 , sets minimum standards for the keeping of farmed animals, and the Animal Welfare Monitoring Regulation 2004 ensures regular inspections are carried out to monitor compliance. Austria has banned enriched cages for laying hens (in 2020) and has agreed to phase out the use of pig farrowing crates by 2033. Additionally, Austria banned long-distance (over 8 hours) international transport for live animals and limits domestic transport of live animals within Austria to 4.5 hours. The production of foie gras has also been banned, and decapod crustaceans also have legal protections, which is not common across the EU. Relevant authorities Legal responsibility for animal welfare primarily lies within the Federal Ministry of Health. In addition, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management works on animal welfare issues relating to farmed animals. Each state is also required to appoint an Animal Protection Ombudsperson whose role is to act as a non-governmental representative who acts independently in relation to animal welfare issues. What’s next? Whilst there are many ways in which Austria has led in the field of animal welfare legislation (as detailed above), the Austrian government still has the opportunity to lead by example, and to encourage other EU countries to enact detailed and robust animal protection legislation and policies which further protect animal welfare. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

From the iconic kangaroos to the wonderful sea creatures of the Great Barrier Reef, Australia is well-known for being home to a wide range of animals. Australia also has several introduced species such as horses, pigs, and sheep. So, when it comes to animal welfare in Australia, one might assume that all animals (both companion and working) are roaming happily across the vast lands. But is this really the case? This week, guest writer Jessica Tang, an Australian qualified solicitor, provides an introduction to the legal framework surrounding animal welfare in Australia.  Current legal framework  The legal framework protecting animals in Australia is complex, with a multi-layered governance system involving federal, state, and local law.  Despite animals being transported across states and territories daily, Australia does not have a national law on animal welfare. This may seem odd: having a single law throughout the country would likely create more consistency and simplicity for everyone involved. However, because of Australia’s Constitution , the Commonwealth (i.e.the country of Australia) has limited powers and can only enact legislation in certain specified fields - as set out in section 51 of the Australian Constitution . As a result, when it comes to animals and their welfare, the Commonwealth can only exercise power in the context of international treaties and external trade (e.g. live export and trade in wildlife). Instead, each state and territory exercises its residual power to enact legislation, and each has its own separate statutes, regulations, and industry guidelines relating to the welfare of animals. The relevant animal welfare statutes are: Animal Welfare Act 1992 (Australian Capital Territory)  (the ' ACT Act '); Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (New South Wales)  (the ' NSW Act '); Animal Protection Act 2018 (Northern Territory) ; Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Queensland) ; Animal Welfare Act 1985 (South Australia) ; Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tasmania) ; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Victoria)  (the ' Victoria Act '); and Animal Welfare Act 2002 (Western Australia) , (the ' Animal Welfare Acts '). Generally, the Animal Welfare Acts make it an offence to commit an act of cruelty to an animal. In   Queensland  and Tasmania ,  the respective Animal Welfare Acts also impose a duty of care on the person in charge of an animal.  Whilst the broad offences are set out in the Animal Welfare Acts, the detail regarding applicable standards and requirements are contained in a series of National Model Codes of Practice. However, the intention is to replace these Model Codes with nationally agreed Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines  (the ' Standards and Guidelines ') In theory, the Standards and Guidelines would aim to achieve nationally consistent objectives, standards, and guidelines across different animal industries. Unfortunately, in practice, it is arguable that they don’t go far enough to uphold  animal welfare.  Concerns of the Standards and Guidelines can be outlined as follows: They only outline minimum recommendations for the proper care and management of animals and are not intended to define best practice; They largely operate to protect the interests of producers over the welfare of the animals; and Each state and territory is responsible for implementing the Standards and Guidelines, meaning, unless incorporated in the relevant laws of each jurisdiction, compliance is only voluntary and non-compliance with the Standards and Guidelines does not constitute an offence.  What is an ‘animal’? Most of the Animal Welfare Acts define an ‘animal’ as a live member of a vertebrate species such as an amphibian, reptile, bird, fish (subject to certain conditions), and mammal (excluding human). The definition of an ‘animal’ varies widely across the Animal Welfare Acts which can be demonstrated as follows: Cephalopods can be included as ‘animals’ in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland;  Crustaceans can be included as ‘animals’ in the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and Northern Territory; Other than fish eggs, live pre-natal or pre-hatched creatures in the last half of gestation or development are included as ‘animals’ in Queensland; and Fish are excluded as ‘animals’ in South Australia and Western Australia meaning that these animals are not protected at all from cruelty under the relevant Animal Welfare Acts.  Property status  Animals are classified as property in Australia. Under common law , domesticated animals are 'absolute property' and wild animals are deemed to be property only once captured or in the possession or control of a person. The status of animals as property is also reflected in legislation both at the federal and state/territory level.  For example, under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) , the definition of 'goods' includes animals. This fails to recognise animals as beings with feelings and their own interests, and is an obstacle to advocating for animals through the legal system. There is a strong community push to reform current legislation to recognise animal sentience more broadly and the Australian Capital Territory was the first (and remains the only) jurisdiction in Australia to recognise animal sentience, with the Australian Capital Territory Act reformed in 2019 to reflect that animals have the ability to 'subjectively feel and perceive the world around them ' .  