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21 July 2026, ECLI:NL:CBB:2026:335 Judgment: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:CBB:2026:335 Summary The 21 July 2026 case of ECLI:NL:CBB:2026:335 (“the 2026 Leg Lifting case”) concerned the enforcement of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 (“Transport Regulation”), which prohibits lifting poultry by the legs when handling them before transport (“the Leg Lifting Prohibition”). In a previous 4 June 2024 ruling, ECLI:NL:CBB:2024:370 (“the 2024 Leg Lifting case”), the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (“the CBb”) had established that lifting poultry by the legs was prohibited by the Transport Regulation, but had required the State Secretary to reconsider the terms of the existing enforcement orders imposed on poultry service companies for acting in breach of it. On 14 May 2025, the State Secretary issued new enforcement orders (“the 2025 Enforcement Orders”) which, crucially, introduced an exception permitting poultry to be lifted by the legs where certain conditions were satisfied. In the present case – the 2026 Leg Lifting case – the CBb reaffirmed that the Leg Lifting Prohibition was clear and fully enforceable. It held that the State Secretary was required to enforce the prohibition without qualification and could not introduce an exception through administrative enforcement orders by anticipating proposed changes to EU legislation. The CBb also increased the maximum penalty payable under the orders from €15,000 to €60,000, extended the compliance period to 1 January 2027 and removed the one-year validity period, meaning that the orders would remain in force without a fixed expiry date. The CBb itself amended the 2025 Enforcement Orders, with its judgment replacing the corresponding parts of the State Secretary’s decisions. Background The 2026 Leg Lifting case arises out of enforcement orders made against poultry service companies that lifted poultry by the legs, in contravention of the Transport Regulation. These enforcement orders were essentially orders requiring the poultry service companies to comply with the Leg Lifting Prohibition, with a financial penalty becoming payable if they failed to comply with that prohibition within the stipulated compliance period. Chicken Catching Companies v the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (4 June 2024) In 2024, the poultry service companies challenged the enforcement orders before the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal. Wakker Dier, a Dutch animal welfare organisation, filed the requests for enforcement action and participated in the proceedings as a third party. Advocates for Animals has written about the outcome of that case here. In summary, on 4 June 2024, the Tribunal reaffirmed that lifting poultry by the legs was prohibited by the Transport Regulation, but that the State Secretary was required to issue new decisions addressing defects in the original enforcement orders, including (i) the compliance period within which the poultry service companies were required to comply with the Leg Lifting Prohibition before they would become subject to a penalty payment; and (ii) the amount of the penalty payment. The 2025 Orders Following the 4 June 2024 ruling and its order for new decisions, on 14 May 2025 the State Secretary imposed the 2025 Enforcement Orders subject to penalty payments , stipulating that: the poultry service companies would incur a penalty of €50 for each bird lifted by the legs in breach of the orders [10.2]; the maximum penalty payment payable was €15,000 [10.2]; the compliance period is six months [10.3], with the 2025 Orders being valid for a period of only one year following the expiration of the six-month compliance period [10.4]; crucially, the 2025 Orders created an exception (“the Exception”) to the Leg Lifting Prohibition where the principles set out in the European Commission's proposal of 7 December 2023 to revise the Transport Regulation were met. Those principles permitted poultry to be lifted by two legs provided sliding boards in cages or the operator's legs were used to support the birds' chests; the animals were not subjected to unnecessary suffering; and during loading and unloading, provisions were made to shorten the period during which the birds are held upside down [1.4]. The 2026 Leg Lifting Case In its 21 July 2026 ruling, the CBb determined nine related cases concerning the 2025 Enforcement Orders (25/285; 25/497; 25/498; 25/499; 25/501; 25/503; 25/504; 25/505; and 25/506). Both Wakker Dier and the poultry service companies had brought various proceedings against the 2025 Enforcement Orders, with Wakker Dier arguing that the 2025 Enforcement Orders did not go far enough, and the poultry service companies contending that they imposed unnecessarily stringent requirements. The issues raised included: A challenge brought by the poultry service companies arguing that the EU’s proposal to revise the Transport Regulation demonstrated that the EU legislature had not intended the Transport Regulation to prohibit lifting poultry by the legs, and that the Leg Lifting Prohibition therefore should not be enforced [4.1]; A challenge by Wakker Dier that the State Secretary should also have imposed administrative fines on the companies, in addition to the orders subject to a penalty payment, in accordance with Article 5.6 of the General Intervention Policy [5.1]; and Various challenges by both Wakker Dier and the poultry service companies pertaining to the content of the 2025 Enforcement Orders, including to: the Exception to the Leg Lifting Prohibition [4.2; 5.3]; the amount of the maximum penalty payment [4.3; 5.5]; the compliance period of the 2025 Enforcement Orders [5.4; 4.4]; and the validity period of the 2025 Enforcement Orders [5.4; 4.4]. The Decision In summary, in its decision the CBb found that (i) Wakker Dier’s appeal that the State Secretary had failed to make the new decisions within time had become inadmissible [11.1]; (ii) the Transport Regulation was fully enforceable and applied to poultry [11.2]; and (iii) the State Secretary was not required to impose administrative fines in addition to the orders subject to a penalty payment [11.2]. Further, the CBb partially annulled the 2025 Enforcement Orders and, in doing so, itself amended their terms [11.2]. The CBb removed the Exception to the Leg Lifting Prohibition and the fixed validity period, increased the maximum penalty from €15,000 to €60,000, and set a new compliance period ending on 1 January 2027 [11.3]. These amendments were made directly by the CBb and replaced the corresponding parts of the State Secretary’s 2025 Enforcement Orders [11.3]. (i) Timeliness of the 2025 Enforcement Orders The State Secretary did not make the 2025 Enforcement Orders until 14 May 2025, even though the deadline set by the court to do so was 15 August 2024 [10.3]. However, given that by the time of this ruling the State Secretary had already made the new enforcement orders, the CBb declared this appeal inadmissible [11.1]. The CBb nevertheless ordered the State Secretary to reimburse Wakker Dier’s relevant costs and court fees [3]. (ii) Enforceability of the Leg Lifting Prohibition The poultry companies argued that the Transport Regulation does not prohibit lifting poultry by the legs. They relied particularly on the EU Commission's proposal to amend the Regulation; the UK's legislative amendment, the Welfare of Animals (Transport) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/776), which made the ban on lifting by the legs cease to apply to chickens and turkeys; and evidence that leg-lifting continued in other EU Member States [4.1]. They argued that these developments showed that the existing prohibition was an unintended omission and, at minimum, created sufficient uncertainty to justify a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CBb did not uphold this appeal, stating that it had already, in its 4 June 2024 ruling, made clear that the wording of the Leg Lifting Prohibition provision is not open to multiple interpretations, as it stipulates in very concrete terms that it is prohibited to lift the animals by the legs and that there is no exception to this rule in the case of poultry [7.2]. The CBb further held that the subsequent proposal by the EU Commission to amend the Transport Regulation and evidence of practices in other Member States did not constitute grounds for revisiting that conclusion [7.3]. (iii) Fines According to Article 5.6 of the Dutch administrative policy rule, General Intervention Policy, both a remedial sanction and a punitive sanction shall be imposed if imposing only one of these sanctions would not be sufficiently effective, proportionate, and deterrent [8.2]. Wakker Dier therefore contended that the policy required both a punitive fine and a remedial sanction where imposing only the remedial sanction would be insufficient to prevent the prohibited conduct from recurring [8.1]. The CBb did not uphold this appeal, stating that in its ruling of 4 June 2024, the Board had already ruled that an order subject to a penalty payment is in itself a suitable means to enforce the Leg Lifting Prohibition. The CBb therefore concluded that an additional administrative fine was not required in the circumstances [8.2]. (iv) Content of the orders subject to a penalty payment Validity of the Exception to the Leg Lifting Prohibition In response to the Exception to the Leg Lifting Prohibition included in the 2025 Enforcement Orders, the CBb held that the State Secretary was required to fully enforce the Leg Lifting Prohibition and therefore could not deviate from it by including an exception clause [9.5; 9.7]. The Board gave three reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, the Exception permitted conduct prohibited by the Transport Regulation without any legal basis. Secondly, the Exception undermined the objective of the Leg Lifting Prohibition – namely to prevent poultry from being lifted by the legs – and failed to ensure sufficiently effective and deterrent enforcement. Thirdly, the Exception permitted individuals to act in contravention of EU law [9.6]. The CBb also rejected the poultry companies’ argument that full enforcement of the Leg Lifting Prohibition would be disproportionate, holding that the national principle of proportionality could not override EU law. Further, the CBb agreed with the State Secretary’s conclusion that enforcing the prohibition would not lead to insurmountable shortages in catching capacity or unreasonable increases in the price of eggs and meat. It also found that alternative catching methods had not been shown to be practically unfeasible [9.6]. Amount of penalty payment Wakker Dier argued that the penalty payments, including the maximum amount payable, were insufficient to deter the companies from repeating the prohibited conduct. It argued that this was because the companies might only comply with the orders during inspections, meaning that the prospect of having to pay a penalty would arise only if a violation were detected during an inspection [4.3]. However, the CBb concluded that the amount of the penalty payments specified in the 2025 Enforcement Orders was reasonably proportionate to the seriousness of the interest protected and the intended effect of the penalty payments. It held that the possibility identified by Wakker Dier – that breaches would only be identified during inspections – was inherent in the enforcement regime regardless of the amount of the penalty payments and therefore this point did not alter the CBb’s conclusion [10.2]. Nevertheless, the CBb agreed with Wakker Dier that the maximum of €15,000 was too low to provide an effective deterrent, particularly because the maximum would be reached after violations involving only 300 chickens. The CBb therefore increased the maximum penalty to €60,000 [10.2]. Compliance period Wakker Dier and the poultry companies both contended that the compliance period was inappropriate, with Wakker Dier arguing that it was too long and the poultry companies that it was too short. The CBb held that the original six-month compliance period set in the 2025 Orders had expired and that, because the 2025 Enforcement Orders were being amended by the CBb’s judgment, the companies required additional time to adapt their business operations. The CBb therefore granted a new compliance period until 1 January 2027 [1.3]. In setting this period, it sought to take into account the interest in effective and deterrent enforcement, proportionality, and the interest in swift enforcement of the Leg Lifting Prohibition so as to protect animal welfare [10.3]. Validity period The State Secretary’s 2025 Enforcement Orders provided for a six-month compliance period, followed by a one-year validity period. This meant that the companies were given six months to comply with the prohibition, after which the enforcement orders would remain in force for a further year before expiring. Wakker Dier challenged the one-year validity period, arguing that the Enforcement Orders should remain in force to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of enforcement. Relying on the same reasoning as Wakker Dier, the CBb upheld this ground. It held that, although a validity period may be attached to an order subject to a penalty payment, this was inappropriate in this case because the Leg Lifting Prohibition would continue to require enforcement after the expiry of the one-year period [10.4]. The CBb therefore removed the validity period, meaning that the Enforcement Orders would remain in force without a fixed expiry date. The CBb also emphasised that the companies could still apply for the enforcement orders to be lifted under Article 5:34(2) of the General Administrative Law Act [10.4]. Commentary The central significance of this judgment is the CBb’s reaffirmation that the prohibition on lifting poultry by the legs follows clearly and unambiguously from the EU Transport Regulation and must therefore be enforced. Although the CBb had already established this interpretation in its 2024 judgment, the 2026 ruling rejected the poultry companies’ renewed attempts to challenge the prohibition’s applicability. In particular, the court confirmed that neither the European Commission’s proposed amendments to the Transport Regulation nor the continued use of this catching method in other EU Member States justified departing from the existing prohibition. The judgment also clarifies the limits of national authorities’ discretion when enforcing directly applicable EU animal welfare requirements. The CBb held that the State Secretary could not introduce an exception to the Leg Lifting Prohibition through administrative enforcement orders without a legal basis. In particular, proposed changes to EU legislation could not be anticipated to permit conduct prohibited under the law currently in force. Significantly, the CBb also rejected the poultry companies’ arguments that full enforcement would be disproportionate. The court confirmed that the national principle of proportionality could not override EU law and agreed with the State Secretary’s conclusion that enforcing the prohibition would not result in insurmountable shortages in catching capacity or unreasonable increases in the price of eggs and meat. It also found that alternative catching methods had not been shown to be practically unfeasible. These findings reinforce that practical difficulties associated with compliance do not, in themselves, justify permitting conduct prohibited by EU animal welfare law. In conclusion, the judgment demonstrates that clear and binding animal welfare prohibitions must be enforced according to their terms, and cannot be weakened through administrative exceptions based on anticipated legislative changes, practices elsewhere or unsubstantiated practical difficulties associated with compliance. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact: info@advocates-for-animals.com.

Judgment: https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:CBB:2026:488 Facts On 13 October 2026, the Dutch Administrative Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven) handed down a judgment concerning the enforcement of the Netherlands’ legal prohibition on routine pig tail docking. Pig tail docking involves the removal of part of a pig’s tail, generally to reduce the risk of tail biting by other pigs. In the Netherlands, routine tail docking is a prohibited practice, subject to an exception which permits the docking only where three legal conditions are satisfied. On 3 March and 11 May 2023, the animal welfare organisation Varkens in Nood requested enforcement action against a number of pig farmers whom it alleged had docked pigs' tails without satisfying the statutory conditions. Following inspections, the State Secretary rejected the requests in decisions dated 6 September and 23 November 2023. Although those initial decisions acknowledged breaches of the prohibition, the State Secretary declined to enforce it, principally on proportionality grounds, including the potential economic impact on individual farms and uncertainty about the applicable conditions [1.1]–[1.3]. In the subsequent decision on Varkens in Nood's objections, the State Secretary upheld the refusals but changed his reasoning. He maintained that the statutory conditions contained too many open-ended requirements to be enforceable. In particular, he considered it impossible to establish whether the farmers had satisfied that preventive measures against tail biting and other behavioural disorders had been taken but had proved ineffective. He therefore concluded that the available evidence did not establish a breach and that he lacked grounds to take enforcement action [1.4]. Varkens in Nood challenged that decision before the Dutch Administrative Court of Appeal for Trade and Industry. The central issue was whether the State Secretary had lawfully refused enforcement on the basis that the statutory conditions permitting tail docking were too unclear to apply. Law Wet dieren (Animals Act) Article 2.8(1) stipulates that it is prohibited to perform physical interventions on an animal. Article 2.8(2)(b) authorises the legislator to introduce an exception to that prohibition in delegated legislation. Besluit diergeneeskundigen (The Veterinarians Decree) The Veterinarians Decree is a form of Dutch delegated legislation, broadly equivalent to a statutory instrument in the UK. Article 2.3(b) permits the removal of part of a piglet's tail only where three conditions are satisfied (“the tail docking conditions”): The piglet is no older than four days Injuries to sows' teats or other pigs' ears or tails have been identified Preventive measures, including adjustments to environmental conditions or management systems, have been implemented but have proved ineffective in preventing tail biting and other behavioural problems Decision The court found that the legal framework had been implemented verbatim from EU Directive 2008/120/EC and as such its decision primarily concerned determination of the proper interpretation and application of the legal framework concerning pig tail docking – specifically, Article 2.8 of the Animal Welfare Act and Article 2.3(b) of the Veterinarians Decree. Interpretation of the prohibition on pig tail docking The pig farmers argued that the Directive permitted tail docking in principle, rather than prohibiting the practice in principle and permitting it only in exceptional circumstances [6.2]. The court rejected that interpretation. It held that routine tail docking is prohibited under both the Directive and Dutch legislation, and that docking is permitted only exceptionally, where the piglet is no older than four days, the relevant injuries have been observed and preventive measures have been taken but have proved ineffective. Unless all three conditions are satisfied, the prohibition continues to apply. The court considered this legal position sufficiently clear and not open to competing interpretations [9.1]–[9.3]. Interpretation of the tail docking conditions (i) The piglet is no older than four days The court found no ambiguity in the first condition. Its meaning was not disputed between the parties [10.2]. (ii) Injuries to sows' teats or other pigs' ears or tails have been identified The State Secretary argued that there was ambiguity concerning the number of injuries required to justify tail docking and where in the production chain those injuries must have occurred. In response, the court acknowledged that the legislation does not specify a minimum number of injuries. However, given that tail docking is permitted only by way of exception to a general prohibition, the court held that the exception must be applied restrictively and that a small number of injuries would not be sufficient to justify docking. The court considered that the State Secretary had discretion to determine the number of injuries required. As to where the injuries must occur, the court held that they must have been observed on the farm where tail docking takes place. Since the statutory requirements are directed at the farmer carrying out the docking, that farmer must demonstrate that the conditions have been satisfied on their own farm. Injuries observed at other farms, including those further along the production chain or in other Member States, cannot be relied upon to justify tail docking [10.3]. (iii) Whether preventive measures have been implemented but proved ineffective The State Secretary considered the requirement for preventative measures to be unclear in three respects: (a) which preventive measures were required; (b) how their effectiveness was to be assessed; and (c) the appropriate interval between the identification of injuries and the measures taken [10.4]. (a) Which preventative measures are required? The State Secretary argued that the legislation does not identify which specific preventive measures farmers must implement, or which combination of measures would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory condition. As tail biting is caused by several interacting factors, this makes it difficult to prescribe a standard set of preventive measures or a chronological sequence of steps applicable to all farms [1.4];[5.2]. The court held that, given the multifactorial nature of tail biting, the preventative measures required must be determined on a farm-specific basis. The appropriate measures will depend on the particular risk factors present on each farm, including feeding, space, temperature, air quality, environmental enrichment, hygiene and animal health. The State Secretary must therefore assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the measures taken are appropriate, while allowing farmers a degree of discretion in determining how to address the identified risks [10.4.1]. (b) whether the measures have proven ineffective As to whether the measures have proved ineffective, the court held that this must initially be assessed by the farmer, potentially with assistance from a veterinarian or other relevant expert. The State Secretary must then assess whether the measures have been effective, again allowing farmers a degree of discretion. Although this assessment may be difficult in practice, the court held that this does not render the legislation unenforceable [10.4.2]. (c) how much time must elapse between the observed injuries and the implementation of preventative measures. The court held that the legislation envisages a continuing process of identifying injuries, examining their causes, implementing preventive measures and assessing their effectiveness. No fixed interval can therefore be prescribed between the identification of injuries and the measures taken, as the appropriate timeframe depends on the circumstances of each farm. The court observed that proposed Dutch legislation envisaged a six-month assessment cycle and considered that period not unreasonable in principle; it did not impose a six-month statutory requirement [10.1], [10.4.3]. The burden of proof The court held that, because the statutory prohibition and its exceptions are directed at pig farmers and veterinarians acting on their behalf, it is the responsibility of the pig farmer to demonstrate that the conditions permitting tail docking have been satisfied. Although there is no specific statutory requirement to record compliance with these conditions, farmers must be able to provide sufficient evidence that they have been met. The court held that farmers are entitled to determine how they demonstrate compliance, including through farm health plans, treatment plans or evidence provided by veterinarians. The absence of a statutory record-keeping obligation does not relieve farmers of this responsibility [11.1]. However, the court distinguished this responsibility from the State Secretary’s burden of establishing that a breach has occurred. The State Secretary must conduct a thorough investigation into the circumstances of the individual farm, taking account of any evidence provided by the farmer. If, following that investigation, the farmer has failed to demonstrate that the statutory conditions for tail docking have been satisfied, the State Secretary must conclude that the prohibition has been breached [11.2]. The court further held that, although the State Secretary may issue guidance or policy rules clarifying how the statutory conditions should be applied, the introduction of further regulations is not a prerequisite for enforcing the existing prohibition [11.2]. Outcome The court upheld Varkens in Nood’s appeal, finding that the State Secretary’s refusal to take enforcement action was inadequately reasoned and therefore unlawful under Article 7:12(1) of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act. The court held that the existing legislation provided a sufficiently clear legal framework for determining whether the prohibition on routine tail docking had been breached. The State Secretary was therefore not entitled to refuse enforcement requests on the basis that the statutory conditions were too ambiguous to apply [12]. However, the court did not determine whether the individual pig farmers had breached the prohibition. It found that the State Secretary had failed to conduct a proper assessment of whether the farmers had complied with all the statutory conditions, particularly whether preventive measures had been implemented and proved ineffective. The court lacked sufficient evidence to establish whether breaches had occurred and order enforcement action against the farmers [13.1]–[13.2], but it did annul the State Secretary’s decision and order him to reconsider Varkens in Nood’s enforcement requests. Commentary The court’s finding that both the Directive and Dutch legislation prohibit routine tail docking and permit the practice by way of exception recognised that, unless all the statutory conditions are satisfied, the prohibition continues to apply. The court held that this legal position was sufficiently clear and not open to multiple interpretations [9.2]–[9.3]. This finding is particularly relevant to the UK, where tail docking remains widespread despite the statutory prohibition on routine docking. The Dutch court's interpretation reinforces the distinction between a general permission to dock and a narrowly conditional exception to a legal prohibition. The existence of an exception does not mean that tail docking may be treated as a standard farming practice, nor does the widespread use of docking diminish the need for farmers to demonstrate that the conditions justifying it have been satisfied. The judgment therefore reinforces the importance of treating tail docking as an exceptional measure requiring justification, rather than an accepted management practice that is presumed lawful. Further, and perhaps most significantly, the court’s finding that the Netherlands’ existing legislation provided sufficient grounds for investigating potential breaches and determining whether enforcement action was warranted [11.2]–[12] is particularly relevant to the UK, where the continued prevalence of routine tail docking potentially reflects a failure to enforce existing legal protections, rather than an absence of legislation prohibiting the practice. The judgment illustrates the distinction between practical difficulties in enforcing a statutory prohibition and an inability to enforce it. Although assessing the conditions permitting tail docking requires farm-specific judgments, those difficulties did not, in the Dutch court's view, justify declining to investigate possible breaches. The same question – whether existing legal protections are being adequately assessed and enforced – may merit consideration in the UK as well. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact: info@advocates-for-animals.com.