At the time of writing, proposed reforms of the Victoria Act  have also been introduced to recognise animal sentience. And although recognising animal sentience does not completely overcome their legal status as property, it is a step towards distinguishing animals from mere objects under the law.  Animals in farms One of the most obvious issues in Australia is that many animals are simply excluded from protection under the Animal Welfare Acts. The Animal Welfare Acts differentiate between farmed animals (such as cattle) and companion animals (such as cats), with most basic protections only covering companion animals. For example, whilst section 9 of the NSW Act  makes it an offence to fail to provide an animal with adequate exercise, 'Stock Animals' (defined as cows, sheep, goats, deer, pigs, and domestic fowl) are expressly excluded. Further, young cows, sheep, goats, and pigs are all excluded from the offence of castrating an animal without anaesthetic under the NSW Act .  In addition, treatment of an animal has to be 'unreasonable', 'unnecessary' or 'unjustifiable' for a cruelty offence to be established in most jurisdictions (for example, section 4(2) of the NSW Act ). These qualifications are subjective and can protect producers. For example, if cruel farming practices are seen as necessary to create food supply for humans, then such cruel farming practices would not constitute a cruelty offence under the relevant Animal Welfare Act.   It is also worth noting that responsibility for regulating animal welfare is delegated to the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, as well as the equivalent departments of Primary Industry and Agriculture in each state. This means that the same department that is responsible for the welfare of farmed animals is also responsible for the profitability of primary industries based on the exploitation of such farmed animals. These two functions are incompatible in nature and economic interests normally take precedence over the welfare of the animal.  Introducing independent offices of animal welfare, solely devoted to promoting animal welfare and with a responsibility to report directly to Parliament (rather than being contained in other governmental departments with conflicting interests and priorities) has long been campaigned for in Australia as a solution to this issue.  At the time of writing, the Independent Office of Animal Welfare Bill 2023 (South Australia)  has been introduced, which intends to establish in South Australia the first such independent office of animal welfare. Animals used for scientific purposes There is specific legislation in each state and territory in Australia, which deals with the use of animals for scientific purposes, either through their respective Animal Welfare Statutes (for example, sections 25 to 36 of the Victoria Act ) or separate legislation (for example, the Animal Research Act 1985 (NSW)  and the Animal Research Regulations 2021 (NSW) ).  Further, at the Commonwealth level, the Australian Code for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes  (the ' Code ') must be complied with for all research conducted in Australia that is funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council. The Code has been incorporated into legislation in each of the states.  The Code applies the ‘3Rs’ principle to animal experimentation: (i) the replacement of animal usage with alternatives; (ii) the refinement of procedures to safeguard animal welfare; and (iii) the reduction of the number of animals used. However, as noted above, any potential offence can be rebutted if an animal’s suffering is deemed to be necessary. Therefore, if the experiment can be shown to have a human benefit, it could be deemed ‘necessary’, resulting in procedures that cause harm to animals being permitted.  Cosmetic testing on animals is banned in Australia under the Industrial Chemicals Act 2019 (Cth)  (' ICA 2019 '). Under ICA 2019, new ingredients that are exclusively used in cosmetic products (e.g. eyeshadow) that are either manufactured in Australia or imported into Australia are not permitted to use information derived from animal testing to prove that the product is safe for humans.  However, a chemical ingredient may still be tested on animals if the ingredient is also intended to be used in a non-cosmetic product. This loophole defeats the purpose of the legislation and means that certain ingredients in Australian cosmetics can still be tested on animals. Animals in exhibitions The laws surrounding zoos, aquariums and marine parks also vary across the different states and territories. In NSW, the Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 (NSW)  and the Exhibited Animals Protection Regulation 2021 (NSW)  govern how animals can be exhibited and the requirements for licences, approvals and permits. The latter provides several standards that animal exhibitors must comply with.  To improve national consistency, the Agricultural Ministers Forum endorsed the Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Exhibited Animals in 2019 , which contains standards for the welfare of animals used for exhibition purposes. They include general standards and guidelines and specific standards and guidelines for the exhibition of koalas, wombats, kangaroos, wallabies, crocodilians and flightless birds. The standards apply to those who are responsible for caring and managing the exhibition of such animals and set out a minimum industry standard. However, the effect of these standards is largely dependent on each jurisdiction implementing them in their legislation. At the time of writing, most states and territories are still either in the process of implementing or considering these standards and guidelines.  Conclusion When thinking about the legal regime applicable to animals in Australia, it is important to understand the specific circumstances of the animal. An animal in Australia may find itself subject to different  legislation depending on: (i) what kind of animal it is; (ii) which context it finds itself in (e.g. farm, zoo or laboratory); and (iii) which state or territory it is in.  However, whilst there is still a long way to go to achieve animal justice in Australia, the current proposed reforms show that Australia is moving in the right direction.   Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Singapore comprises a mere 728 square kilometres of landmass and population of 5.6 million people. Located in Southeast Asia at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, its geographically advantageous position has aided in enhancing economic growth and securing itself as a world trade centre. Singapore has adopted a parliamentary system of government based on the Westminster model where the legal system is common law. This week's guest writer, Isabelle Bloomstein, will explore legislation pertaining to animal welfare on the small island city-state. Companion animals  The companion animal population of Singapore is on the incline, with a dog population of 114,000 in 2023 , a 3% rise from 2019. In 2023, reports of animal cruelty rose by an alarming 79%, reaching an eleven year high  with the majority of those comprising welfare and neglect cases linked to unsatisfactory living conditions. The increase is most likely due to a shift in mindset where people are more inclined to report instances of animal cruelty on social media, as opposed to an actual increase in the cases of animal cruelty. Legislation protecting the welfare of companion animals can be found under the Animal and Birds Act 1965 (as amended in 2014).  