“Estrellita Monkey” Case (253-20-JH) Spanish:https://ecojurisprudence.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Ecuador_Constitutional-Court-Ruling-on-Habeas-Corpus-for-Primate_347.pdf English:https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/Final-Judgment-Estrellita-w-Translation-Certification.pdf Facts On 27 January 2022 the Constitutional Court of Ecuador handed down its judgment (253-20-JH) in the case of Estrellita, the woolly monkey. The case concerned whether, and to what extent, an individual animal falls within the scope of the constitutional rights of nature framework established by Ecuador’s constitution, and the corresponding rights of wild animals as subjects of rights. Estrellita was taken from the wild as a baby and raised in a human home as a pet for 18 years. In 2018, she was anonymously reported to the authorities, who in 2019 seized her and transferred her to a zoo on the grounds of possession of a wildlife specimen without authorisation [140]. In 2019, the claimant, who describes herself as the ‘mother and caregiver of Estrellita’ [24], filed a habeas corpus action, a legal order requiring Estrellita to be brought before a judge so the court could decide if it had been lawful to remove Estrellita from her custody [51]. Shortly after being transferred to the zoo, Estrellita died [46]. Upon finding out about Estrellita’s death, the claimant changed the writ of habeas corpus to request the delivery of her body [45]. Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the claimant’s habeas corpus action [47]; [49]. The case was then brought before the Constitutional Court, which selected it for consideration in order to establish binding jurisprudence on how Ecuador’s constitutional rights of nature framework applies to animals [2]. This represents a distinction in the Ecuador courts, where under paragraph 6 of Article 436 of the Constitution, cases do not need to be appealed to the Constitutional court but rather are selected by the court for review for the purpose of issuing a judgment that constitutes binding case law on a novel constitutional question. Ecuador was the first country in the world to include a rights of nature provision in its national constitution, and the court wanted to establish how this provision related to the individual rights of wild animals. In its judgment the court sought to answer three questions: (i) What is the scope of the rights of nature and is it possible for them to encompass the protection of a wild animal, such as a woolly monkey? (ii) Were nature’s rights violated in the case of Estrellita? (iii) What constitutional actions or guarantees are suitable for the protection of the rights of nature in general and for the case of Estrellita in particular? Law In 2008 Ecuador promulgated a new constitution that for the first time in any nation’s constitutional tradition recognised the rights of nature. In particular, Article 71 stated that: Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. Any person, community, people or nationality may demand from the public authority the fulfillment of the rights of nature. Critical to Estrellita’s case, therefore, is the fact that the Ecuadorian Constitution goes beyond classical anthropocentrism, instead embracing a ‘socio-biocentrism grounded in [Ecuador’s] ancient roots and the contributions of the pluralism and interculturality of the diverse peoples who make up Ecuador’ [56]. Consequently, under Ecuador’s constitutional law, nature is viewed as a subject of rights possessing intrinsic value; that is, ‘an end in itself, rather than merely a means to achieve the ends of others’. Decision (i) What is the scope of the rights of nature? Is it possible for them to encompass the protection of a wild animal, such as a woolly monkey? Applying the rights of nature constitutional framework to wild animals, the court found that ‘it is evident that animals in Ecuador enjoy special constitutional and legal protection, given the value that the Constitution places on nature shares a common axiological foundation with animal rights’ [94]. Importantly, the court held that these rights extend not only to nature as the ‘universality of beings, phenomena and biotic and abiotic elements that coexist’, but also to nature in each of its singular elements, such as a forest, a river, or a wild animal whose species is threatened, which may each also be an individual rights holder [66]. Further, the court affirmed that the rights of nature in Ecuador not only protect general species but also particular animals, since ‘it would not be possible to recognise the intrinsic value of nature as a whole and neglect to give the same value to its elements’ [125]. As a result, the court determined that, among other rights, wild species and individual animals of a wild species, have the right not to be hunted, fished, captured, collected, extracted, kept, retained, trafficked, traded or exchanged. Likewise, they have the right to the free development of their animal behavior, which includes the guarantee not to be domesticated and not to be forced to assimilate human characteristics or appearances, including the ability to behave according to the instincts and behaviours characteristic of their species and to develop their biological cycles, processes and interactions freely [112]. The court made clear that the rights to which it referred are not exhaustive, and may be developed over time [96]. As a result, the court held that the domestication, humanisation and pet-keeping of wild animals may directly interfere with the rights of nature [116]–[119]. As a result, the court found that it was possible for an individual animal such as Estrellita to be protected by the rights of nature, because her life and physical integrity may be seriously harmed by humanising treatment or interference with her habitat [120]. The court further held that the rights of wild animals such as Estrellita are fully justiciable [121]. ii) Were the rights of nature violated in the case of Estrellita? The court found that Estrellita’s rights, and consequently the rights of nature, were violated at three stages: (i) when she was removed from her natural habitat and kept in a domestic environment [134]; (ii) when she was seized by the authorities [145]; and (iii) when she was subsequently placed in a zoo [145]. The court found that the claimant’s humanisation and keeping of Estrellita over an 18-year period was incompatible with her right to life and integrity, particularly given her species-specific needs and the circumstances in which she was found [134]. The court further held that the seizure and transfer of Estrellita also violated her right to integrity because the authorities failed to assess her individual circumstances, including the effects of her prolonged captivity and humanisation [142]-[143]. The court decided that while the precise cause of Estrellita’s death was disputed [153], the physical conditions that contributed to her death – including malnutrition, body conditions resulting from an inadequate environment, stress levels, etc. – were the result of the actions or omissions of both the claimant and the state entities involved in her seizure and captivity in the zoo [154]. (iii) What constitutional actions or guarantees are suitable for the protection of the rights of nature in general and for the case of Estrellita in particular? The court did not order Estrellita’s return to the claimant because returning Estrellita to the claimant’s house meant continuing to subject Estrellita to captivity and therefore to deprive her of freedom [172]. Further, the court also held that the habeas corpus was inadmissible because it revolved around the recovery of the corpse of a wild animal, which requires phytosanitary treatment carried out by authorities and competent persons [177]. Notwithstanding the habeas corpus being inadmissible, the court also held that the lower courts should have referred the apparent rights violations to the Ombudsman for appropriate action, particularly given that the sequence of events ultimately led to Estrellita’s death [178]. Instead of ordering Estrellita’s return, the court ordered the Ministry of Environment to develop a protocol to assess the circumstances and needs of captive wild animals to guarantee their protection. Furthermore, the court ordered the Ombudsman and National Assembly to prepare and approve a bill on the rights of animals, based on the rights and principles developed in the judgment. [182]-[183]. Commentary While the Constitutional Court chose to decide the merits of the case, this was done under an exception to usual procedure because the court considered that the scope of the review was sufficiently limited to the facts of the selected case and that the procedural record was sufficient [22]. The main objective of the court’s decision was to issue rulings that constitute binding jurisprudence in the constitutional proceedings selected for review [20]. Most countries, such as the UK, protect wild animals primarily through animal welfare and conservation legislation rather than by recognising animals as holders of constitutional rights in their own right. Some jurisdictions have gone further in recognising the legal status of animals: for example, courts in Argentina, India and Colombia have recognised forms of non-human personhood or individual legal protection for particular animals. However, Ecuador's judgment is distinctive in that its Constitutional Court expressly recognised individual animals as subjects of constitutional rights under the country’s rights of nature framework, rather than limiting constitutional protection to animals collectively, their species or the ecosystems of which they form a part. The ruling is further significant because it not only elevated the legal status of non-human animals under Ecuador’s existing constitutional rights of nature but it also led to the creation of new legislation in Ecuador being drafted to protect the rights of animals, building on and expanding Ecuador’s rights of nature framework to make clear that its protections extend to animals. The court directed the Ministry of Environment, with the support of the Ombudsman’s Office, to develop legislation implementing the rights recognised in the judgment. Internationally, the judgment has also been identified as an important precedent in the developing dialogue concerning animal rights and the rights of nature, as well as a significant development in the constitutional recognition of individual animal rights. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact: info@advocates-for-animals.com.

Link to judgment: https://www.bverwg.de/230426U3C2.25.0 Factual background ‘BVerwG 3 C 2.25’, the judgment of 23 April 2026, was handed down by Germany’s Federal Administrative Court, the highest federal court in Germany for administrative matters. The claimant was a German animal rights organisation, Menschen für Tierrechte Baden-Württemberg e.V., which literally translates to People for Animal Rights Baden-Württemberg. The defendant was the State of Baden-Württemberg. The interested party was the operator of a turkey-fattening farm (“the turkey farm”). The claimant applied to the animal welfare authority for an order prohibiting the turkey farm from keeping turkeys, either entirely or in respect of particular breeds, alleging that the farm had committed serious violations of animal welfare law. The defendant rejected this application on 10 November 2017, finding that no serious violations of animal welfare law had occurred. The claimant subsequently challenged this refusal before the Stuttgart Administrative Court, challenging the defendant’s refusal to intervene. By a judgment of 31 October 2018, the Administrative Court dismissed the claimant’s claim as inadmissible [3]. The claimant then appealed the Administrative Court’s decision to the Higher Administrative Court, which ruled in an interlocutory judgment of 3 November 2021 that the claim was admissible. In its subsequent judgment of 7 March 2024, the Higher Administrative Court partially upheld the claimant’s appeal, setting aside the defendant’s refusal and ordering it to reconsider the claimant’s application for animal welfare intervention in accordance with the court’s legal findings, and to and to take appropriate enforcement action to remedy the identified breaches of section 2(1) of the German Animal Protection Act. However, it refused to order a prohibition on turkey keeping [4], [13]. The defendant then appealed against the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment to Germany's Federal Administrative Court, with the claimant also bringing a cross-appeal. The defendant’s grounds were that: (i) The Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the claimant's claim was admissible because the claimant lacked standing to bring the proceedings [6]. (ii) The Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm [6]. The claimant's cross-appeal sought to overturn the Higher Administrative Court's refusal to order a prohibition on turkey keeping at the farm, rather than merely requiring the defendant to reconsider what enforcement action to take [4], [45]. The law Tierschutzgesetz (Germany’s Animal Protection Act, “APA”) The APA is Germany’s principal legislation governing animal welfare, establishing general obligations for the protection, care and keeping of animals, as well as powers for the competent authorities to enforce those requirements. Section 2 of the APA establishes general animal welfare obligations for anyone responsible for keeping or caring for animals. Section 2 No. 1 (“section 2(1)”) specifically requires anyone who keeps, cares for or is responsible for an animal to feed and care for it appropriately according to its species and needs, and to house it in a manner appropriate to its natural behaviour. Section 16a(1), sentence 1 (“section 16a”) of the APA states that the competent authority must issue the orders necessary to remedy established violations of animal welfare legislation and prevent future violations. Section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 1 separately empowers the competent authority to order, in individual cases, the measures necessary to ensure compliance with section 2. Section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 3 empowers the competent authority to prohibit a person from keeping or caring for animals of a particular species or any species where that person has repeatedly or seriously breached section 2, an order made under section 16a(1), sentence 2, No. 1, or regulations made under section 2a, thereby causing significant or prolonged pain or suffering, or significant harm, to animals in their care. Such a prohibition may be imposed where there are grounds for believing that further violations will occur. Alternatively, the authority may make the keeping or caring for animals conditional upon obtaining an appropriate certificate of competence. Section 2a(1) of the APA authorises the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture, with the consent of the Federal Council, to make secondary legislation specifying the animal husbandry requirements imposed by section 2, insofar as necessary for the protection of animals. In particular, section 2a(1) No.2 empowers the Ministry to prescribe requirements concerning the premises, cages, enclosures and other facilities used to house animals, as well as the design and construction of tethering, feeding and watering equipment. Judgment (i) Whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the claim was admissible The Federal Administrative Court rejected the defendant’s challenge to the Higher Administrative Court’s finding that the claimant’s claim was admissible [12]-[13]. In its interlocutory judgment of 3 November 2021, The Higher Administrative Court had ruled that the claimant's claim was admissible under Baden-Württemberg's legislation granting recognised animal welfare organisations the right to bring proceedings [13]. Although the defendant continued to contest the claimant’s standing to challenge its refusal to take enforcement action against the turkey farm, the Federal Administrative Court held that the question had already been conclusively determined. Neither the defendant nor the turkey farm had challenged the refusal of permission to appeal against the 2021 interlocutory judgment. Consequently, that judgment had become final and binding on the Federal Administrative Court, which could not reconsider the claimant’s standing [13]. (ii) Whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm In considering whether the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm, the Federal Administrative Court considered a number of arguments put forward by the defendant: whether there was an adequate legal basis to require enforcement action; whether section 2 applied differently to intensive farming systems; whether the court was prevented from determining the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys in this context; assessment of the evidence and interpretation of the applicable husbandry requirements; Whether the housing conditions breached section 2(1); Whether, following the finding of a breach, the defendant was legally obliged to intervene or retained discretion not to do so; and Whether the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was enforceable and compatible with the farm operator’s constitutional rights. (a) Whether there was an adequate legal basis to require enforcement action Section 2 of the APA establishes general animal welfare obligations concerning the keeping and care of animals, while section 2a authorises the adoption of secondary legislation specifying the requirements necessary to comply with those obligations. The defendant argued that, in the absence of regulations made under section 2a specifying the husbandry requirements applicable to fattening turkeys, section 2 alone was insufficiently precise to establish that the farm’s housing conditions were unlawful or to provide a sufficient legal basis for enforcement action. Accordingly, it contended that the Higher Administrative Court had erred in finding that the defendant was required to intervene against the farm [6]. The Federal Administrative Court rejected this argument, holding that section 2(1), read together with section 16a of the APA, provided a sufficiently precise legal basis for enforcement action against the farm. The court emphasised that, although secondary legislation made under section 2a could clarify those statutory requirements, the absence of such legislation did not prevent the obligations imposed by section 2 from applying or being enforced [16]-[17]; [19]. (b) Whether section 2 applied differently to intensive farming systems The court made clear that the statutory obligations under section 2 applied equally to intensive livestock farming and that the widespread use of particular husbandry practices did not prevent their lawfulness from being assessed against those obligations [20]–[21]. The complexity of the matter and the need to balance differing interests, as cited by the defendant, also did not change the way in which section 2 applied to the turkey farm[21]. (c) Whether the court was prevented from determining the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys in this context In order to determine whether the turkey farm had breached section 2(1), the Higher Administrative Court assessed the evidence concerning turkeys’ species-specific needs and determined whether the farm’s housing conditions satisfied the general statutory requirements. The defendant argued that the court could not itself determine the husbandry requirements applicable to turkeys because there is not a scientifically recognised assessment criteria for conventional turkey farming. In response, the court referred to the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 23 October 2018 ( 1 BvR 2523/13 et al. – BVerfGE 149, 407) which determined at [19] that ‘if no delegated legislation exists to specify how legal requirements are to be assessed, authorities and courts must directly make use of findings developed by scientists and experts to clarify these specialist elements’ [21]. (d) whether the court erred in how it came to its decision about the husbandry requirements The court looked at both the validity of the factual findings and legal interpretation adopted by the Higher Administrative Court in reaching its conclusion. The Federal Administrative Court concluded that the Higher Administrative Court's factual findings were legally sound. In particular, it was entitled to rely on an independent expert report and the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the European Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, rather than treating the 2013 Turkey Standards or the assessments of official veterinarians as conclusive [25]–[30]. The court also clarified the proper interpretation of section 2(1), specifically how the word ‘appropriately’ should be interpreted within the provision’s requirement that animals should be housed ‘appropriately’. The Federal Administrative Court held that the requirement to house animals ‘appropriately’ under section 2(1) of the APA means that housing must be appropriate to the animals’ species-specific needs. Restrictions on the fulfilment of those needs are permissible only where they serve a legitimate human interest, such as the keeper’s interest in minimising the effort required to meet the animals’ needs, and that interest outweighs the animals’ welfare needs. The court explained that this would be the case where the costs or effort associated with alternative housing arrangements would be so substantial, and the resulting welfare improvements so limited, that implementing those alternatives could not reasonably be expected of an average animal keeper [34]. (e) Whether the housing conditions breached section 2 Applying this interpretation to the turkey farm’s husbandry system, the Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court’s finding that the housing conditions of the interested party breached section 2(1) of the APA. The court emphasised the combined effects of stocking density, group size and inadequate housing structures on the turkeys’ fundamental resting and social behaviours, finding that these conditions significantly impaired their ability to meet their species-specific needs [39]. The court further held that, although the necessity of beak trimming did not, in itself, establish that the housing conditions were inappropriate under section 2 No. 1, it was a relevant consideration when assessing their lawfulness. The court emphasised that priority should be given to improving housing conditions rather than adapting animals to commercially convenient husbandry systems through amputation [39]. The court also concluded that the turkey farm’s economic interest in minimising the effort required to meet the animals’ needs did not outweigh the significant impairment of the turkeys’ welfare needs. It considered that improvements could be achieved through economically reasonable measures, such as better housing structures, additional resting and hiding opportunities, and reduced stocking densities [40]. (f) Whether, if there had been a breach the defendant was required to take enforcement action against the turkey farm After concluding that the turkey farm’s housing conditions had breached section 2(1), the court then considered whether this meant that the defendant had been required to intervene against the turkey farm, or if the defendant still retained a discretion not to do so. The Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court's finding that the defendant was required to intervene against the turkey farm. Given the established breaches of section 2 No. 1 APA, the defendant was not entitled to remain inactive. However, it retained discretion to determine the appropriate enforcement measures under section 16a(1) APA [41]–[42]. The court explained that neither the administrative nor judicial proceedings had established the costs and benefits of the available enforcement measures. It was therefore for the defendant to determine which measures should be imposed to remedy the unlawful housing conditions, in accordance with the Higher Administrative Court’s findings [42]. (g) Whether the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was enforceable and compatible with the farm operator’s constitutional rights Finally, the Federal Administrative Court considered two further arguments advanced by the defendant. Firstly, it rejected the argument that the Higher Administrative Court’s judgment was insufficiently precise to be enforceable, holding that it clearly established the authority’s obligation to intervene while leaving the choice of enforcement measures to its discretion [43]. Secondly, it held that requiring enforcement action did not unlawfully interfere with the farm operator’s constitutional freedom to pursue an occupation under Article 12(1) of the German Basic Law, as the authority retained discretion to take the operator’s legitimate interests into account [44]. The claimant’s cross-appeal The Federal Administrative Court also dismissed the claimant’s cross-appeal seeking an order requiring the defendant to prohibit turkey keeping at the farm, rather than merely reconsider its decision on enforcement action, as inadmissible. This was because the claimant had previously unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of permission to appeal [45]-[46] and the claimant had failed to provide adequate grounds for its cross-appeal, largely repeating its earlier arguments without sufficiently identifying any violation of federal law [47]. Outcome The Federal Administrative Court therefore dismissed the defendant’s appeal and rejected the claimant’s cross-appeal as inadmissible. The Higher Administrative Court’s judgment therefore remained in force, requiring the defendant to take enforcement action to address the unlawful turkey housing conditions while retaining discretion over the particular measures to be imposed. The court ordered the claimant to bear half of the judicial costs of the appeal proceedings, with the defendant and the turkey farm each bearing one quarter. Commentary The judgment is relevant to the development of animal welfare law interpretation and enforcement. Although the decision is not binding on UK courts, it provides a useful comparative perspective on the interpretation and enforcement of broadly expressed statutory animal welfare obligations. This is particularly relevant given that aspects of the farmed animal welfare regimes in both jurisdictions have been influenced by common EU requirements. It is also relevant that the court found that the APA applied equally to intensive farming systems as to other farming systems, notwithstanding the commercial and economic interests in those systems. Further, the court’s insight that just because a particular husbandry practice is standard or widespread, this does not prevent them from being found to be unlawful. Finally, the approach of the court in this decision to the scientific evidence on turkey husbandry systems is also interesting when compared with the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal in The Humane League UK v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2024] EWCA Civ 1560 (“the Humane League”). In The Humane League, the court accepted that the question of whether fast-growing chicken breeds could lawfully be kept under paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 depended on contested scientific evidence which was not appropriate for determination in those judicial review proceedings [2]-[3]. By contrast, the German Federal Administrative Court upheld the Higher Administrative Court’s reliance on independent expert evidence to establish the welfare needs of turkeys and determine whether the particular housing conditions breached the APA. This comparison illustrates the different procedural contexts in which scientific evidence may be examined by courts in different jurisdictions. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact: info@advocates-for-animals.com.