Section 41C establishes a positive duty of care; any owner, person in charge of an animal (whether temporary or permanent) must care for animals in accordance with the Codes of Animal Welfare issued by the Animals and Veterinary Service (AVS). The standard of care required includes the following:  the animal is provided with adequate and suitable food and water, taking into account its dietary needs; the animal is provided with adequate shelter; the animal is not kept in confinement, conveyed, lifted, carried or handled in a manner or position that subjects the animal to unreasonable or unnecessary pain or suffering; and the animal is protected from, and rapidly diagnosed with, any significant injury or disease. Section 42 of the Animal and Birds Act 1965  creates an offence of animal cruelty in instances where any person:  Physically beats, tortures, hurts or abets in hurting an animal. Terrifies or infuriates an animal. Causes unnecessary pain or suffering to an animal or, as the owner, allows the animal under their care to suffer.  Forces an animal to work when it is sick or otherwise unfit to do so.  Uses the animals in any capacity related to animal fighting activities.  Wild animals  Despite its modest land mass and dense population, the city- state is one of the greenest cities in the world. Thanks to government initiatives incorporating nature into the urban landscape and a focus on preserving natural reserves, Singapore leads the way as 1st in the Green Cities Index in Asia . That being said, biodiversity has suffered at the expense of rapid urbanisation, with a total of 37% of native flora and fauna having vanished.   The Wildlife Act (1965) , which covers any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish or invertebrate, whether of a wild nature or otherwise, is said to be an act for the protection, preservation and management of wildlife for the purposes of maintaining a healthy ecosystem and safeguarding public safety and health and for related matters. Under Section 5A-C, a person may not intentionally feed, release, kill, trap or keep any wildlife without first obtaining written permission to do so. However, in circumstances involving damage to property, Section 6 declares it not unlawful for the occupier to trap, kill or take wildlife that was found to be damaging property or crops on the land. The onus of proof lies on the person alleging the fact to prove that the wildlife did in fact cause damage.  Section 8  provides that a person may not offer for sale, sell or export (dead or alive) any wildlife without permission from the Director-General.  Under Section 9,  a person may not import any living wildlife into Singapore without approval.  Farm animals As for the welfare of farm animals, legislation is limited owing to the fact that land- scarce Singapore is almost entirely dependent on imports for its meat requirements, the majority of which is sourced from Brazil, Australia and the United States , who are the main suppliers of Singapore’s frozen beef and pork. Regulation of imported meat is governed by the Singapore Food Agency (SFA), a statutory board that sets out standards for food-related matters within the country.  Singapore does import live pigs from Malaysia  currently and previously Indonesia before an outbreak of African Swine Flu caused the cessation of shipments. These live pigs are processed at the only abattoir in the country.  Laws governing the welfare of animals intended for slaughter are mandated by the SFA under the Wholesome Meat and Fish Act 1999 . Under Section 42  of that act, the Minister may make rules, which has happened in the form of the Wholesome Meat and Fish (Slaughter- Houses) Rules . These rules relate to any animal intended for slaughter for meat products; they decree that all animals must be allowed sufficient rest and water before slaughter.  Specific conditions for different species have also been created, which include the following:  The Conditions of Licensing for Pig Slaughter Houses , which under Section 1.20, states that the method of slaughter shall be as humane as possible and approved by the Veterinary Authority. And under Section 6.3, approved stunning systems should be adopted.  The Conditions of Licensing for Poultry Slaughter Houses , which stated that  the method of sIaughter shaII be as humane as possibIe and approved by the SFA. It also dictates the chickens be stunned first with the appropriate voltage for their size before being slaughtered.  Animals involved in traffic accidents  The government has enacted regulations in relation to animals harmed by vehicles by way of amendments to Section 84 2A of the Road Traffic Act . The act now imposes an obligation on drivers to stop and seek help, but only where there is a reasonable belief the animals have an owner or where the animals poses a threat to other road users.  Conclusion  In line with increased growing sentiment for animals, legislation penalties for animal cruelty in Singapore have risen substantially in the last two decades.  In practice, the laws in place are only effective to the extent that they are enforced. In the period from 2019-2023, 1250 cases of alleged animal cruelty were reported. Of those, during 2019-2022 only 60 cases were found to be animal cruelty  with enforcement action taken. While this is progress in the right direction, there is still much that needs to change.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