Cruelty Free International v Information Commissioner and Home Office [2026] UKUT 328 (AAC) Cruelty Free International v Information Commissioner and Home Office [2026] UKUT 328 (AAC), Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), 21 August 2026. Background Cruelty Free International v Information Commissioner and Home Office [2026] (“Cruelty Free International”) was a three-judge Upper Tribunal case concerning access to information about animal experimentation and the right to receive information under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). Cruelty Free International (“CFI”) is an animal-protection organisation which campaigns against experiments on live animals which cause pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm. In May 2023, CFI requested information from the Home Office concerning licences authorising testing on animals involving ingredients used in certain cosmetic products. CFI wanted to understand how the Home Office applied the harm-benefit assessment under section 5B(3)(d) of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (“ASPA”). In response to CFI’s Freedom of Information request (“FOI”), the Home Office disclosed some information to CFI but made significant redactions. CFI argued that the redactions prevented meaningful scrutiny of how the Home Office evaluated and granted licences. The Home Office justified its redactions and the withholding of the information under section 44(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) and section 24 of ASPA. The Home Office pointed out that section 24 ASPA made it a criminal offence to disclose information obtained in the exercise of functions under ASPA which was known or reasonably believed to have been given in confidence. This, it argued, meant the redacted information fell within the section 44(1)(a) FOIA exemption. Section 44(1)(a) provides that where the disclosure of information is prohibited by another enactment, it becomes exempt from the section 1(1)(b) FOIA right to disclosure. CFI complained to the Information Commissioner, who held that the Home Office was entitled to rely on the section 44 exemption. CFI then appealed that decision to the First-tier Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal in June 2025. CFI subsequently appealed to the Upper Tribunal. The Law Freedom of Information Act 2000 Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 gives any person making a request for information to a public authority the right to be told by the public authority whether they hold that information, and if they do, to have that information communicated to them. Section 44(1)(a) FOIA creates an exemption to the general right articulated by section 1 where the disclosure of the requested information is prohibited by or under another enactment. There are a number of other exemptions to the section 1 general rule, including information whose disclosure would prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs (s 36), information protected by legal professional privilege (s 42), and trade secrets or information whose disclosure would prejudice commercial interests (s 43). These exemptions are all qualified exemptions which remain subject to a public-interest test. The section 44 exemption, however, is an absolute exemption which has no FOIA public-interest balancing test. Section 41 (confidential information) is nominally absolute but in effect is qualified because the common law of confidence incorporates a public interest test. Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 Under section 3 ASPA, regulated procedures may only be carried out, among other requirements, where the person undertaking them holds an appropriate personal licence and the work forms part of a programme authorised by a project licence. When determining an application for a project licence, section 5B(3)(d) requires the Secretary of State to carry out a harm-benefit analysis, assessing whether the harm caused to protected animals in terms of suffering, pain and distress is justified by the expected outcome. This assessment should take into account ethical considerations and the expected benefit to humans, animals or the environment. Section 24 ASPA provides a criminal prohibition on the disclosure of information obtained in the exercise of functions under ASPA which was known or reasonably believed to have been given in confidence. European Convention on Human Rights and Human Rights Act 1998 Article 10 ECHR protects freedom of expression, including freedom to ‘receive and impart information and ideas’. Article 10 is a qualified right, meaning that interference with it may be lawful where it is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) requires UK domestic courts to take the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) into account when exercising their judicial functions. Additionally, section 3 HRA requires courts to, so far as is possible, read legislation compatibly with the Convention rights. Section 4 HRA empowers specified senior courts to issue declarations of incompatibility when domestic legislation is not compatible with the ECHR and the incompatibility cannot be cured under section 3 HRA. The Upper Tribunal is not a specified court able to make such declarations. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary (2016) The case of Magyar concerned an NGO’s request for State-held information about the appointment of public defenders in Hungary. In its judgment, the ECtHR recognised a limited Article 10 right of access to State-held information where access is instrumental to freedom of expression. The Court outlined four criteria which must be met for such a right to arise: The information is sought for the purpose of exercising freedom of expression – in other words, the requester intends to disseminate it; The information concerns a matter of public interest; The requester performs a public-watchdog role, such as a journalist or an NGO; and The information is ready and available rather than requiring the authority to create new information. Satisfying these four criteria gives rise to an Article 10 right to receive the requested information, subject to Article 10(2). Relevant Domestic Authorities In BUAV v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 870 (“BUAV”), CFI, under its former name, challenged the interpretation of section 24 ASPA in the context of a FOIA request. The Court of Appeal held that section 24 should be given its ordinary meaning and that it did not incorporate a separate objective test derived from the law of confidence. It was entirely up to the giver of information – including licence applicants – whether they gave the information in confidence. Instead, the question was whether the person holding the information knew, or had reasonable grounds for believing, that it had been given in confidence, and the Home Office tells licence applicants that it will regard everything as having been given in confidence, save for the brief mandatory non-technical summaries (“NTSs”). The Court did not, however, consider whether Convention rights or section 3 HRA required section 24 to be interpreted differently – the case was pre-Magyar. In Sugar v BBC (No 2) [2012] UKSC 4 (“Sugar”), the appellant sought the BBC’s internal Balen Report on its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The five-judge Supreme Court held that the report was held for the purposes of journalism and therefore fell outside FOIA. In discussing Article 10, Lords Brown and Mance rejected the proposition that it created a general right to access information held by public authorities. Lord Wilson was more equivocal, such that it wasn’t clear whether there was the requisite majority on this issue. In the subsequent case of Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 (“Kennedy”), a Times journalist sought documents concerning the Charity Commission's inquiries into the Mariam Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the relevant material was exempt under section 32 FOIA – it was held by virtue of a statutory inquiry. Additionally, in obiter dicta the majority, whilst acknowledging that ECtHR case law appeared to be developing, did not accept that Article 10 created a general positive right to obtain State-held information. Lord Wilson was one of two dissenters on this issue. Both Sugar and Kennedy were decided before Magyar. In the Upper Tribunal case of Moss v Information Commissioner and Cabinet Office [2020] UKUT 242 (AAC) (“Moss”), the appellant relied on the decision in Magyar (2016) to argue that Article 10 protected his access to requested information. The Upper Tribunal held that it was bound by the domestic approach in Sugar and Kennedy and so could not apply Magyar’s recognition of a limited Article 10 right of access to information. This was because an earlier House of Lords case, Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] 2 AC 465 (“Kay”), had decided that lower courts and tribunals had to follow binding decisions of the House of Lords (now succeeded by the Supreme Court) even in the face of a later contrary ECtHR decision. The Upper Tribunal in Moss, later supported by a three-judge panel in another case, ruled that reasoned comments by the Supreme Court (and, presumably, the Court of Appeal) fell within the Kay principle. This is what CFI challenged. Judgment The Upper Tribunal’s reasoning in Cruelty Free International can be divided into six questions: Did the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider the ASPA/HRA arguments? Was the Upper Tribunal prevented by domestic precedent from recognising the Magyar Article 10 right under the Kay principle? Did CFI have an Article 10 right to receive this information? Did withholding the information interfere with that right? Was that interference justified under Article 10(2)? Could s 24 ASPA be ‘read down’ under s 3 HRA to cure the violation? (1) Did the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal have jurisdiction to consider the ASPA/HRA arguments? The Information Commissioner and the Home Office argued that CFI’s human-rights challenge to section 24 ASPA should have been brought by judicial review. The Upper Tribunal disagreed and held that it and the First-tier Tribunal did have jurisdiction to consider the application and interpretation of section 24 ASPA, including the effect of section 3 of the Human Rights Act. Determining whether the section 44 FOIA exemption applied necessarily required them to decide whether disclosure was prohibited by section 24 ASPA. The possibility of challenging section 24 by judicial review did not remove that statutory jurisdiction. (2) Was the Upper Tribunal prevented by domestic precedent from recognising the Magyar Article 10 right? In reaching its decision, the First-tier Tribunal (correctly) considered itself bound by Moss, and so was unable to recognise the Magyar Article 10 right established by the ECtHR. The Upper Tribunal, however, found this to be an error of law. It held that the earlier comments of the Supreme Court in Sugar which seemed to reject or express doubt about a positive Article 10 right to information were obiter, rather than binding ratio, and it was common ground that that was the case with the Kennedy majority dicta. The Kay principle did not extend to obiter remarks, however fully reasoned. The Tribunal also expressly departed from the relevant reasoning in Moss and held that the tribunal in Moss was wrong to conclude that domestic precedent prevented the Upper Tribunal from recognising the Magyar right. As such, the Upper Tribunal was not prevented from applying Magyar. (3) Did CFI have an Article 10 right to receive this information? To determine whether CFI had an Article 10 right to receive the requested information, the Upper Tribunal applied the four Magyar criteria. It found that in the present case all four were satisfied. Indeed, the Home Office did not dispute that this was the case. Expression – CFI wanted the information to inform the public, politicians and courts and contribute to debate over animal experimentation. Public interest – the material concerned how the Home Office exercised a statutory power in a controversial area. Public watchdog – CFI’s investigations, education, advocacy, regulatory engagement and litigation meant it performed the relevant NGO watchdog function. Ready and available – the documents already existed within the Home Office licensing process. (4) Did withholding the information interfere with that right? The Upper Tribunal held that the Home Office’s withholding of the information requested did indeed interfere with CFI’s Article 10 right established in Magyar. There was no realistic alternative way for CFI to obtain the sought-after material. By its very nature, section 24 effectively followed the information whichever disclosure regime was used because disclosure of protected information would remain a criminal offence. Consequently, refusing access under FOIA risked rendering CFI’s Article 10 right merely theoretical rather than practical and effective. The combined effect of section 44 FOIA and section 24 ASPA was therefore an interference with CFI’s Article 10 rights. (5) Was that interference justified under Article 10(2)? The Upper Tribunal accepted that protecting commercial confidentiality and intellectual property, the effective operation of the licensing system, and the safety of people involved with animal experimentation were legitimate aims capable of justifying an interference under Article 10(2). In this case, however, it concluded that the blanket prohibition provided under section 24 ASPA and section 44 FOIA was disproportionate. Section 24 protects all information within its scope irrespective of its actual sensitivity. It contains no exemptions even for trivial information or for material whose supplier may later consent to its disclosure. Additionally, the section contains no public-interest balancing mechanism and so the importance of the request, the identity of the requester, the possibility of redaction and the absence of actual prejudice cannot be weighed. The Tribunal held that this was particularly problematic where information is being sought by a public watchdog about the exercise of public power. The Upper Tribunal also recognised that meaningful scrutiny of the animal licensing regime required more than the non-technical summaries the Home Office already published. Although the summaries provided some transparency, they did not disclose the Home Office’s evaluative reasoning or explain how the harm-benefit assessment was conducted. Without access to the requested material, meaningful scrutiny of whether the relevant ethical and legal safeguards were properly observed was substantially impaired. The Upper Tribunal therefore found that the regime failed to strike a fair balance and that the interference with CFI’s Article 10 rights was not justified. (6) Could s 24 ASPA be “read down” under s 3 HRA to cure the violation? The Upper Tribunal held that BUAV remained binding authority on the ordinary meaning of section 24 ASPA. However, because the Court of Appeal in BUAV had not considered Convention rights, it did not prevent the Upper Tribunal from considering whether section 3 HRA required a different, Convention-compliant interpretation. Section 3 HRA requires the Upper Tribunal to read section 24 ASPA, so far as possible, compatibly with the Convention rights. CFI effectively asked the Tribunal to do this by introducing a public-interest qualification or defence to the section 24 prohibition. The Tribunal, however, held that because section 24 was a criminal provision, carrying potential imprisonment, and it contained no existing public-interest, lawful-excuse or proportionality defence, reading one into it would significantly alter Parliament's statutory scheme. The Tribunal held that this would cross the boundary between statutory interpretation and impermissible judicial legislation. The Upper Tribunal therefore concluded that it was not able to cure the incompatibility of section 24 ASPA using section 3 HRA. Accordingly, the ordinary interpretation of section 24 established in BUAV continued to apply. Outcome CFI prevailed on all the issues save for the section 3 HRA remedy. Although the First-tier Tribunal had been technically correct to follow Moss, which was binding upon it, the Upper Tribunal held that the relevant reasoning in Moss was wrong. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision therefore involved an error of law in failing to apply Magyar. CFI did have an Article 10 right and this was breached when the Home Office withheld the information they sought. The Upper Tribunal therefore set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. This said, the Upper Tribunal decided it could not read section 24 ASPA compatibly under section 3 HRA and it did not have the power to grant a formal declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA. The Tribunal therefore re-made the First-tier Tribunal’s decision but ultimately refused CFI’s underlying appeal against the Commissioner’s decision. Consequently, the information sought by CFI was not ordered to be disclosed. CFI is seeking permission to appeal the section 3 decision to the Court of Appeal and the Commissioner and the Home Office are seeking permission to appeal the issues they lost. Commentary The judgment in Cruelty Free International v Information Commissioner and Home Office [2026] identified a serious human-rights problem with the blanket confidentiality regime under section 24 ASPA and section 44 FOIA. The combined operation of section 24 ASPA and section 44 FOIA may, in circumstances in which the Magyar right is engaged and the interference cannot be justified, violate Article 10. The Tribunal also recognised that animal-protection NGOs are capable of being public watchdogs. The judgment removed, at Upper Tribunal level, the supposed domestic-law obstacle to the Magyar principle. This is a potentially significant development beyond animal law for NGOs, journalists or other watchdogs seeking State-held information necessary for public-interest expression. In practice, Magyar is only likely to be relevant where the public authority relies on an absolute exemption and no public interest is therefore possible. On the other hand, the case also highlighted an important limitation. There is no general right to obtain government information (CFI had not argued that there was). Claimants must satisfy the Magyar criteria, and even if they do, an interference with their Article 10 rights may still be justified under Article 10(2) of the Convention. Additionally, as was the case here, even if a breach of Article 10 is found, the Upper Tribunal lacks the remedial power necessary to overcome primary legislation prohibiting disclosure if it decides that it cannot use the section 3 HRA interpretive obligation to cure incompatibility with the Convention. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-251193 Background G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland (2026) is a European Court of Human Rights case concerning the protection afforded to ethical veganism by the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). It concerns circumstances in which individuals were deprived of their liberty and were dependent on the State for food. The European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) joined together the applications of a pre-trial detainee and an involuntary psychiatric patient. Both Applicants complained that they were given meals that were unsuitable or inadequate for a balanced vegan diet. The Applicants argued that, by failing to consistently provide them with vegan meals, the Swiss authorities had breached their Article 9 rights to freedom of belief. They also argued that Swiss domestic law had prevented them from effectively challenging this arguable violation of their Convention rights before the domestic courts. The Court was therefore required to consider whether the Applicants’ ethical veganism and adherence to a vegan diet were protected by Article 9. Additionally, if they were, whether the Swiss authorities had fulfilled their positive obligations under that provision. The Court was also asked to consider whether the Applicants had an effective method of challenging the potential violation of their rights within the domestic legal system. Facts The First Applicant: G.K. The First Applicant, referred to in proceedings as ‘G.K.’, was held in pre-trial detention in Geneva between November 2018 and October 2019. During his detention, G.K informed the authorities that his ethical belief against harming animals required him to follow a vegan diet. The Swiss authorities maintained that most of the prison’s vegetarian menu was suitable for vegans and that additional food and vegan products were available. G.K. argued, however, that many of those meals contained animal products and that the alternatives did not provide a balanced vegan diet. Despite repeatedly raising the issue, he never received a formal decision on his request. G.K.'s attempt to challenge the prison’s response was declared inadmissible because the correspondence he received from the prison authorities was not considered an appealable administrative decision. That conclusion was then upheld by Switzerland's Federal Supreme Court. The Second Applicant: A.S. The Second Applicant, ‘A.S.’, was involuntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Lausanne between February and April 2021. He informed the hospital that he had been vegan for 16 years because of his opposition to animal exploitation. Although the hospital attempted to adapt its menus, A.S. was served a number of meals containing animal products and he maintained that other meals were nutritionally inadequate. A.S. requested a formal declaration that he was entitled to balanced vegan meals, but the hospital responded without issuing an appealable decision. A.S.’s subsequent appeal was declared inadmissible on that basis, and the Federal Supreme Court upheld that conclusion. The Law The European Convention on Human Rights is an international treaty that protects the fundamental civil and political rights of individuals residing in the member States party to the Convention. The provisions relevant to the case at hand are found contained in Articles 9 and 13 of the Convention. Under Article 9 of the Convention, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. This right includes the right to “manifest [one’s] religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. Although the freedom to hold a belief is absolute, the right to manifest that belief may be restricted in certain circumstances. Under Article 9(2) limits can be placed on an individual's right to manifest their belief where it is “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Under Article 13 of the Convention, member States must have domestic procedures and mechanisms through which individuals can raise complaints that their Convention rights have been violated. Judgment In reaching its judgment, the Court addressed four relevant questions: whether the Applicants’ ethical veganism was protected by Article 9 of the Convention; whether abstaining from animal-derived food was a practice sufficiently connected to those beliefs to be protected under Article 9; whether Article 9 imposed positive obligations on the Swiss authorities, and, if so, whether the Swiss authorities had fulfilled those obligations; and whether the Applicants had an effective means of challenging the arguable violations of their rights as required under Article 13. (1) Whether the Applicants’ ethical veganism was protected by Article 9 of the Convention The Court considered whether Article 9 applied to the Applicants’ beliefs. The question was whether their ethical veganism was protected under the Convention. The Court held that, whilst not all opinions or convictions constitute beliefs protected under Article 9 of the Convention (Pretty v UK [2002]), a belief would be protected if it attained a sufficient “level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance” [86]. This was a test first formulated by the Court in the ECtHR case of Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982). It has since been applied in UK domestic law in cases including Grainger plc v Nicholson (2010). The Court noted that vegan convictions had previously received protection under Article 9 – including in the former European Commission of Human Rights decision W v UK (1993). The Court also conducted comparative-law research and found that the Council of Europe member States generally regarded veganism as a non-religious belief [57]–[58], [88]. In light of those considerations, and because Switzerland did not challenge the sincerity or consistency of the Applicants’ ethical veganism, the Court held that their beliefs did indeed fall within the scope of Article 9 [89]. (2) Whether abstaining from animal-derived food was a practice sufficiently connected to those beliefs to be protected under Article 9 The Court then considered whether the Applicants’ conduct – abstaining from animal-derived food in accordance with their beliefs – was protected under Article 9. The Court explained that for a specific practice or conduct to count as a “manifestation” of a belief, and so be protected under Article 9, there must be a sufficiently close and direct connection between that conduct and the underlying belief. Whether that connection exists must be determined on the facts of each case [86]. The Court noted that – in cases such as Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France [2000] – it had previously held that, “in practice, observing dietary rules can be considered a direct manifestation of religion or belief in the sense of Article 9” [88]. In the present case, the Court held that the Applicants’ abstention from consuming animal-derived food was directly connected to their ethical veganism. The Applicants’ compliance with dietary rules arising from genuine and consistently held beliefs was therefore protected by Article 9 [88]–[89], [120]. (3) Whether Article 9 imposed positive obligations on the Swiss authorities, and, if so, whether the Swiss authorities had fulfilled those obligations In its judgment, the Court explained that in certain contexts Article 9 may require a State to provide an effective and accessible means of protecting the rights it guarantees and, where appropriate, to take specific measures to secure those rights. The Court referred to the case of Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v Switzerland (2017), where this principle had been emphasised [119]. As such, the Court examined whether such a requirement existed in the present case, and, if it did, whether the Swiss authorities had fulfilled their obligations. The Court did not decide whether Article 9 imposed a specific obligation on the Swiss authorities to supply the Applicants with vegan menus. The Court acknowledged that the extent of the State’s positive obligation depended on striking a fair balance between the Applicants’ interests and any organisational, financial or practical constraints. Citing CGAS v Switzerland [2023], the Court reiterated the general principle that domestic authorities are ordinarily better placed to assess local needs and conditions than an international court [130]. This said, the Court did find that Article 9 imposed a burden on the authorities to address the Applicants’ requests substantively and weigh up the various competing interests [126]. The Court found that the domestic authorities had failed to undertake any substantive examination of the merits of the Applicants' grievances. The Court therefore concluded that this failure amounted to a violation of Article 9 [129], [131]. (4) Whether the Applicants had an effective means of challenging arguable violations of their rights as required under Article 13 Article 13 of the Convention requires member States to provide individuals with an effective means of raising arguable complaints that their Convention rights have been violated. This includes ensuring that individuals are able to challenge any arguable violations of their Article 9 right to freedom of belief [76]–[83]. The Court considered whether Swiss domestic law provided the Applicants with the means to effectively raise their grievances. Both Applicants wrote to the relevant authority responsible for the provision of their meals whilst they were deprived of their liberty. Both sought formal decisions from the authorities which they could, if necessary, challenge through the domestic legal system. In their responses, however, neither institution provided such a decision. When the Applicants attempted to challenge the authorities in the domestic courts, the courts determined that the authorities' responses to their requests for vegan meals were merely informative communications, rather than formal administrative decisions capable of appeal under Swiss domestic law [91]–[92]. The European Court of Human Rights held that the way in which both the administrative authorities and national courts had applied the domestic law made it practically impossible for the Applicants to obtain the administrative decisions necessary for their claims to be examined on the merits [94]. The Court held that the domestic authorities’ excessively formalistic approach as regards what did and did not amount to an appealable decision meant the Applicants had no effective means to challenge the arguable violations of their Convention rights. The Court concluded that the domestic authorities had therefore breached the Applicants’ Article 13 rights [94]–[96]. Commentary The principal significance of the judgment in G.K. and A.S. v Switzerland is the Court’s express recognition that ethical veganism can constitute a protected belief under Article 9 and that adherence to a vegan diet can amount to a protected manifestation of that belief. Although the judgment remains grounded in human rights law rather than the legal interests of animals, it recognises the seriousness and coherence that an ethical opposition to harming animals may possess, and protects individuals’ ability to live in accordance with those beliefs. The decision does not establish an unconditional entitlement to any particular vegan menu. The Court accepted that competing interests may be relevant. Instead, the central requirement is that public authorities take requests founded upon protected vegan beliefs seriously, consider them substantively and strike a fair balance between the competing interests, taking account of any relevant constraints. Whilst the particular accommodation required of the State will therefore depend upon the circumstances, it seems that the judgment is likely to be especially important where individuals are deprived of their liberty or otherwise dependent upon the State for food. In those circumstances, merely directing a person to purchase alternatives or make their own arrangements may be inadequate, particularly where those options do not provide a realistic means of following a balanced vegan diet. . Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.

Norfolk Free Range Ltd (“NFR”) has been fined £15,000 following a conviction for contravening the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 (“WATOK”). This case serves as an important reminder that companies who derive profit from the killing of sentient animals bear a high level of responsibility to ensure compliance with the regulations. Facts NFR operates a number of commercial pig farming premises in Norfolk. In June 2022, animal activist and advocate Joey Carbstrong conducted an investigation on NFR’s Harford Farm site. The farm was in the midst of a salmonella outbreak at the time which had resulted in high levels of morbidity and mortality. On 3rd June 2022 hidden camera footage captured a farm worker approaching an injured pig and beating them to death with a hurdle pin, striking them a total of 16 times. Expert evidence confirmed that the pig was alive and conscious for at least the first eight blows and would have experienced intense pain, fear and suffering. When the footage came to light in 2023 the employee involved was dismissed by NFR and was subsequently interviewed under caution by Norfolk County Council Trading Standards. In interview, he admitted the killing and stated that he had been left with no other option by his employer due to a lack of training, support and equipment. He subsequently accepted a caution for an offence of causing unnecessary suffering contrary to section 4(1) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. NFR was charged with a number of animal welfare offences but subsequently pleaded guilty to a single WATOK offence shortly before the trial was listed in June 2026, thereby accepting strict liability for the actions of its employee. As a result of this guilty plea, the other offences charged were not proceeded with. At the time of the offence, NFR was responsible for approximately 60,000 pigs across its multiple finishing farms. In 2025 it made a pre-tax profit of over £800,000. In passing sentence the Judge found that the offence involved a high level of harm. He noted that this was a serious welfare failing and that the pig experienced severe pain and substantial avoidable suffering. In relation to culpability, the Judge accepted the prosecution’s submission that strict liability under the WATOK regime recognises the importance that Parliament attaches to the humane treatment of animals; accordingly, whilst NFR’s culpability was necessarily low as a result of its strict liability, it was not minimal. Law Any person who kills animals in a commercial context is required to have a WATOK licence and to be assessed as competent, subject to an exception in the case of an emergency. However, what constitutes an emergency is undefined and is the subject of conflicting guidance. Evidence in this case suggested that approximately 6.9% of pigs on a typical pig-rearing farm either die or are killed on-farm, meaning that many millions of pigs in the UK may be killed in an undefined emergency by someone who is not certified as competent and does not hold a WATOK licence. Irrespective, any killing of an animal (whether in an emergency or otherwise) must be conducted in accordance with article 3 of the Regulation (EC) 1099/2009. This requires that “animals shall be spared any avoidable pain, distress or suffering during their killing and related operations” and goes on to specify the necessary steps that a business operator must take in this regard. Regulation 30(1)(g) of WATOK makes it an offence to “contravene, or to cause or permit a person to contravene” article 3. Importantly, the courts have confirmed that WATOK offences are strict liability (R (Jarrett Ltd) v Bristol Magistrates’ Court [2025] EWHC 1674 (Admin)), meaning that an employer is strictly liable for the actions of its employee. Article 3(1) was specifically considered by the Supreme Court in R v Highbury Poultry [2020] UKSC 39, a case concerning the liability of a poultry slaughterhouse operator for the actions of its employees in failing to properly sever the chickens’ carotid arteries or to verify death following simple stunning and before the animals entered the scalding tank. The Supreme Court confirmed that article 3(1) imposes strict liability without the need to prove any negligence on the part of the employer. It follows that, in cases involving alleged breaches of s.30(1)(g) WATOK and article 3 of the Regulation (EC) 1099/2009 by a company as a result of the actions of an employee, there is no need to prove mens rea or that the employer specifically caused or permitted the employee to act as they did. Rather, the employer contravenes article 3(1) because the act of the employee is the act of the employer. The rationale behind strict liability offences was explained by Lord Bingham CJ in Milford Haven Port Authority [2000] 2 Cr App R 323: “Parliament creates an offence of strict liability because it regards the doing or not doing of a particular thing as itself so undesirable as to merit the imposition of a criminal punishment on anyone who does or does not do that thing irrespective of that party’s knowledge, state of mind, belief or intention. This involves a departure from the prevailing canons of the criminal law because of the importance which is attached to achieving the result which Parliament seeks to achieve.” (emphasis added) Strict liability offences may therefore “prompt the employer to organise the work of his employees in such a way as to ensure compliance” (Public Prosecutor v Hansen & Son I/S (Case C-326/88) [1992] ICR 277) and may act “as an incentive to improve standards” (Highbury Poultry [2020] UKSC 39, para 35). Sentencing There are no sentencing guidelines for WATOK offences, however a breach of article 3(1) is the only offence which is imprisonable in the case of an individual and it is therefore the most serious. In the case of a corporate offender therefore, the maximum sentence is an unlimited fine. The ‘General guideline: overarching principles’ notes that: “When sentencing organisations the fine must be sufficiently substantial to have a real economic impact which will bring home to both management and shareholders the need to comply with the law. The court should ensure that the effect of the fine (particularly if it will result in closure of the business) is proportionate to the gravity of the offence.” In passing sentence on NFR, the Judge granted full credit for the guilty plea and found there to be substantial mitigation, including NFR’s generally positive welfare record and RSPCA Assured and Red Tractor certifications, but also recognised the severe suffering involved and the need for deterrence. In addition to a fine of £15,000, NFR was ordered to pay a contribution to the prosecution costs of £7,500 and a statutory victim surcharge. Getting Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.

R (Respondent) v McCafferty and others (Appellants) [2026] UKSC 20 https://supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2025-0165 Background This case concerned the scope of the statutory offence of public nuisance under section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 ("PCSCA 2022"), and in particular whether obstructing access to private business premises via a private road amounts to obstructing the public in the exercise or enjoyment of "a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large". The proceedings arose from a protest organised by Animal Rising on 8 September 2022 as part of a campaign highlighting the environmental impact of the dairy industry and the suffering of animals within it. Protesters targeted a Müller dairy processing facility near Droitwich by preventing vehicles from entering and leaving the site. Six protesters: James McCafferty, Osian Dixon, Alberto, Catherine, Sarah and Tatum, were charged with intentionally or recklessly causing a public nuisance contrary to section 78 of the PCSCA 2022. At Worcester Crown Court, the trial judge accepted a submission of no case to answer and acquitted the defendants, finding that the prosecution had failed to establish an essential element of the offence. The Crown successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ordered that the proceedings resume. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the acquittals. Facts The protest took place outside the entrance to a Müller dairy processing site located within a private industrial estate. Access to the site was via Pointon Way, a private road owned by the estate's investment company and marked with signage stating that it was private land. The defendants chained themselves to temporary fencing or glued themselves to the road immediately outside the entrance to the dairy site. As a result, vehicles were unable to enter or leave the premises for approximately four hours, although pedestrians could still gain access with the permission of Müller staff. The Crown prosecuted the defendants under the second limb of section 78(1)(b) of the PCSCA 2022, alleging that they caused nuisance by obstructing members of the public in exercising a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large. The prosecution did not rely on the first limb of the offence, which concerns conduct creating a risk of, or causing, serious harm to the public. Law Section 78 of the PCSCA 2022 abolished the common law offence of public nuisance and introduced a statutory offence that can be committed in two distinct ways. Section 78 of the 2022 Act provides: (1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person— (i) does an act, or (ii) omits to do an act that they are required to do by any enactment or rule of law, (b) the person’s act or omission— (i) creates a risk of, or causes, serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or (ii) obstructs the public or a section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large, and (c) the person intends that their act or omission will have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b) or is reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence. The first limb criminalises conduct that creates a risk of, or causes, serious harm to the public or a section of the public. The second limb criminalises conduct that obstructs the public, or a section of the public, in the exercise or enjoyment of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large. The certified question before the Supreme Court was whether people travelling to and from private business premises, including employees, customers and suppliers, were exercising such a public right when entering or leaving those premises via a private road. Judgment The Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the defendants. Delivering the leading judgment, Lord Leggatt held that the second limb of section 78 protects only genuine public rights, not activities carried out with the permission of a private landowner. The Court drew a clear distinction between a legal right and a licence or permission. While members of the public may be permitted to enter private land, permission alone does not amount to a legal right capable of protection under section 78(1)(b)(ii). The Court held that Pointon Way was a private road. The public had neither a public right of way over it nor any general legal entitlement to use it. Employees, suppliers and other authorised visitors were able to use the road because they had permission derived from the occupiers of the premises, not because they enjoyed a public right. Consequently, obstructing passage along Pointon Way could not amount to obstructing the exercise of a right enjoyed by the public at large. In reaching this conclusion, the Court undertook a detailed examination of the history of public nuisance and the law relating to highways. It concluded that the second limb of section 78 reflects the historic common law protection of public rights, such as the public's right to pass along highways, navigate public waterways and exercise other recognised public rights. It rejected the broader interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeal, which would have extended the offence to places merely open to the public by permission, such as private businesses, sporting venues or concert halls. The Court also emphasised that Parliament had deliberately created two separate limbs of the offence. Cases involving obstruction that causes serious inconvenience or disruption to the public may still fall within the first limb, provided the statutory threshold of serious harm is met. However, where the prosecution relies solely on the second limb, it must establish interference with a genuine public right for the public at large. As the Crown had chosen not to rely on the first limb, and the defendants had not interfered with any right exercisable by the public at large, the prosecution could not succeed. The acquittals were therefore restored. Commentary Since the passing of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 there have been serious concerns within the animal protection community regarding what this means for all forms of protest activity. This judgment provides important clarification of the scope of the statutory offence of public nuisance. The decision confirms that the second limb of section 78 cannot be used simply because protesters interfere with access to private premises. Instead, prosecutors must demonstrate that the conduct obstructed the exercise of a genuine public right, rather than activity undertaken pursuant to a private landowner's permission. The judgment also reinforces the distinction between the two limbs of the offence created by Parliament. Where protest activity causes widespread disruption, prosecutors may still seek to rely on the first limb by establishing that the conduct created a risk of, or caused, serious harm to the public. However, they cannot satisfy that threshold by relying on the second limb where no public right has been interfered with. The decision establishes an important precedent for the interpretation of section 78 of the PCSCA 2022 and will no doubt reassure anyone who protests. However, there remains some uncertainty over where the threshold will be met for the first limb of the test which makes it an offence to create a risk of, or causes, serious harm to the public or a section of the public, rather than the public at large. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.

R V D’Netto, Houghton, Vyas, Patterson, Sasportas (Animal Rising) [2026] Background The case arose from a coordinated action by animal rights activists connected to the group Animal Rebellion, now known as Animal Rising. In December 2022, campaigners entered MBR Acres, a Cambridgeshire breeding facility that supplies beagle dogs for scientific and pharmaceutical testing. The activists removed several puppies from the premises, arguing that the animals faced suffering and exploitation within the testing industry. The prosecution treated the incident as a criminal burglary. Across multiple trials, different groups of defendants were prosecuted for their involvement in the operation. This summary concerns a case concluded at Peterborough Crown Court in March 2026, where five defendants faced allegations connected to the rescue of 18 beagle puppies. Facts The evidence showed that the rescue operation had been carefully organised. Participants allegedly used hired vehicles, temporary accommodation, burner phones, and separate operational teams. Some individuals cut through fencing or climbed into the facility, while others acted as drivers or coordinated the removal of the dogs. Twenty puppies were initially taken, although two were later recovered and returned to the facility. MBR Acres held licences connected to the breeding and use of dogs for laboratory purposes. Evidence before the court indicated that dogs bred at the site could be used in scientific and toxicology testing, including procedures involving blood sampling and euthanasia under anaesthetic conditions authorised by licence. The defendants openly accepted their participation in the rescue operation. However, they argued that they acted from moral conviction and believed the animals were being kept in unacceptable and illegal conditions. Several defendants stated that they considered the rescue to be justified on ethical grounds rather than motivated by personal gain. In contrast with prior open rescue cases, the defendants in this case focused on: (a) their perceived civic duty to ensure vulnerable beings were protected (rather than their ideological opposition to animal testing); and (b) the individual experience of the dogs. Law The prosecution relied on the offence of burglary. To establish liability, the Crown needed to prove that the defendants entered the premises as trespassers with the intention of stealing property belonging to another. In this case, the “property” concerned was the beagle puppies removed from the facility. A central legal issue was dishonesty. The trial judge directed the jury to consider what each defendant genuinely believed at the time of the incident and then determine whether ordinary decent people would regard the conduct as dishonest in light of those beliefs. The prosecution accepted that the defendants sincerely held their views about animal welfare, but argued that sincere motives did not excuse unlawful conduct. Defence advocates argued that dishonesty ultimately remained a factual issue for a jury to decide according to contemporary standards. Judgment After a seven-day trial and more than nine hours of jury deliberations, all five defendants were acquitted. The jury returned not guilty verdicts on the burglary allegations. The acquittals were particularly notable because two trials involving other defendants connected to the same rescue operation had produced convictions while one other had ended in acquittal. As a result, different juries reached inconsistent conclusions despite the cases arising from substantially similar facts. The acquittal does not create a wider legal exemption for activists who remove animals from commercial or research facilities. Nevertheless, it demonstrated that a jury could conclude that activists acting from genuinely held moral beliefs were not dishonest for the purposes of burglary offences. Commentary The decision is significant because it highlights the flexibility of the legal concept of dishonesty. Rather than focusing solely on whether the defendants technically removed property, the jury was invited to assess the moral context surrounding the conduct. The defence argued that the defendants’ conduct should be understood in the context of protest and animal welfare concerns, rather than ordinary criminal theft. From an animal rights perspective, the case has been regarded as an important example of “open rescue” activism reaching the British courts. Although the acquittals do not change the substantive law on burglary, they may encourage future defendants to argue that actions motivated by animal welfare concerns are incompatible with dishonesty in the criminal sense. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com.