A major barrier for activists in speaking out against animal oppression, or publicising the results of investigations, can be the threat of defamation proceedings. Those of us of a certain age will remember the 'McLibel' case. But, are defamation proceedings something you really need to worry about? Well, with a little foreknowledge, probably not. Guest writer and barrister Alan Robertshaw has set out a general, and hopefully practical, guide as to what defamation is; so you’ll be able to protect yourself from the threat of proceedings, but still be able to speak out or report. Definition of defamation Let’s start with what defamation actually is. Simply put, it’s publishing an untrue statement of fact about a person that would tend to make 'right minded' members of society think less of them. Now, to break that down a bit: Publishing means communicating to a third party; it doesn’t apply to personal conversations you can say what you want to someone’s face. Be careful though of inadvertently publishing to a third party. Make sure you can’t be overheard; and if you write to someone, or email them, mark the envelope or email header 'Private and Confidential. To be opened by addressee only.' That way, if the recipient allows someone else access to their mail, they’re deemed to have consented to the publication. You can be regarded as publishing someone else’s statement if you refer to it, or facilitate its dissemination; for instance by allowing comments on your website. There are special protections however in such circumstances. Untrue just has its everyday meaning. One unusual feature of defamation, is that generally it's for the Defendant (the person who made the statement) to prove it’s true. The Claimant (the person the statement was about) doesn’t have to prove it’s false. That’s counter to the usual rule in civil cases that it’s for the Claimant to prove their case. In civil cases the standard of proof is 'the balance of probabilities'; that’s just 'is it more likely than not?', which is often expressed as 'greater than 50%'. That’s very different to criminal law where the standard is 'So that you are sure' or, as they only say on TV, 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Statement is usually words; written or spoken; but it doesn’t have to be. Pictures , gestures, indeed any way of communicating can all amount to a statement. Placing someone’s waxwork next to the chamber of horrors was held to be defamatory; so who knows what the courts will make of memes? The statement has to be taken as a whole though; in the context of the entire publication. So, for example, a seemingly defamatory headline might in fact not be if the rest of the story puts it in its true context. Of fact means just that, opinions are fine. But be careful not to frame a factual allegation as an opinion; 'In my opinion, he’s a crook' is still a statement of fact. One safeguard is that 'mere vulgar abuse' can’t form a cause of action; so feel free to be as gratuitously insulting as you want. Person doesn’t just include humans. Why non human animals aren’t regarded as persons by the law, but corporations are, is a subject for another day (and one I welcome any opportunity to vent about) but there we are. Companies can’t claim hurt feelings of course, but they can claim for material loss. You don’t have to name the person. It can be enough if the public, or a section of the public, would know who you were referring to. Also, be careful when using names in fiction; you may accidentally give the villain of your work a real person’s name; and then they could sue. That happens quite a bit with fictional companies; so maybe do a bit of Googling first. The traditional advice to authors was to always say the bad guys were bad in bed so no-one would be tempted to say 'That’s clearly meant to be me!’. You can defame people by reference to a group but not if it’s a large group. So, 'Such and such legal firm are crooks!' could cause problems; 'All lawyers are crooks' is fine. Right minded is judged by the supposed standards of the day. Saying someone is gay or promiscuous is no longer defamatory for example, because no right minded person should care. The allegation must be taken with regard to the subject though. Saying you saw someone eat a bacon sandwich wouldn’t generally be defamatory but it could be if the person was an outspoken vegan. One area where this is relevant to activists might be an accusation that someone was a police informer. That could cause their peer group and friends to 'shun and avoid them' (a traditional test for defamation) but it wouldn’t be defamatory because 'right minded' people are deemed to support law and order. Think less of them refers to the fact that defamation is about reputation, not character. If someone is already held in low regard, they might not be able to bring a claim if the untrue statement couldn’t make people’s opinion of them any worse. The audience also matters. If the only people who became aware of the statement wouldn’t believe it anyway, then it’s probably not defamatory. Categories of defamation Defamation was traditionally separated into libel, slander, and malicious falsehood. Libel was where there was a ‘permanence’ to the statement, usually meaning it was in writing, whereas slander concerned more transient matters. That distinction is breaking down a bit in the digital age; with the courts regarding videos as libel and social media comments as slander. However, now that there’s a requirement to show actual serious loss in all forms of defamation, the distinction is less relevant. Previously, libel was actionable per se, even when there was no loss. Malicious falsehood is just a parallel form of defamation; the history of which is probably only of concern to lawyers. It is the cause of action companies often use though; and it has a slight practical significance in that, with malicious falsehood, the Claimant has the burden of proving the statement is false. Defences The principal defences to a defamation claim are: Truth; Honest Opinion, Publication on a matter of public interest, Operators of Websites, Peer reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals, and Reports protected by privilege. We can look at each of these briefly in turn. Truth - This seems fairly self explanatory. If something is true, then it can’t be a cause of action and, so long as the main allegations are true, it doesn't matter if you get a few details wrong if they don’t really add anything. Remember though, in libel or slander, it’s for you to prove that it’s true. You also have to be careful about exactly what you’re saying. 'Everyone says Joe Smith is an animal abuser' might be literally true but the underlying allegation is about the abuse and that’s the bit that you’d have to prove. And, contrary to what you see on TV, adding “allegedly...' doesn’t get you off the hook. Also, beware when a statement could have multiple meanings, some of them defamatory and others not. In libel and slander cases, courts apply a ‘single meaning’ test. That is, they ask how most people would interpret the meaning, regardless of how the publisher meant it. One of the differences with malicious falsehood is courts allow statements to have multiple meanings. So, if you can point to a non defamatory interpretation, you’re in the clear. Honest opinion - To raise this defence, you need to satisfy a three part test. The statement has to be an opinion, not an assertion of fact; you need to refer to the facts that caused you to form that opinion; although that only has to be in general terms, you don’t need chapter and verse; and the opinion has to be one that an honest person could come to if they knew the same facts. It doesn’t matter if someone else might have come to a different conclusion. The opinion has to be genuinely yours, though. The defence fails if you don’t actually think that; even if someone else reasonably could. Publication on a matter of public interest - This is perhaps the most useful defence for activists because it protects you not just in relation to opinion, but also when you make an assertion of fact. To qualify, the statement must have been made in relation to a matter of public interest; and you must have reasonably believed it was in the public interest to have made the statement. The courts look at all the circumstances and context when considering whether you were reasonable; and the reasonableness of your belief is assessed by an objective standard; but the law gives wide scope to what may be reasonable. Basically, courts regard just about any action as reasonable unless no reasonable person would have done it; and it doesn’t matter if most people wouldn’t have, so long as someone else might have. Of particular relevance to activism is that, if you’re commenting on legal proceeds that you’re a party to, you can pretty much say what you want without even considering whether it might be true; and courts are expressly forbidden from taking that into account when deciding if it was reasonable. The courts are also slow to interfere with editorial decisions about what is in the public interest. Operators of websites - The details of this defence are beyond the scope of this post but at its simplest: you’re not liable for what someone else posted on your site unless you’d been told about it and did nothing. Peer reviewed statements - This protects both authors of journal articles, and anyone who quotes them. To qualify, the statement must relate to a matter of scientific or academic interest; and have been reviewed by either the editor or one or more experts on the subject. Reports protected by privilege - So long as your report is a 'fair and accurate' representation of what was said, you can refer to anything that arose in any legislature, court, or tribunal anywhere in the world. Of possible utility to activists, this also applies to reports about any 'international conference'. The requirement for serious harm A major recent change in defamation laws is that now Claimants must show that they have suffered serious harm; and where that’s a commercial organisation, harm means serious financial loss; or at least the real likelihood of that happening. Also, courts are a lot more willing to prevent a claim from going forward when the number of people who became aware of the statement was small; or any audience wouldn’t have been that interested anyway. As one judge put it:'In the old days we provided the pitch and the referee and let the parties play on it any game they wanted. Those days are gone.' So, the mere fact someone has a good defamation case doesn’t mean the court will allow it to proceed if at the end of the day no one really cares. Time limits for defamation actions If someone wants to sue for defamation they must bring the claim within twelve months of the statement being made; and time starts running from the first time it was made; the clock doesn’t restart just because the statement is repeated. Conclusion So, that’s defamation in a nutshell. In a future post, we can look at some of the procedural aspects, should anyone actually bring a claim. Hopefully however, with the above, you’ll feel comfortable fending off any attempts to silence or intimidate you. If you’re unsure how to respond to a groundless threat of defamation proceedings, just copy what defamation lawyers do and say 'We refer you to the reply in Arkell -v- Pressdram '. That was a case in which someone threatened defamation proceedings against a magazine, and said the amount of damages sought would depend on the magazine’s response. The magazine’s response was 'F**k off'. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

On Monday two men who ate dead, uncooked squirrels at a vegan food fair were found guilty of a public order offence and fined. This was a crass, gratuitous act of carnist trolling, by callous individuals whose food-related ethics could not be further from most animal rights activists. As such, animal lovers may be tempted to celebrate their punishment at the hands of the criminal justice system. However, guest writer Sam March will look at why this was no victory for animals, and still less for animal activists. Deonisy Khlebnikov, 29, and Gatis Lagzdins, 22, are anti-vegan activists. They believe 'veganism is malnutrition'. They promote and celebrate the right to eat other animals. In order to put vegans off their food and raise awareness of the perceived dangers of veganism, they publicly consumed raw squirrels outside a vegan stall in Soho. Several people complained and asked them to stop, one young boy with autism became visibly distressed. Two animals were killed, and two anti-vegans were punished; but this was not an animal protection case. The protestors were convicted of using disorderly behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. This is a public order offence; the victims of which are those members of the human public likely to be distressed. In order for this to be considered an animal protection case, animals’ rights or welfare laws would need to be engaged. The hapless squirrels had no rights: they had no standing to bring any kind of claim themselves, they were in no way recognised as victims and the law offered them no protection against being shot as ' game '. When game is shot, it is reduced to a mere thing. The Defendants could have been prosecuted for the same offence had they, for instance, eaten their own vomit to similar effect. Once any perception of animal protection motivations is dismissed with regard to the prosecution, the case appears in a different light. It is no victory for animal activists, or any activists. It is a victory of the state over people’s right to protest. Essentially, two protestors were convicted and fined for doing something that is not, in and of itself, illegal; but became illegal when done in a way that was likely to distress people by, in this instance, putting them off their food. Before charging a suspect, crown prosecutors must be satisfied that it is in the public interest to prosecute. The fact that such a petty act of protest passed this test should worry animal and vegan activists. Using distress to put people off their food is a staple of vegan activism. In November last year, vegan activists stormed a steakhouse , playing records of animals being slaughtered. Whilst the damning coverage of this in the media suggests perhaps this wasn’t vegan activism at its most effective; the chants of 'It’s not food, it’s violence,' are pretty typical of vegan activism. The meat and dairy industries are undeniably brutal; what happens daily in battery farms around the world is one of humanity’s greatest moral atrocities. Exposing this is bound to be distressing; and that distress in turn is a vital tool in changing attitudes towards animals and food. Protestors today play an important role in shaping the law, policy and morals of the future. This is why it is so important that human rights such as freedoms