[2025] UKFTT 58 (GRC) https://www.iclr.co.uk/document/2025000421/2025ukftt58grc_TNA/html Advocates for Animals acted for Animal Equality in a First-Tier Tribunal appeal against the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (‘DEFRA’). The case concerned an appeal against DEFRA' s decision to approve an application for a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a Protected Geographical Indication (“PGI”) related to Scottish Farmed Salmon. Facts On 20 July 2023, DEFRA decided to approve an application made by Salmon Scotland Ltd for a non-minor amendment to the product specification for a Protected Geographical Indication (“PGI”) related to Scottish Farmed Salmon (submitted under Article 53(1) of the Assimilated EU Regulation 1151/2012). A geographical indication is a protection for food, drink, and agricultural products with geographical connections, or that are made using traditional methods, that can be registered and protected as intellectual property. The amendment sought to change the PGI name from “Scottish Farmed Salmon” to "Scottish Salmon”.  The two appellants Wildfish and Animal Equality filed notices of opposition and reasoned statements of opposition to this amendment application. DEFRA declared the reasoned statements of opposition inadmissible and approved the amendment on 3 April 2024.  The two appellants challenged DEFRA’s approval decision before the First-tier Tribunal (FtT), which is tasked with hearing appeals against certain decisions made by DEFRA under the relevant legislative scheme.. Law Assimilated EU Regulation 1151/2012 concerning geographical indications (assimilated by virtue of post-Brexit the Agricultural Products, Food and Drink (Amendment etc.)(EU Exit) Regulations (S.I. 2020/1637)).   Article 6(2) states that ‘a name may not be registered as a designation of origin or geographical indication where it conflicts with a name of a plant variety or an animal breed and is likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product.’ Article 51 deals with the issue of standing to object to an application for a non-minor amendment to a GI, the process for doing so, and the consequences thereafter.  Article 51(1) states that a natural or legal person having a ‘legitimate interest’ may lodge a ‘notice of opposition’ with DEFRA within three months of the date of publication of that application. If a notice of opposition does not contain a declaration that the application might infringe the conditions laid down elsewhere in the Assimilated Regulation, it is void.  The Claim The Tribunal was required to consider, among other issues, its jurisdiction to hear the appeals, the appellants’ legitimate interest in opposing the amendment, and the substantive compliance of the amendment with Article 6(2).  The appellants asserted a legitimate interest in protecting consumers of Scottish salmon, emphasizing consumer protection and informed choice as objectives of the Assimilated Regulation.  The appellants also contended that the amendment breaches Article 6(2) of the Assimilated Regulation, which prohibits registration of names that conflict with the name of an animal breed, and are likely to mislead consumers as to the product’s true origin. This is because ‘farmed salmon’ constitutes an animal breed distinct from wild salmon, and that removing ‘farmed’ from the PGI name creates a conflict with this breed name, likely misleading consumers.  The appellants also contend that ‘true origin’ should be interpreted broadly to include essential characteristics of the product, such as being farmed, not merely geographical origin. They criticise the removal of ‘farmed’ as diluting the specificity of the PGI and potentially misleading consumers about production steps and product characteristics.  The Defence  The respondent DEFRA argued that ‘legitimate interest’ requires an economic interest, limiting standing to producers rather than consumer advocates.  The respondent also contended that the term ‘conflicts’ in Article 6(2) means identity or near identity, and since ‘Scottish Salmon’ is not identical to the breed name ‘farmed salmon’, no conflict exists. The respondent interpreted ‘true origin’ as referencing solely to geographical origin, asserting that ‘Scottish Salmon’ correctly identifies the product’s geographic origin, and thus consumers are not misled. DEFRA argued that labelling rules will ensure consumers are informed that the salmon is farmed, mitigating any risk of confusion. The respondent maintained that the appellants’ reasoned statements of opposition were inadmissible and that there is no right to appeal such a determination. The Decision  The Tribunal dismissed the appellants’ appeals against DEFRA's decision to approve the non-minor amendment to the PGI, changing the name from ‘Scottish Farmed Salmon’ to ‘Scottish Salmon’. The Tribunal confirmed that both appellants had legitimate interests and that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeals, but found no breach of Article 6(2) of the Assimilated Regulation.  Standing The Tribunal rejected the respondent DEFRA’s narrow interpretation that only persons with an economic interest (i.e. producers) have standing. They relied on the purposive approach and the Court of Justice of the European Union’s  reasoning in Hengsteinberg GmbH & Co. KG v Spreewaldvereinev (C-53/20), and held that legitimate interests include a broader range of persons, including those with consumer protection interests. Both appellants, being charities advocating for consumer and environmental interests related to salmon products, were found to satisfy the threshold for legitimate interest. They noted that the threshold for legitimate interest is not demanding and that the legislative intent was to allow a wide range of persons to oppose amendments to PGIs. They accepted that both appellants were entitled to, and did, lodge a notice of opposition, and that FtT has the jurisdiction to determine both appellants’ appeals.  The amendment  Regarding the substantive issue under Article 6(2), the Tribunal identified two connected requirements: first, whether the proposed GI name conflicts with the name of an animal breed; second, whether the name is likely to mislead consumers as to the true origin of the product.  The Tribunal found that ‘farmed salmon’ constitutes an animal breed as agreed by both parties, and ‘Scottish Salmon’ is sufficiently similar to the breed ‘farmed salmon’ to require a full inquiry into the likelihood of consumer confusion.  On the second limb, the Tribunal also interpreted ‘true origin’ purposively as meaning true geographical origin only, consistent with the definition of geographical indications and the product specification requirements. The appellants did not contend that the amended PGI would mislead consumers about geographical origin, and the Tribunal agreed that the amendment does not mislead consumers in this respect.  The Tribunal also rejected the appellants’ broader arguments that removing ‘farmed’ undermines the product’s essential characteristics or production steps, finding that the production specification and geographical nexus requirements remains satisfied.  Finally, the Tribunal noted that there is no right to appeal DEFRA’s decision to treat reasoned statements of opposition as inadmissible, and that the appeal before it only concerns DEFRA’s approval of the amendment application.  Commentary  The decision clarifies the interpretation of legitimate interest and the application of Article 6(2). The Tribunal found that the term ‘legitimate interest’ should be interpreted widely, and in particular, that it is not restricted to those who have a legitimate economic interest in the examination of an PGI amendment application. Regarding the substantive issue under Article 6(2), the Tribunal identified two requirements: first, whether the proposed GI name conflicts with the name of an animal breed; second, whether the name is likely to mislead consumers as to the true origin of the product. The second limb relating to ‘true origin’ means true geographical origin only. The current ruling has significant implications for animal law advocates seeking transparency in food chain production. The Tribunal held that the ‘true origin’ requirement in Article 6(2) means true geographical origin only, which meant that producers in this case can remove the word ‘farmed’ from the initial product specification ‘Scottish farmed salmon’ without misleading consumers as to its geographical origin. It creates greater barriers for consumers who wish to make more ethical and informed consumer choices based on the method of production.  Advocates for Animals is due to appeal this decision in May on behalf of Animal Equality. It is represented by Alex Shattock of Landmark Chambers.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Ford v Wiley (1889) 23 QBD 203 (QB Divisional Court) Facts The defendant farmer arranged for 32 cattle to have their horns sawn off close to the head. The evidence showed the animals experienced bleeding, infection, and prolonged suffering, with some still discharging pus weeks later. Veterinary experts testified that the operation caused excruciating and prolonged pain and provided no benefit to the animals.  The farmer’s reasons were commercial and practical, for example dehorned cattle fetched higher prices, more animals could be kept or transported together, and the cattle could not gore one another. The Magistrates Court dismissed cruelty charges under the Protection of Animals Act 1849. The prosecutor appealed by way of case stated, arguing that dehorning was not legally justifiable.  Law The relevant provision was under the Protection of Animals Act 1849, where section 2 made it an offence to cruelly abuse, ill-treat, or torture an animal or cause an animal to be cruelly abused or tortured.  Judgment The Divisional Court found that the Magistrates Court should have convicted.  It found that the dehorning as performed caused extreme and prolonged suffering and that the purposes of higher price, easier management, packing efficiency were commercial advantages only, not necessity. The Court also found less painful alternatives existed, for example removing horn tips. It was held that the suffering was unnecessary and disproportionate, amounting to cruelty under the statute. The case was sent back to the Magistrates Court for conviction.  Commentary Ford v Wiley is a leading case establishing the modern proportionality approach in animal welfare law. Cruelty arises where suffering is unnecessary, and whether suffering is necessary depends on whether it is proportionate to a legitimate aim. The Court made clear that “necessity” does not include mere convenience, increased profit, or efficiency. Economic benefit alone cannot justify serious animal suffering. Liability depends on whether the conduct was objectively justified, not whether the farmer believed it to be necessary. Although the case itself did not expressly address the use of anaesthesia, when interpreted through a modern welfare law framework the decision reflects the principle that, where a painful procedure is carried out, reasonable steps should be taken to minimise suffering. Today, dehorning is legally permitted but is tightly regulated and requires the use of anaesthetic under the Mutilations (Permitted Procedures) (England) Regulations 2007. In practice, earlier and less invasive methods, such as debudding, are more commonly used. Where dehorning is performed, the stated justification is typically animal welfare for example, preventing injury to other cattle, or preventing injury to handlers. In light of the Ford v Wiley principle, increasing the level of suffering, whether than be through using a more painful method or failing to administer pain mitigation, for reasons of cost, convenience, or efficiency would be difficult to justify, as commercial advantage alone is not a legitimate basis for causing avoidable suffering. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

2025 has been a big year for us and our clients. From establishing legal principles and wins in court through to raising awareness of animal law. We are beyond grateful for the progress we have been able to make. Some highlights from 2025 include: We brought a planning permission case on behalf of our client Animal Equality and in doing so established the principle that animal welfare can be a material consideration in planning decisions. We are already seeing momentum and improvements for animals in decisions that affect their lives. You can learn more here . On behalf of our client, The Animal Law Foundation, we were granted permission to judicially review the change in law that dilutes animal welfare standards and allows chickens to be handled by their legs, something which causes significant suffering and is standard practice on chicken farms. You can learn more here . The hearing is in early February 2026. We won a private prosecution on behalf of our client Animal Justice Project against calf traders who were caught abusing animals. You can learn more here . We were shortlisted for Specialist Law Firm of the Year at The Lawyer Awards , a significant recognition that animal law is gaining the credibility it deserves. We continue to spread the word of Advocates for Animals and our work, which helps raise awareness of animal law and animal legal protections. You can see some coverage here  and here . Thank you to all of those who continue to support us, we could not do it without you.