of belief, assembly and expression are protected. You may not agree with Khlebnikov and Lagzdins’ beliefs, but they have a right to have and express them. They expressed these through what, under current law, is no more than a petty act of protest. You may believe that the current law is wrong to allow them to procure or eat dead squirrels, but that isn’t what they were punished for. Justice for animals is about stopping abusive treatment that harms animals, not punishing petty disorder that makes humans feel distressed. As such, their convictions are not evidence of progress for animal activists, they only serve to illustrate the increasingly draconian approach of the police and CPS towards protestors, an approach that will primarily harm those closest to our causes. For instance, just last week it emerged that the MET and CPS are working together to bring the vast majority of Extinction Rebellion suspects, more than 900 cases , to court over the coming months. The prosecution of petty protestors, even those whose actions or causes we disagree with, should concern activists of all persuasions. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Animal Rights Activism and Employment Law As believers in animal rights and welfare, it is almost expected of us to engage in activism and proselytising. As the case of Jordi Casamitjana shows: the cost can be high when our beliefs compel us to act. So, whilst we are used to making sacrifices for animals; here guest writer and barrister Alan Robertshaw would like to examine the potential consequences in the workplace when we express our beliefs; and whether employment law offers any degree of protection for activist employees. Politics or morality? A complicating factor is that animal rights activism can be both a political stance and a philosophical belief. Whilst English law contains protections for the holding and expression of both political and philosophical views; there is more protection for the latter. There is, however, often a degree of overlap. Activity within work Generally, employers have an absolute right to control or restrict conduct in the workplace. This could involve prohibitions on discussion about politics or beliefs; and/or the wearing of clothing with slogans or items related to religion or belief. Such restraint though has to be justifiable and proportionate. Different considerations might apply to staff dealing with customers to those working behind the scenes. Employers have to be consistent, though. Ethical veganism, and respect for animal life, are almost certainly 'protected beliefs' within the meaning of the Equality Act. That is, they are afforded the same respect as religious beliefs. So, if an employer allows the wearing of religious iconography; then they would have to allow vegans the same. That means if your colleague can wear a crucifix, then arguably you can wear the Vegan symbol. Activity outside work All employment contracts are deemed to contain an implied term of 'trust and confidence' between employees and employers. That term has been held to include a duty on the employee not to bring his employer into 'disrepute'; which has been interpreted to cover conduct outside of work. There is of course an obvious tension here between that duty and the employee’s rights to freedom of expression and assembly. An employer, whose clients include members of minority ethnic groups, may well be justified in prohibiting employees' membership of violent far right organisations; just as a legitimate public safety concern. However, the mere fact that potential customers may not approve of particular views, or even conduct, will generally not be grounds for dismissal or even prohibition of expressing those views or engaging in activism raising from them, where those views fall into the category of protected belief. So, for example, the employment tribunal held that a dismissal of a hunt saboteur was unlawful, even though customers were boycotting his employer because of his activities. The tribunal held that 'respect for the sanctity of animal life' was a protected characteristic under the Equality Act, and that included acting on this belief. It should be noted that the usual 'qualifying period' of twelve months before an unfair dismissal claim can be brought does not apply in such circumstances. An employee could bring a claim at any stage; and even prior to employment if they were rejected for a job because of their beliefs. ‘Unlawful’ activity We can see then that holding views related to animal rights is protected; as is expression of those views, which would include taking part in demonstrations and marches. But what if our views end up being expresses through unlawful activity; whether that be civil disobedience, or beyond? The first consideration is whether we even need to tell our employers. Obviously, if we appear on the news being dragged into a police van, they may find out that way; but is there an obligation to inform them otherwise? That depends on the nature of your employment contract. There may well be a term that imposes a requirement to notify your employer of any convictions, or even merely being charged. Just being charged, or even convicted, though, is not determinative. In order to take action over such things, employers must show a compelling justification. A conviction for assault, for example may be more significant for a teacher than a lighthouse keeper; and minor public order convictions, such as for a refusal to comply with a condition on a march, might not be relevant at all. It should also be noted that a conditional discharge, which is a common disposal for such offences, isn’t technically a conviction, but I will cover more about ‘criminal’ penalties in a future article. Conclusion Obviously, this is a complex topic. Cases will be fact specific and different considerations will apply in every one. Hopefully, however, this article has highlighted factors to be aware of. Such an article, though, can never be a substitute for proper legal advice. Of course, the employment contract doesn’t just work one way. What if your employer’s actions amount to criminal, or merely just disreputable conduct? Can you bring that to people’s attention? To find out, tune in next time when we will be taking a look at ‘whistleblowing’ and the Public Interest Disclosure Act. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Activists are often on the receiving end of injunctions; the recent Canada Goose case being one such example. Guest writer and barrister Alan Robertshaw will address, very briefly, a basic overview of what injunctions are. Whilst we hope this helps activists, this should not be taken as legal advice, as each case is unique. At their most basic, injunctions are just orders of the court telling people to do something, or, more often, to not do something. There are two main types of injunctions; permanent and interim. Permanent injunctions are imposed after a full trial. Interim injunctions, however, can be imposed at very short notice, without the person on the receiving end necessarily being aware of their application. They are used where there is an urgent need to prevent an activity, either to preserve the status quo pending a full trial on the facts or to prevent irreparable harm. In practice, an interim injunction can have a permanent effect if it prohibits an action for which there was just one opportunity. The principles governing the grant of interim injunctive relief were explained in a case called American Cyanamid. The broad principles are: (i) The Court must satisfy itself that there is a serious question to be tried. (ii) Applications should be decided primarily on the balance of convenience. (iii) An interim injunction should be refused if damages would adequately compensate the claimant (and the defendant will be able to pay). (iv) An interim injunction should be granted if the claimant's cross-undertaking in damages would adequately compensate the defendant (and the claimant would be able to pay). (v) If damages would not fully compensate either party, the balance of convenience decides the issue. (vi) If the balance of convenience favours neither party, the relative strengths of the parties' respective cases on the merits may be taken into account if one case is disproportionately stronger. (vii) If other factors are finely balanced, the Court should maintain the status quo. There must be an underlying legal basis for the application. That could be harassment, interference with rights, recovery or preservation of property, etc. Basically, anything that would give you a claim to sue someone. The ‘balance of convenience’ is a test that considers which party would suffer more if the application went against them. Applications for injunctions can be made ‘on notice’ or ‘without notice’. That’s just the current legal terms for whether the other side gets a chance to speak at the application. Sometimes the older terms ‘inter parties’ or ‘ex parte’ are used. Generally, even if someone applies for a ‘without notice’ injunction, they should at least let the other side know that’s what they are doing; unless ‘tipping off’ the other side would defeat the object of the injunction, or there’s no way of knowing how to communicate with them. That’s often the case with protestors, who will then be described in the application as 'persons unknown'. If an application is made without notice, the person seeking the injunction has a duty to bring to the court’s attention any arguments, whether of fact or law, that the other side could make if they were there. If an interim injunction is granted without the other side being present, then a hearing will be listed at the earliest opportunity for the other side to attend and have their say on whether the injunction should stay in place; either in whole, or with variations. Breach of an injunction is a contempt of court that can be punished with a fine or by being committed to prison. One thing to note about injunctions is that they are what is called an 'equitable remedy'. That means, unlike the usual legal remedies, which are available to anyone, regardless of their character, a person seeking an injunction must come to the court 'with clean hands'. That means a party that has engaged in disreputable conduct might not be granted an injunction, even if the merits of the case otherwise were in their favour. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This week guest writer Joe Wills will look into the topic of personhood. One of the law’s most fundamental divides is between the human and nonhuman. If you are human, you have basic rights to life, to liberty, to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, to non-discrimination, to freedom from enslavement, to a family life and so on. Of course, violations of these rights are frequent, but they exist as de jure rights under international, constitutional, customary and common law. By contrast, it is entirely consistent with nearly every legal system on the planet to kill, mutilate, confine, poison, dissect, drug, artificially inseminate, isolate, trap, hunt, abduct, experiment on, exterminate and, put bluntly, enslave and torture nonhuman animals in the pursuit of a wide variety of trivial human goals. Of course, there is legislation that purportedly protects animals, but these laws, when examined in their totality, are more significant in terms of the huge amount of violence they explicitly or implicitly sanction than the more peripheral forms of cruelty they outlaw. A case in point is the recently passed US Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture Act (PACT), which makes it a federal crime to purposefully crush, burn, drown, suffocate, impale or otherwise inflict serious bodily injury on animals. Leaving aside the fact that PACT doesn’t prohibit killing or inflicting ‘non-serious’ bodily injury, it sounds relatively promising, right? Well, yes, until you read the small print. The act does not apply to conduct that involves, amongst other things, ‘a customary and normal veterinary, agricultural husbandry or other animal management practice’, ‘the slaughter of animals for food’, ‘hunting, trapping, fishing… predator control, or pest control’, or ‘medical or scientific research’. In short, PACT carves out exceptions so large you could drive a tank through them, leaving the vast majority of instances of violence against animals legally unchallenged. While there are other examples of animal protection legislation that do not sanction violence against animals in the blatant way that PACT does, most follow the same basic structure: they either protect a very narrow range of animal interests or allow for protected animal interests to be easily overridden when they interfere with human goals. Scholars and practitioners working in the field of animal law are seeking to challenge this anthropocentric and speciesist legal order and to reform the law so that the interests of animals are more adequately protected. One way in which they seek to do this is by broadening and strengthening existing animal protection laws. While this has undeniably been, and continues to be, an important strategy, it also has a significant limitation from an anti-speciesist standpoint: it does not challenge the apartheid structure of the law, which grants robust fundamental rights to human beings and a comparably far weaker protection regime for animals. Even if new animal welfare laws could more closely approximate human rights protections, as long as animals remain legally ghettoised and viewed as separate and inferior, there will always be strong pressures to downgrade their levels of protection. Where animals have relevantly similar interests to humans – for example their interest in avoiding the infliction of bodily injury - there is no reason why they oughtn’t be protected under the same legal framework. Obviously, moving nonhuman animals into the same paradigm of legal protection as humans is no mean feat. This is where strategies to get animals recognised as ‘legal persons’ comes in. In common parlance, ‘person’ is often taken to be synonymous with ‘human’ but in law the term has a more expansive meaning. It has long been recognised that entities as diverse as corporations , ships , states and religious texts , buildings and idols can be recognised for various purposes as ‘persons’ in the law. Recently, natural entities such as rivers and mountains have been granted legal personhood in some jurisdictions, and more recently still, this category has started to be applied by Courts to nonhuman animals too. Animal legal personhood In 2015, an Argentinian Court declared an orangutan called Sandra to be una persona no humana or ‘a non-human person’, finding her captivity in Buenos Aires Zoo to be an unlawful detention. The following year, a similar judgment was issued in relation to a chimpanzee called Cecilia who was being held at Mendoza Zoo. Both great apes have subsequently been relocated to sanctuaries. In 2017, a court in Colombia found a spectacled bear called Chucho to have ‘juridical personhood’ entitling him to be relocated to ‘full and decent semi-captivity conditions’ conducive to his wellbeing. This ruling was subsequently reversed and is currently being adjudicated before the Colombian Constitutional Court. In 2018 and 2019 two different Indian High Courts ruled that the ‘entire animal kingdom’ were legal persons (more on this below). Finally, efforts are presently afoot in Argentina to have endangered jaguars recognised as legal persons. A group that has played a central role in developing animal legal personhood strategies is the US-based Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) who, since 2013, have filed lawsuits on behalf of four chimpanzees and four elephants, seeking to release them from the facilities where they are detained. While as-of-yet no courts have recognised any of the NhRP’s clients as legal persons for the purpose of their lawsuits, there has undoubtedly been a shift in the nature of judicial discourse on animals. A sympathetic judgment from Fahey J of State of New York Court of Appeal in 2018 stressed the need for serious deliberation about the legal status of animals, stating that ‘we should consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect’. A month later, the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division declared that ‘it is common knowledge that personhood can and sometimes does attach to nonhuman entities like… animals.’ A subsequent New York criminal court dealing with an animal cruelty case further noted ‘an emerging awareness of the injustice of treating animals as 'things', and present efforts to change the status of nonhuman animals from 'things' to legally recognised 'persons'. These rulings are indicative of the beginnings of a shift in judicial culture; claims of animal legal personhood are no longer automatically greeted with glib dismissals as they were in the recent past. Which animals ought to be legal persons? From this brief survey, we notice that animal legal personhood strategies have taken a variety of forms. A central tactical consideration for such campaigns is which species of animal ought to be advocated for, and why? The NhRP are at present litigating on behalf of ‘self-aware, autonomous beings’ on the basis that such individuals have liberty interests of the sort protected at common law. At present, they are limiting their potential clients to great apes, elephants, dolphins and whales living in capacity across the US. The two successful rulings from Argentina both involved captive great apes. Meanwhile, the ongoing spectacled bear and jaguar cases seem closely tied to the imperatives of species and environmental preservation. At the most expansive end of the spectrum, the two High Court rulings in India declared the entire animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic species, to be legal persons. In his 2019 ruling for the Chandigarh High Court, Justice Rajiv Sharma stated that citizens are loco parentis for the welfare and protection of animals, implying that they have legal responsibilities and functions similar to the legal guardians of children. Beneath the rhetoric, however, the judgment’s prescriptions do not appear to exceed those of traditional animal welfare adjudication. The judgment confirmed that animals should not carry loads exceeding prescribed limits and applied existing rules around veterinary care, housing and food for animals. While this outcome is admirable and the ruling itself a stirring defence of animals, I’d suggest that Justice Rajiv Sharma's invocation of ‘personhood’ may have been unnecessary, and runs the risk of draining the concept of its potential emancipatory force. When it comes to legal personhood, it may well be preferable, under present conditions, to pursue a strategy of advancing it for a narrow range of species, rather than the entire animal kingdom as the Indian High Courts have done. This is not because only a narrow range of species are morally deserving of much better legal protection (I happen to think that all sentient beings are entitled to fundamental legal rights) but rather because, under present conditions, affording human-like rights to all sentient creatures by judicial decree is unfeasible. Courts are not realistically in a position to issue rulings with implications that would likely be the termination of multi-billion dollar industries. The upshot of this is that when animal legal personhood is interpreted as applying very broadly, the transformative features of the concept risk getting watered down. Whereas the Argentinian Courts’ habeas corpus rulings on personhood for great apes secured liberation from human exploitation, the Indian Courts’ judgments were more closely tied to placing limits on human exploitation, i.e. the historic mission of animal welfare law. This is not to dismiss the importance of the latter, merely to suggest that there may be utility in a clear division of labour between welfarist and personhood legal strategies so as to preserve the benefits of each. Legal personhood strategies can be classified as ‘deep and narrow’ in so far as they have the potential to radically alter the legal status of animals but feasibly only apply to a small number. Animal welfare strategies, by contrast, can apply to a broad range of species but tend to offer relatively meagre limitations on human violence against animals. While personhood and welfare strategies are sometimes viewed as oppositional approaches, they are perhaps better thought of as complementary, each making up for the weaknesses of the other. Animal legal personhood ought to be seen as an important component of the panoply of campaigns to advance the legal status of animals. Potentially its most significant contribution is challenging the sanctity of the species divide that has hitherto consigned the entire non-human animal kingdom to the law’s wastelands. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .