3 and 4 May 2023 URL : http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2023/1243.html Citation : [2023] EWHC 1243 (Admin) Advocates for Animals acted for The Humane League UK (THL), who brought a judicial review against the Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs ('the Secretary of State' or 'Defra') for the use of fast growing chickens bred for meat (broilers). National Farmers Union was an interested party in the case and The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) was an intervenor. The facts The case centred around the use of broiler chickens that have been genetically selected to prioritise fast growth to produce the most meat in the shortest time possible. This growth rate causes health and welfare issues, which include: (i) heart attacks, (ii) lameness, (iii) green muscle disease, (iv) hock burns and (v) organ failure. The RSPCA published a report in March 2020, which for the first time looked holistically at health and welfare issues attached to fast growth by comparing three fast growing breeds against a slower growing counterpart. Its executive summary states that the genetic selection of meat chickens for performance contributes to welfare problems such as chronic leg disorders, heart and circulatory problems. It also discusses the reduction in activities and behavioural patterns such as: 'less active, spending less time walking and standing, and more time feeding and sitting, and spent less time engaged in enrichment type behaviours: foraging, perching and dust bathing.' The trigger system assesses the results of inspections that are carried out by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) staff at slaughterhouses to determine if there are any welfare problems on a farm. The welfare conditions that are assessed are: Ascites/Oedema Cellulitis & Dermatitis Dead on Arrival (DOA) Emaciation Joint lesions Septicaemia/Respiratory Total rejections Cumulative Daily Mortality Rate A 'trigger report' is produced if post- mortem conditions exceed a defined threshold in respect of chickens from the same flock. Annex 3 of The Code of Practice for the welfare of meat chickens summarises the thresholds as follows: Process 1: A trigger report is generated if the level of a post-mortem condition is exceptionally high (defined as greater than 6 standard deviations above the average). Process 2: A trigger report is generated if the Cumulative Daily Mortality Rate is unusually high (defined as greater than 3 standard deviations above the average = 7.37%) and, additionally, the level of three or more other post-mortem conditions is high (defined as above the average). The trigger report is shared with the producer and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) which then identifies farms at highest risk on non-compliance. The law The primary legal framework of this judicial review rests on: (i) Directive 98/58/EC or the 'Farming Directive' and (ii) Directive 2007/43/EC or the 'Chicken Directive' and the domestic transposed legislation. The Farming Directive recognises the need for common minimum standards for the protection of animals that are kept for farming purposes. It ensures no animal must be kept unless it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of its genotype or phenotype, that it can be kept without ‘detrimental effect on its health or welfare’. The Chicken Directive sets down minimum rules for the protection of chickens kept for meat production. It also includes monitoring requirements to ensure that welfare detriment is detected and reported. The above requirements are transposed into UK law through The Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 (WOFAR), which places a duty on people responsible for farmed animals to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the conditions under which the animal is bred or kept comply with Schedule 1 . In addition a person responsible for conventionally reared meat chickens must comply with Part 2 of Schedule 5A Schedule 1 includes a similar requirement to the Farming Directive Requirement, this being: Paragraph 29 Animals may only be kept for farming purposes if it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detrimental effect on their health or welfare. Schedule 5A derives from the Chicken Directive and states: Part 2, paragraph 15 (1) An official veterinarian conducting controls under Regulation (EU) 2017/625 in relation to chickens must evaluate the results of the post-mortem inspection to identify possible indications of poor welfare conditions in their holding or house of origin. (2) If the mortality rate of the chickens or the results of the post-mortem inspection are consistent with poor animal welfare conditions, the official veterinarian must communicate the data to the keeper of those chickens and to the Secretary of State without delay. The claim THL asserted that the defendant was in violation of paragraph 29 through the use of fast growing chickens, by virtue of the detriment experienced based on their genetic makeup. THL argued that the Secretary of State had misdirected herself as to the correct interpretation of paragraph 29, which had manifested in a range of unlawful practices and policies, including: A flawed code of practice, which did not offer any clarity on paragraph 29 A flawed position that commercial productivity is a relevant consideration when complying with paragraph 29 A failure to undertake any prosecutions for breaches of paragraph 29 THL put forward its interpretation of paragraph 29 as meaning if animals whose genotype or phenotype is such that, in modern farming conditions, detrimental effects on health and welfare arise, then they cannot be kept. THL claimed that the prohibition was a conditional permission and if this conditional permission was not satisfied, keeping of the animal would be prohibited. THL asked the Court to provide its interpretation of the provision. The claimants also submitted that the Secretary of State had an unlawful monitoring enforcement mechanism termed 'trigger system'. It was argued before the judge that the trigger System needed to factor in the paragraph 29 duty to detect any breaches of that provision. Further, it was argued that the trigger system had set the thresholds for detecting and reporting welfare issues unlawfully high as per the requirements under paragraph 15 Schedule 5A WOFAR and even if a report was triggered, it would not ordinarily lead to an APHA inspection. THL also claimed that action being taken against non-compliant producers outside of the trigger system was remote. THL argued therefore that the system had an effect of concealing rather than revealing the true extent of the welfare problems. A final argument was that the trigger system violates the principle of equal treatment as applied between compliant producers on the one-hand and non-compliant producers on the other. The operation of the trigger system treats compliant and non-compliant producers equally, but without justification. Non-compliant lower-welfare producers whose flocks suffer much higher levels of detriment are being treated identically, through non-enforcement, compared to higher welfare producers whose flocks exhibit much lower levels of welfare detriment and are more likely to be compliant. This is to the benefit of non-compliant producers who avoid regulatory costs without any material sanction, thereby skewing the market. The defence The Secretary of State argued that she had no policy that condoned or permitted the use of fast growing chickens, despite fast- growing breeds being standard in the industry. The Secretary of State acknowledged that there are higher welfare issues and risks with fast- growing breeds; however, it was argued that environmental conditions have a significant influence on the welfare for both fast and slow- growing breeds, such as: lower stocking densities and the use of straw bales or step platforms. As such it was reasoned that there is no scientifically agreed definition of what constitutes as detriment to welfare, and the risks of fast growth does not automatically result in 'unacceptably poor welfare in all circumstances and therefore cannot (based on their genetics) be kept without detriment to their health and welfare'. The Secretary of State argued that the trigger system was often cited as an example of 'best practice' to monitor on- farm welfare issues and that the thresholds chosen were at appropriate levels to ensure proper reporting of poor welfare conditions. It was also claimed that there were other referral and complaints mechanisms. The Secretary of State argued the unequal treatment ground was parasitic on the success of the other two grounds and as such it should fail. The judgment A wealth of scientific evidence was presented to the Court along with the RSPCA report, this included a recent report by the European Food Safety Authority 2022, which concluded that fast growth causes welfare detriment. The Court concluded that it was not its task to form a view on the scientific literature regarding fast-growing chickens [79], but that the task is to review what the Secretary of State has done and to decide whether it falls short in public law terms. The Court found that the Secretary of State assessed the literature and took advice from expert advisers, which led to her reaching the judgment that environmental conditions have some bearing on the health and welfare of fast-growing chickens. The Court found that the conclusion is not irrational, and it cannot be said to have left out material findings to which she should have given attention [78]. The Court was also asked to define the meaning of paragraph 29. The Court found that the construction of paragraph 29 must take account of the potential criminal liability to which its breach can lead and as such required a narrower interpretation than what otherwise may obtain, as such it rules out that paragraph 29 constitutes a conditional permission if this means that keepers of animals are prohibited from keeping them subject to the condition that they can satisfy a criminal court (in practice, the magistrates' court) that as regards their genotype or phenotype they can be kept without detrimental effect on their health or welfare [88]. The Court felt that it was putting the burden too high to expect keepers to be familiar with scientific literature to prove this [91]. The Court ruled that paragraph 29 meant: given the breed of animal chosen for keeping for farming purposes, it must reasonably be expected by the reasonable person responsible for them that given their genotype or phenotype they can be kept in appropriate conditions without any obvious or deleterious effect on their health or welfare [94].The Court found that there was no support in the language or context of 'kept for farming purposes' that meant kept in reasonably foreseeable farming conditions. Rather the Court found that paragraph 29 does not mean kept in any particular farming conditions and that it could mean kept in environmental conditions which improve the health and welfare outcomes of the animals from what might be the case if kept in other conditions. The Court concluded that the obligation under paragraph 29 is on the keeper who must keep the breed chosen in appropriate conditions without any detrimental effect on the animals' health or welfare [93]. Turning to the trigger system, the Court found that paragraph 15(2) of Schedule 5A does not quantify the thresholds to trigger reporting or further action and that the Secretary of State has also established other referral and complaints mechanisms for enforcement [106]. The Court concluded that as a matter of judgment the Secretary of State has chosen these thresholds as the appropriate levels to ensure reporting of poor welfare conditions and that the criticisms do not meet the high threshold for a successful irrationality challenge, especially in this type of technical area where experts can differ [107]. Finally, on the principle of equal treatment, consistency of treatment is regarded as rational behaviour, so that inconsistent treatment is only reviewable if it is deemed irrational. The Court stated that even if it could be shown that the trigger system leads to failures of enforcement, that of itself would not amount to inconsistent treatment and even if inconsistent treatment was established then you would need to show such treatment was irrational. The Court concluded this had not been evidenced [109]. Commentary The fate of billions of animals was hanging in the balance. Despite evidence that fast-growing chickens suffer from lameness, heart attacks, organ failure and burns to the skin, the Court ruled in favour of the government on technical grounds. It is THL’s view that the law clearly applies to the detriment suffered in standard conditions, of which the science proving this happens is plentiful, but in any event adjusting the birds’ environment is not enough to improve their welfare since the complications arise from their genes itself. Whilst the trigger system may have been deemed proportionate by the Court, the issues connected to it still continue. The high thresholds mean unlawful producers go undetected and issues go unaddressed. The judgment essentially shifts the onus on the farmers, requiring them to find the environment where the breeds can be kept without detriment. This is a significant burden when the legislation and guidance is geared towards the standard conditions. An appeal has been launched against the High Court’s decision. Advocates for Animals instructed Brendan McGurk and Ed Brown KC. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Citation: [2023] NIKB The facts On 24 March 2022, the Department for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) made the decision to implement a non-selective cull of badgers as part of its strategy for controlling bovine tuberculosis (bTB) within Northern Ireland. This decision was made in reference to a consultation that took place in July 2021, which included releasing a consultation paper to the public and asking for their views on how best to eradicate bTB among other things. However for the sake of this case, only the part of the consultation that dealt with badger intervention was discussed. There was also much reference within the March 2022 decision to a submitted business case, this was disclosed to the court and the parties; however this was not disclosed to the public. This cull would involve the controlled shooting (often referred to as ‘free-shooting’) of wild badgers and would be non-selective i.e. infected badgers and healthy badgers would be killed. It was to be delivered and paid for by farmer-led companies. The cull was due to begin in November 2023. Northern Ireland Badger Group (NIBG) and Wild Justice (WJ) raised issue with this approach. In response to the consultation NIBG stated that there was no quantified research that would support the claim that badgers transmit bTB to cattle. They even quoted a section on DAERA’s website which agreed with this statement. In short. The applicants contended that bTB is spread by and between cattle and that there is limited (if any at all) evidential basis for the suggestion that badgers materially contribute to the infection of herds. The applicants therefore submitted that the most efficient way to manage the spread of bTB within cattle would be to use cattle-based control methods instead. It was also stated that the open shooting of badgers was not the ‘only option’ available to DAERA, and that there were a number of more humane methods that could be used instead. They advocated for the use of the ‘Trap, Vaccinate, Remove (TVR)' programme, which involved trapping wild badgers and testing them for bTB. If they were free from the infection, they would be vaccinated and released, but if they were infected then they would be humanely killed. This approach had been taken by the department in a research project during 2014-2019 and provided successful results. Open shooting had also been shown previously to be ineffective in killing badgers immediately; some badgers once shot took up to five minutes to die, whilst many would only be injured and could escape. The law The public law requirements in respect of consultations carried out by public authorities, as to proposal which affect the rights and interests of others, are well established. These requirements are referred to as ‘the Gunning Principles’, which came about following the case of R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168 . The principles were then re-affirmed in the case of R v north and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan (2001) QB 213 ; the principles can also be referred to as ‘the Coughlan Principles’. These principles are: (1) the consultation must be undertaken when the proposals are at a formative stage; (2) there must be sufficient reasons given for particular proposals to allow those consulted to give intelligent consideration and an intelligent response; (3) adequate time must be afforded for this; and (4) the product of the consultation must be conscientiously taken into account when the decision is taken. These principles have been discussed at length within caselaw, which centres on the fact that to be lawful, a consultation process must be fair. The Gunning Principles represent elements of what fairness requires; however, this is a highly context-specific question, depending upon the facts and context of the particular case. In some circumstances, fairness may require that interested persons are consulted not only upon the preferred option but also upon arguable yet discarded alternative options. Under Article 13(1) of The Diseases of Animals (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, DAERA may provide for the destruction of a wild animal population within an area, where a disease, other than rabies, exists within the population of wild animals, which can be transmitted to livestock within the area, and where the destruction of the wildlife population is necessary to reduce the risk or eradicate the disease in livestock. Article 13(2) states that any order must specify the area to which any order will relate and Article 13(3) allows for methods of destruction that would in other circumstances be deemed unlawful be used if the method is deemed to be the most appropriate. The Wildlife Order (Northern Ireland) 1985 provides protection to badgers and their setts. Under Article 10(1) of this order, a person will be guilty of an offence if they intentionally or recklessly kill, injure or take a badger. It is therefore generally an offence to have a badger (either alive or dead) in one’s possession or control. Article 10 does not apply to anything done for the purpose of preventing the spread of disease or for the purpose of preventing serious damage to livestock, if done under or according to a licence granted by DAERA. The Welfare of Animals Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 makes it a criminal offence under Section 4(1) for a person in certain circumstances to cause unnecessary suffering to an animal. Whether or not the suffering is unnecessary is to be determined having regard to a number of considerations set out in section 4(3). The claim The central plank of NIBG and WJ's challenge was an alleged failure to conduct a proper and lawful consultation namely: That DAERA failed to disclose adequate information in the course of the consultation to permit properly informed response; and, that the Minister failed to give conscientious consideration to the product of the consultation in some respects. DAERA and the Minister had referred heavily throughout their March 2022 decision to a business case that had been submitted to them, which outlined the options available to them and the pros and cons of each option. This business case however was never disclosed to the consultees. NIBG and WJ also submitted that the Minister had not been told in detail why NIBG and other consultees had objected to their proposed option, i.e. that the Minister had not been fully informed as to the inhumanness of the open shooting. Northern Ireland Badger Group and Wild Justice were represented by David Wolfe KC and Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, who were instructed by Leigh Day and Phoenix Law. The defence DAERA relied heavily on evidence that the health problem presented by bTB was a very serious one, including the fact that close to 10% of all herd keepers within Northern Ireland were subject to some form of restriction. It submitted that any approach to eradicate bTB had to address all factors of disease spread and maintenance. DAERA submitted that NIBG and all other consultees had been involved in the consultation process for many years prior to the 2021 process, which was considered in the Ministers March 2022 decision. DAERA also submitted that business cases are not normally published and that there was a risk, in the event that the lengthy business case, that consultees would lose focus on the relevant material. DAERA also submitted that the Minister had been told about the relevant information in responses that NIBG and other consultees had submitted, as this was covered by the responses given by another organisation The Ulster Wildlife Trust (UWT). The Minister had also met with UWT in person to discuss the response. The Minister therefore had properly considered their objections to the proposed option of non-selective open-shooting. The Defendant was represented by Tony McGleenan KC, Philip McAteer and Laura Curran who were instructed by the Departmental Solicitor’s Office. The judgment The judge held that there was no unfairness in the Minister not being told that NIBG and others shared particular concerns, which had been raised by other groups with a similar outlook. The judge felt that this amount of detail was not necessary for the Minister to be able to make his decision. A summary report had been given to the Minister where it was made clear to the Minister that all environmental organisations that responded were against the option that had been chosen. The judge, however, held that whilst the Defendant had identified a clearly preferred option, it declined to provide consultees with the analysis underpinning its selection of that option and therefore the applicants (and other consultees) were not provided with a fair opportunity to respond in sufficient detail. For example, the business case was central to the Defendant's thinking and to the basis for its selection of open-shooting as the preferred option, as such it should have been provided. There was no proper reason for concealing the detailed analysis which lay behind the selection of this option from those who were to be consulted. The judge also held that DAERA had failed to conscientiously consider the product of the consultation exercise, in that the Minister ought to have been advised, but was not, of the evidential basis upon which a number of the consultees contended that the Defendant's preferred option represented an inhumane option which would give rise to unnecessary suffering. The application for Judicial Review was therefore granted. The judge also quashed the Defendant's decision to implement a non-selective cull of badgers by way of controlled shooting as part of DAERA'S bTB eradication strategy. All other aspects of the Strategy remain unaffected by this decision. The judge did however also make it clear that this judgment was to deal with the procedural fairness of the process conducted to date, and nothing in the judgment should be read as any comment upon the substance of the options under consideration, which is a matter for DAERA. Commentary This case highlights the importance of procedural fairness, and puts the onus on the government department to provide all necessary information when seeking responses from consultees. It had been discussed at length throughout the case that one of the biggest concerns raised by consultees had been the inhumanness of DAERA’s proposed option of the open-shooting, especially when there was very limited scientific evidence to support such an activity. Scientific evidence had yet to show any quantifiable link between badger culling and the spread of bTB to livestock, and instead supported cattle-based intervention programmes over that of badger-based. The case also shows that a balance needs to be struck between the most efficient option for intervention and the most humane option. Since the Minister had not been provided with the evidential support that was contained within the consultees responses, he had therefore not been able to fully consider whether the proposed option was humane. Advocates for Animals hope that this case will encourage government bodies to increase their levels of transparency when it comes to consultation practises and will also encourage government ministers and decision makers to consider a consultees response in more detail. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This case was about a break up and a subsequent dispute over the ownership of a dog that was rescued during the relationship. Advocates for Animals (AfA) represented the Defendant (who later became the Appellant), SK, in the appeal proceedings. AfA would not normally act in a pure 'property' dispute. However, the case had unusual features and presented an opportunity to question the legal principle that, as chattels, animals are subject to the same rules of property law as inanimate objects. AfA believes the interest of the animal should be taken into account.  The facts The Claimant (DM) and The Defendant (SK) planned to adopt a dog in late 2020/early 2021. This dog would be a companion for SK’s other dog The rescue charity required the new home to have a resident dog to keep the rescued pup company, this was satisfied by SK’s other dog.  A home check took place on 9 February, which was signed and dated by SK as ‘the person being home checked’. On 19 March 2021 the contract was sent to DM’s email address and transferred the adoption fee, with SK claiming to have paid more household bills that month. SK took the first week off work so that she could help the dog settle in and continued to work from home thereafter.  DM did not work from home.  SK set up the dogs pet insurance with PetPlan and registered the dog at the vets soon after he arrived and took him to his first ‘puppy health check’ on 25 May 2021. SK also organised his first flea and worm treatment at this appointment. SK covered all the vet treatment.  SK ended the relationship with DM in April 2021, but they remained living together on amicable terms until 31 August 2021. When SK and DM moved into separate properties on 31 August 2021, the dogs stayed with SK, with DM taking occasional custody of the dogs.     This arrangement was suddenly called into question when on 8 January 2022, after taking the dogs for the night, DM sent a message to SK stating that having a dog share doesn’t work long term. DM later returned the dogs to SK.  Despite the previous event, on 18 January 2022, DM asked to see the dogs. SK went for a walk with him. The walk quickly became tense and when SK went back to her car, DM took the dog from the boot and started running to his car with him. Some strangers helped get the dog back, the police were called and the matter was reported.  On 8 February 2022, SK received a letter of claim for the possession of the dog.  First instance hearing Apart from DM having initial legal counsel, both parties were litigants in person in the case of first instance.         Deputy District Judge Jabbour, on 3 February 2023, found in favour of DM, primarily on the basis that he signed the adoption contract and transferred the adoption fee. The judge stated the following: I made clear to the parties at the beginning of the hearing, and I should state I explained that this was very much a binary process, that [the dog], or indeed any other dog or pet, is treated as property in the eyes of the law, these are civil proceedings as the parties were not married. Whilst the parties may have, and do have, strong attachments to [the dog], in the eyes of the law [the dog] is property and as the claim is effectively pleaded as such, the Court approaches the matter on that basis, notwithstanding the strong feelings of attachment that both parties may have for [the dog].  Therefore, for all of those reasons I find that on the balance of probabilities the intention was that [DM] would be the sole owner and adopter of [the dog], and that is the adoption contract that was signed. Of course there is no doubt that [SK] did look after [the dog] very well. [DM] is not suggesting otherwise. The fact that she is an experienced dog owner and handler and trainer is noted, but unfortunately those are not relevant to the issue of legal ownership and intent. Again, I reconfirm that the payment of the adoption fee is again consistent and supports my finding that [DM] was intended to be the sole owner. SK came to Advocates for Animals to appeal the decision.  The decision as to who is the owner was decided on a question of fact, as such the appeal focused on the point of law that after finding that DM was the owner, the judge should have used their discretion to decide the most suitable remedy. Permission was granted on this basis.  The appeal Relevant law The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977   Subsection 3(1)  In proceedings for wrongful interference against a person who is in possession of in control of goods relief may be given in accordance with this section, as far as appropriate.  Section 3(2)  The relief is – an order for delivery of the goods, and for payment of consequential damages, or an order for delivery of the goods, but giving the defendant the alternative of paying damages by reference to the value of the goods, together in either alternative with payment of any consequential damages, or damages. Section 3(3) (a)relief shall be given under only one of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (2)             (b)relief under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) is at the discretion of the court, and the claimant may choose between the others. Sharma & Sharma v Pumridge, Roper & McNeil 1991 WL11780401  This case concerned two dogs. There was a judgment in the County Court ordering delivery up of the dogs to the plaintiffs by two of the Defendants. These dogs had bred and then been sold and delivered to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs lived in comfortable premises and had a run and shed for the dogs which escaped on 05.12.87 and were found running loose and delivered to after seven days under the Dogs Act 1906 to an organisation called Collie Rescue which placed the dogs with two of the Defendants where they remained. In the Court of Appeal, the court’s discretion under subsections 3(2)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the 1977 Act was considered. Lord Justice Dillon stated in his judgment: Thus an order for delivery up of the goods without any option in the defendant of of paying damages is an order to be made at the discretion of the court. This is in line with long-established law…….[LJ Dillon then quotes from the case of Whitely Limited v Hilt [1918] 2KB 808]….  But, in my judgment, as the matter is in the discretion of the court and indeed on the authorities the order for delivery up of a specific chattel is an exception rather than the general rule, factors such as the time the animals had been with Miss Roper and Mrs McNeil, and the fact that for the last year or thereabouts Mr and Mr Sharma had acquired two more collie dogs, are matters which the judge was fully entitled to take into account when considering whether or not to exercise the discretion under section 3(2) of the 1977 Act. He was persuaded to the contrary, but wrongly, in my judgment, so persuaded. Therefore the position is that he has not exercised any judicial discretion under that section as expressly required by the words of that section.   …….. One cannot consider the one factor as a reason why an order for specific delivery up should be made without also taking into account the other factors……. Bearing the lapse of time in mind and the other matters I have just mentioned, I frankly regard it as silly that these dogs should be taken now, more than a year after the judge’s order, when even then there has been the long lapse of time since the dogs were last with the plaintiffs, and be delivered back to the plaintiffs who already have their two other collie dogs. I take the view that this is, and indeed was at the time it was tried by the judge, emphatically as case where an award of damages is sufficient compensation.                                   Lord Just Stocker agreed stating:  …..it seems to me that only harm could be done to either of the protagonists or indeed the dogs were they now to be uprooted and returned to their original owners, the Sharmas….In my view, the exercise of discretion which my Lord has proposed and with which I wholly agree accords not only with the proper exercise of discretion but with the application of common sense.  Orton, Clarke & Jamieson v Lane , Case Number E00HF536 The county court case of Orton v Lane involved the possession of a rescue dog called Sylvie, and also concerned the court’s discretion under section 3 of the 1977 Act and the failure of a District Judge to exercise her discretion or consider any options available to her. You can read that case summary here .   The Learned Judge considered the relief under section 3 and referred (at paragraph 23) to the discretion available to the court which the District Judge   in that case, as here, had failed to recognise. There were options available to the District Judge which she had failed to consider. The Learned Judge said that|:- in failing to decide what remedy was available, she failed to exercise her discretion and it is now for me to exercise my discretion in her place. The judge allowed the appeal against an order for delivery up of the dog and described Sylvie as 'unique' and 'a sentient being' and that 'she had a relatively small market value but clearly a substantial emotional one'. The Learned Judge stated there were 'two sides to be balanced'. The judge found that damages were an adequate remedy for the deprivation of Sylvie and allowed the appeal, ordering a payment by way of damages instead of delivery up of Sylvie and order that, on payment of the damages, the ownership of Sylvie would be transferred to Ms Lane, the Appellant. The judgment On 8 December 2023, District Judge Simpkiss found in favour of the Appellant and allowed the dog to stay with SK, setting aside Judge Jabbour’s order. The judge also ordered that DM’s ownership of the dog be extinguished and instead have it vested in SK.  SK was ordered to pay nominal damages, a deemed necessary measure when exercising the discretion, which was set off against the cost of maintenance for the dog; bringing the sum payable to DM to zero. In addition SK was awarded her fixed costs in the proceedings.  In reaching his decision, Judge Simpkiss found that Judge Jabbour, after finding DM was the owner of the dog, had not exercised her discretion under the 1977 Act as to the most appropriate remedy.  Judge Simpkiss then went on to consider the most appropriate remedy, the factors he considered included:  The dog was purchased jointly  When they broke up they had a shared custody arrangement, but the dog primarily resided with SK Ownership by DM was technical SK looked after the dog well The dog was bonded with the other dog that lived with SK Commentary  The first instance judge found DM was the owner on a question of fact, this being that DM signed the agreement and paid the fee. SK disputes that it was ever the intention that DM owned the dog. The appeal was confined to a question of law, this being the the lack of discretion exercised by the first judge. When arguing on discretion, SK was able to make representations that the best interest of the dog should be taken into account above their property status. In doing so she was able to overturn the previous decision.  Our clients are often outraged that nonhuman animals under their care are considered mere property, or 'things', under law, and they believe that this does not reflect the status or value they deserve. We will continue to represent clients when animals are treated as mere property, without their real value and interests taken into account. Advocates for Animals was instructed as the solicitors for the Appellant, who were represented at trial by Edmund Walters of 42 Bedford Row Barristers.  Brighton County Court: 8 December 2023  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Fitzgerald v CPS [2024] EWHC 869 (Admin):  https://bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2024/869.pdf On 16 April 2024, the High Court quashed a dog destruction order and replaced it with a contingent destruction order. This meant that instead of being euthanised, a dog called ‘Yosser’ would be rehomed with a new human under certain strict conditions. The case reviewed and clarified the approach to deciding whether a dog should be destroyed following their human companion’s conviction under s.3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991; and in particular the status of an uncontested expert’s report in a case of this kind.  The facts Yosser had been in the care of a vulnerable man who had mental and physical health problems. Yosser’s human companion was so mentally and physically unwell that he ended up being sectioned under The Mental Health Act. During his decline, he sadly lost control of Yosser on a number of occasions.  There had been an incident on 24 April 2021 where Yosser bit a visiting surveyor but he had not pieced the skin, and no formal action had been taken.  A few months later on 27 July 2021, Yosser had bitten another dog and, when the keeper of the other dog got involved, they had feared that they might be injured too. No injury was actually caused to any human in that case. Yosser’s human companion pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to s.3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, and a 'contingent destruction order' (CDO) was imposed in respect of Yosser, requiring that he be euthanised unless kept on a muzzle and lead when in public.  On 22 February 2022 there was a third incident that gave rise to this case. Whilst his muzzle was being readjusted, Yosser pulled away and jumped up and nipped or mouthed the victim’s arm, leaving a mark but not breaking the skin.  Yosser’s keeper pleaded guilty to an aggravated offence contrary to s.3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and the magistrates made a 'dog destruction order' (DDO). There was no expert report before them and it was unclear what conditions were forward that could have persuaded the court to suspend destruction a second time.   Yosser’s keeper had a brother who was an experienced dog owner and fond of Yosser. He got involved and helped secure two assistance specialist solicitors, a specialist barrister and an expert in dog behaviour; and an appeal was made to the Crown Court.  The expert provided a detailed report and concluded that Yosser would not be a danger to public safety if rehomed to the brother; and that the brother had a suitable home and was a fit and proper person to take charge of him and could be trusted to adhere to a muzzle and lead condition.  The prosecution read the report and confirmed in writing that they did not dispute the opinion and that the expert did not need to come to court to give evidence or be challenged on it.  Despite this, the Crown Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the destruction order. They noted that the expert had not assessed Yosser in a public place as he had been seized by police at the time. They did not deal expressly with why rehoming to the brother would not address any concerns about Yosser and simply said that they gave 'great regard' to the history in the case and that they had to uphold the Destruction Order because they could not be satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety.  The issues On appeal from the Crown Court to the High Court by way of case stated, there were four questions posed:  QUESTION 1: Did the Crown Court unlawfully and/or unreasonably fail to identify a rational or proper basis and/or give cogent reasons for departing from uncontradicted and unchallenged expert evidence that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety if released subject to certain conditions?  QUESTION 2: Was it unreasonable and/or irrelevant and/or unfair to take into consideration that the expert had not assessed the dog in a public place, given that the dog was at the time seized by police and so could only be inspected in circumstances prescribed by the police?  QUESTION 3: Did the court fall into error by failing to determine whether or not Terry FITZGERALD was a fit and proper person before deciding that it could not be satisfied that the dog would not be a danger to public safety if ownership and/or keepership were transferred to him?  QUESTION 4: On the facts of this case, was the conclusion that there were no conditions whatsoever that could be put in place that would ensure, on balance, that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have come to it?  Held Uncontested expert evidence  The court considered the leading criminal and civil cases on uncontested or uncontroverted expert evidence. Despite following from a criminal sentence, authorities suggest that a CDO or DDO are in fact part of the civil jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court and so the leading civil case of TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UK SC48 was considered in particular depth.  As explained at paragraphs [31]-[32], the effect of applying that case to these facts was that, unless certain exceptions applied that would provide a valid reason to depart from it, fairness required that uncontested expert evidence be accepted. The Crown Court’s decision was therefore unfair.  Seized dog not assessed in public  The only attempt the Crown Court had made to grapple with the expert report or its conclusions was the notice it took of the fact that the expert had not assessed the dog in public. At paragraph [24], the High Court was 'wholly unpersuaded by this attempt to minimise [the expert’s] findings'.  Three reasons were given at paragraph [24]:  'First, of course, she was unable to see Yosser in public areas because he was detained by the police. Secondly, [the expert] herself would have been only too aware of the fact that she had not seen Yosser in a public place but, on the face of her report, that did not affect her conclusions. Thirdly, if this was a real point of doubt or difficulty, and one which at least potentially undermined [the expert]’s conclusions, then fairness dictated that she should have been asked about it, rather than her report and recommendations simply being set to one side'. Proposed change of keeper No challenge had been made to various assertions in the brother’s statement, character references or the expert’s report that he would be a fit and proper person to take on Yosser. This was significant in a case where it was quite clear that Yosser’s former companion was not a fit match for him.  The High Court considered that the 'the failure to grapple with that issue is one of the main omissions in the Crown Court judgment' [paragraph 42].  A review of relevant authorities at paragraph [16] stressed 'Where a CDO is proposed, and particular conditions are put forward, a court which rejects those conditions must explain why they would not address the danger posed by the dog.' The High Court ruled at paragraph [35] that in this case, at best the reasons for the Crown Court’s rejection of this part of the proposal were implicit (which was contrary to the authorities reviewed). At worst, they were not addressed at all. Either way, the decision was unlawful.  So unreasonable no reasonable tribunal could agree The final ground of challenge was that the decision of the Crown Court was 'so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have come to it'. As an appeal by way of case stated is only allowed on a point of law, a challenge to the merits of the decision being appealed has a very high threshold.  This final ground was something of a catch all ground, where the arguments mirrored those made in respect of the issues above, but took aim at the merits rather than the legality or fairness. At paragraph [43] Lord Coulson stated in answer to the question of whether the high threshold for irrationality was met, 'It is probably not necessary to decide this question, because of my answers to the first three questions. But if required, I would say Yes, for the reasons set out above.' Commentary The ruling in Yosser’s case has been welcomed by those working in defence of allegedly dangerous dogs. Save our Seized Dogs Ltd, the company who funded Yosser’s appeal said 'This is not just a victory for Yossah, this case has set a precedent and can now be used to protect expert witness reports in any future cases'. Samuel March of 9 King’s Bench Walk, the specialist animal protection barrister acting for the appellant, said: 'This is first and foremost a life-saving ruling for Yosser, and a huge relief for his family and those who have supported them through this process. This is an important case to use in future cases where there has been a breach of a previous CDO. Very often, failure to adhere to basic safety measures imposed by a previous court order will be more indicative of safety issues at the human end of the leash. Yosser’s previous human companion was a sweet man, without any malice – but he was seriously unwell and not in the right state to take on the serious responsibility of a strong and energetic dog. This case makes it clear that even a breach of a previous CDO need not always be fatal for a dog – it may very well be that the dog just needs to be re-homed to someone experienced, willing and able to take the order seriously. Finally, the case puts to rest an uncertainty around the status of unchallenged experts in these cases. It has become common for the prosecution to agree, or at least not contest, expert reports about dogs. However, even where there is no dispute, there has been a lingering risk that courts would ignore the expert and go on to make life-and-death decisions about dogs they have never met and do not have the specialist knowledge to reliably form their own views about. Thanks to this case, we now have a considerable degree more certainty in terms of what an uncontroverted expert reports means for the outcome in this sort of case. Hopefully this will help avoid the wrongful destruction of other dogs in Yosser’s position. We had reached a point where experts were wasting time and money having to travel around the country to attend hearings on the off chance that a court might questions for them, even where it was clear that the prosecution did not'. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Angie Van Dijk July 2024 On June 4th, the administrative court (CBb) in the Netherlands ruled in the so-called “chicken catching” procedure (see also Uitspraak CBb kippenvangen ). The CBb has also devoted a press release to this ruling, which emphasises the social importance of this ruling: Persbericht CBb kippenvangen . Background to the case This legal dispute has been running since 2020 and concerns the question of whether chickens can be caught by their legs before they are put in transport crates. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 ( The Transport Regulation) is clear: catching chickens by the legs is against the law. Nevertheless, most chickens in the Netherlands (and EU/UK) are caught by their feet, resulting in many capture injuries such as bruises and broken bones.  This dispute has an impressive history: The Dutch regulator on animal welfare (NVWA) initially declared Dutch animal protection group Wakker Dier’s request for enforcement action against this practice inadmissible (2021), which means that it did not substantively assess the enforcement request. The CBb put a stop to this in 2021 and determined that the NVWA must indeed enforce compliance with the Transport Regulation. The NVWA subsequently carried out inspections on poultry service companies (catching teams) and imposed fines for violating the Transport Regulation. The poultry service companies have objected to these fines. The NVWA subsequently converted these fines into warnings in a new decision (a de facto promise that these violations would not be enforced). Wakker Dier has appealed against this decision to issue warnings to the Rotterdam court. The Rotterdam court ruled in favour of Wakker Dier in 2022, i.e. the NVWA must enforce the law on catching chickens by the legs and could not suffice with issuing warnings. The NVWA then made a new decision: the companies had to stop catching chickens before the end of August 2024. Both Wakker Dier and the poultry service companies have appealed against this to the CBb. The core questions on appeal before the CBb were whether (1) the Rotterdam court rightly ruled that the NVWA must enforce the Transport Regulation and that a warning was insufficient and (2) whether the NVWA has correctly imposed orders subject to a penalty. Wakker Dier believes that the compliance period until August 2024 is too long (after all, the issue has been running for a number of years); the companies believe this period is too short, and they also think the penalty connected to the order (€60,000) is too high. CBb ruling In this long-awaited ruling, the CBb decided the following:  Catching chickens by the legs is prohibited on the basis of the Transport Regulation. The fact that the newly proposed European Transport Regulation may contain an exception to this ban for chickens does not change this.  The ruling of the Rotterdam court is confirmed. This means that the NVWA cannot just issue a warning but must actually enforce the Transport Regulation with a penalty or an order subject to a penalty. The NVWA has not properly substantiated the orders subject to a penalty. This applies to both the amount and the length of the compliance period. These decisions are therefore annulled, and the NVWA must make new decisions. The interests of animals and the interests of companies must be weighed against each other. The latter appears to be a new development in case law. What’s next?  The NVWA must make a new decision before 15 August 2024. Wakker Dier will keep a close eye on this decision. To stay informed see: https://www.wakkerdier.nl/doe-mee/doneren/nalaten/?utm_source=GoogleGrants&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=TR-20462138557&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjwnqK1BhBvEiwAi7o0X0dBwq2NjspenRelxncgCDI1N1EvJUSl93TdbHbz8agGsBXmodUvbhoCWRAQAvD_BwE Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

23 and 24 October 2024 URL: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Humane-League-UK-v-Secretary-of-State-for-Environment-Food-and-Rural-Affairs.pdf   Citation : [2024] EWCA Civ 1560 Advocates for Animals acted for the Humane League UK (THL) in this recent appeal concerning the welfare of 'fast-growing chickens'. The case was against the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Secretary of State). The National Farmers Union was an interested party, and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) and the British Poultry Council were intervenors. Background THL brought a judicial review against the Secretary of State; the claim for judicial review was dismissed by the High Court in a judgment dated 24 May 2023 (The King (on the application of the Humane League UK) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2023] EWHC 1243 (Admin)). You can find the background to the case in our previous post here , which sets out the relevant legislative framework and summarises the scientific evidence in relation to the serious welfare issues suffered by fast-growing chickens. THL appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal. References in [ ] are to paragraphs of the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The issue on appeal 'At the heart of this appeal' [40] was the meaning of Paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, which provides: 'Animals may only be kept for farming purposes if it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detrimental effect on their health or welfare.' An animal’s genotype refers to its genetic makeup; its phenotype refers to its observable characteristics, which are determined by its genotype. THL also wished to appeal the High Court failing to conclude that, as a result of misdirecting himself as to the meaning of Paragraph 29, the Secretary of State consequently erred in (i) failing to articulate the proper meaning of Paragraph 29 in the Code of Practice; (ii) wrongly suggesting, in the Code of Practice, that productivity considerations could be weighed against animal welfare detriment; (iii) failing to undertake any prosecutions; and (iv) failing to interpret paragraph 15(2) of Schedule 5A of the 2007 Regulations such as to give effect to Paragraph 29. THL also argued that the thresholds that have been set within the trigger system were unlawful and that the Secretary of State had failed to discharge his Tameside duty of inquiry, having not referred to any scientific evidence or literature despite claiming a ‘nuanced view’, a view that was not in fact ever articulated. Judgment on appeal The challenges regarding the trigger system and the Thameside duty were not pursued at the hearing.  The Court of Appeal agreed with THL that the judge at first instance erred and that Paragraph 29 is a prohibition which is subject to a proviso, meaning 'The keeping of animals for farming purposes is prohibited unless it can reasonably be expected, on the basis of their genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without any detrimental effect on their health and welfare' [46]. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Secretary of State that Paragraph 29 is a prohibition on the keeping of farmed animals whose genotype and phenotype mean that, regardless of the conditions in which they are kept, they cannot be kept without detriment to their health or welfare [50]. However, the Court of Appeal provided an explanation of what this means in real terms, namely recognising the difference between detrimental characteristics which are inherent in the nature of the breed and which cannot be mitigated by changing the environmental conditions in which the animal is kept and those which can be so mitigated. Most noticeably the Court of Appeal stated that if the conclusions in the RSPCA report are correct  fast-growing chickens, for example fast growing chickens suffer from increased heart problems with consequential higher mortality, or leg development disorders because the chicken cannot support its own weight, then no improvement in the environmental conditions in which such chickens are kept could mitigate those detrimental effects upon their health or welfare, and therefore the keeping of such a breed would be prohibited by Paragraph 29 [52].  The Court of Appeal also pointed out that even if environmental conditions can mitigate the detriment, then whilst the keeping of that breed may not be prohibited by Paragraph 29, it might constitute a failure to take reasonable steps in all the circumstances to ensure that the needs of the animal were met, contrary to Section 9 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 [51]. In relation to the 'can reasonably expect' test in Paragraph 29, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the test is an objective one [53]. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the judge at first instance who had held that the ‘reasonable person’ could not be taken to know the content of the RSPCA report and the other scientific evidence relied upon by THL. The Court of Appeal confirmed that this was a question of fact and stated that '…it is reasonable to expect that a reasonable person keeping or intending to keep fast-growing chickens, who is after all responsible for their health and welfare, would at least be aware of the controversy about the keeping of such chickens and would take some steps to inform him or herself about it' [53]. Importantly, the Court of Appeal, disapproving of the gloss introduced by the judge at first instance, clarified that the threshold for 'any detrimental effect' in paragraph 29 is a low one and would be satisfied unless that detriment was only 'minimal or momentary' or occurred 'only in a tiny proportion of such animals' [57]. Notably, the Court of Appeal went on to state that Paragraph 29 'unequivocally prioritises animal health and welfare over commercial benefit', that '…there is no question of balancing the advantage of higher productivity against the detrimental effect(s) on an animal’s health or welfare' [60] and that: 'If a given breed can reasonably be expected to suffer a detrimental effect on its health or welfare because of its genetic make-up, the prohibition on keeping that breed of animal applies regardless of any commercial advantages which it may have,' per Males LJ at [60]; and If the proviso is satisfied '…then that particular breed cannot be kept as farmed animals, no matter how profitable or convenient the breed might be for a farmer. The 2007 Regulations do not permit the well-being of such a breed of animal to be traded off against the economic interests of farmers' per Snowden LJ at [75]. Despite the significant win by THL challenging the Judge at first instance’s interpretation of paragraph 29 and the Court of Appeal largely agreeing with THL's interpretation, the appeal was dismissed [62]-[72]. This was due to the Court of Appeal finding that the first case was not an appropriate case for a declaration in the abstract, but rather the interpretation of paragraph 29 reached by the Court will be for the Secretary of State to consider as it pertains to its practices and the Magistrates Court should it be faced with deciding on a case involving an offence under paragraph 29.   Commentary The ruling by the Court of Appeal represents a significant legal step towards ending the practice of keeping fast-growing chickens, who suffer as a result of having been bred to prioritise fast growth, productivity and profit at the expense of their welfare. The message from the Court of Appeal is clear: in the context of the selective breeding of farmed animals, profits and productivity cannot be prioritised over welfare.  The judgment provides welcome clarity on the interpretation and application of Paragraph 29 of the Regulations and confirms that the keeping of any farmed animal who can reasonably be expected to suffer any detriment as a result of its genetic make-up is prohibited. This case draws vital attention to the extreme suffering experienced by billions of chickens, and despite the Court of Appeal not being in a position to rule on the science in the context of this judicial review claim, it nonetheless represents an important step towards securing enforcement action to prevent the farming of animals bred into suffering in pursuit of profit.  Local authorities are entrusted with the enforcement of Paragraph 29, breaches of which constitute a criminal offence triable in the Magistrates’ Court. The Court of Appeal’s judgment clarifies the legal position and therefore paves the way for further legal challenges if local authorities and the government do not act swiftly. Advocates for Animals acted for THL and instructed Brendan McGurk KC and Edward Brown KC as counsel.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

On 14 February 2025, Adriana Orme and Holly LeGresley were sentenced to 15 months and two years of imprisonment, respectively, for their involvement in the creation, distribution, and viewing of disturbing and extreme animal cruelty content, specifically depicting the torture of primates. They both engaged in chat rooms dedicated to causing torture to monkeys. Orme and LeGresley pleaded guilty to offences under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the Serious Crime Act 2007.  Facts Adriana Orme, a 56-year-old woman, pleaded guilty to the offence of publishing an obscene article and encouraging another to cause unnecessary suffering to a protected animal. Orme shared extreme animal cruelty videos on an online chat group. The material shared by Orme depicted the torture and killing of monkeys, showing disturbing violence and sadistic behaviour. Orme also made payments to an individual who ran the online groups, made comments on the videos, and saved videos depicting the torture of infant monkeys on her devices. According to Orme, her involvement in these online groups started with an innocuous search, and her initial motivation for joining the groups was to research and gather evidence on the videos so that they could be taken down, but she did not raise the issue with the police.  Holly LeGresley, a 37-year-old woman, was more actively involved, acting as the administrator of the chat groups, sharing similar content, making payments for specific videos of torture to be made, and making several comments in support of the content and showing explicit approval. She engaged in particular with a man who self-styled himself as ‘Torture King’, who then identified her as playing a key role in one of the online groups. LeGresley also had interactions with other members of the group organising cruelty towards animals, including detailed suggestions about how to harm monkeys. LeGresley played a significant role in contributing to the dissemination of such content within the group, having gained the respect of its members and being entrusted with cataloguing and distributing videos of the torture. These videos, which depicted the torture of monkeys, were visually recorded outside the UK before being shared, usually for payment, across online platforms worldwide. During police interviews, LeGresley stated that she became involved due to a deep-seated phobia of pregnancy and childbirth, which she claimed was triggered by baby monkeys because of their resemblance to human infants. She admitted to channelling her fear and anger into the abuse of these animals, which led her to become increasingly engaged in online communities that shared and encouraged violent content. Both individuals were found to have displayed a prolonged and repeated engagement with disturbing articles. Their offence represents a course of conduct that ‘can only be described as depraved, sickening, and wicked’, said His Honour Judge Burbidge KC.  The law Both defendants were convicted under section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which criminalises the distribution of obscene materials with the potential to corrupt or deprave others.  Additionally, they were convicted under Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which criminalises intentionally encouraging or assisting the causing of an offence.  Each offence carries a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment. Sentencing  Both Orme and LeGresley were convicted of multiple offences and sentenced accordingly: LeGresley received two years' imprisonment for her involvement in the crimes, taking into account her important contribution to the online group and the extreme nature of her actions. Her sentence was considered to be within the range for offences involving serious cruelty, with a starting point of four years reduced for general mitigation and psychiatric factors Orme was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment, with a starting point of three years reduced for her involvement, medical conditions, and mitigating factors such as her lesser degree of participation compared to LeGresley Both sentences were to be served concurrently, and each defendant will serve half of the sentence, with the possibility of release on licence after this period, assuming no further offences are committed. While there are no specific sentencing guidelines for this case, the court used the sentencing guidelines for animal cruelty offences. The harm caused was considered to be in Category 1 because death or grave life-threatening injuries occurred. Both offenders were found to have a high level of culpability, with LeGresley, in particular, playing a more prominent role in the distribution and encouragement of such content. Sentencing remarks His Honour Judge Burbidge KC emphasised the horrific nature of the crimes, stating that both Orme and LeGresley had engaged in a pattern of sadistic and depraved behaviour, which led to further illegal behaviour in the form of animal cruelty.  A psychiatric assessment of both defendants revealed that they are likely to have undiagnosed autism spectrum disorders, combined with mixed anxiety and depressive disorders. Judge Burbidge noted that their psychological profiles did not absolve them of responsibility but considered the sentencing guideline on offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments.   LeGresley was described as having a leading role in the group, not only watching and sharing videos but also actively contributing to the discussions and encouraging others to participate.  In one chilling statement, she remarked, 'Got sliced up good and proper, and it survived long enough to suffer. What's the point in just killing them? That's no fun.'  Although Orme’s involvement was lesser than LeGresley’s, the judge considered that her offences still merit condemnation.  The judge concluded that the sentences should not be suspended, despite both individuals’ personal circumstances, as the public interest in deterring such behaviour outweighed the mitigating factors. Commentary  The Orme and LeGresley case is another example of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 being used to tackle online cruelty against animals. A similar case of charges brought under this act was the case against Peter Stanley. This is an important space to watch as we observe the police, the CPS, and judges becoming more comfortable with applying this legal framework to online cruelty against animals. The case highlights how commonplace content that depicts extreme cruelty against animals is becoming, with users starting to engage with this content on mainstream social media platforms like YouTube and Facebook and then moving to encrypted platforms like Telegram. The need to take action against this type of content appears to be what underpinned Parliament’s decision to include the offence of animal cruelty as illegal content under the Online Safety Act 2023. The act imposes a duty of care on social media companies and search engines with regard to illegal content and content that is harmful to children. Social media companies now have a duty to remove animal cruelty content, provided that it is live-streamed or it encourages others to commit animal cruelty. It remains to be seen how social media companies apply these requirements in practice. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

On 24 September 2024, Peter Stanley was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment to be served concurrently, having pleaded guilty to three charges of publishing obscene articles under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. He was charged for uploading three videos depicting extreme animal cruelty to a Facebook group dedicated to monkey torture. Despite claiming that he had yielded to morbid curiosity, the sentencing judge determined that Mr Stanley’s actions encouraged the creation and distribution of such material, which warranted a harsh sentence.  Facts Peter Stanley, a 42-year-old man with no prior convictions, became an active member of a monkey torture social media group called ‘Monkey Sauce’ because he hated monkeys. The group shared disturbing content depicting bestiality, pornography, and images of tortured monkeys and extreme animal cruelty acts resulting in the death of primates. He viewed many of these images, including 26 linked to torture.  Stanley was charged for uploading three videos showing the torture and killing of baby monkeys, including horrible acts of mutilation and extreme violence that the sentencing judge found 'have no place in any civilised society’. He also made comments in the videos, such as ‘A fave of mine, this one’ or ‘Now, do as you are told.' His participation in these groups was voluntary, and he admitted to engaging with such images due to ‘morbid curiosity’. His psychological assessment indicated he had low self-esteem, difficulty forming relationships, and a susceptibility to harmful online communities and would benefit from mental health treatment. As a result of his actions, he lost his job and a long-term relationship.  The law  Stanley was charged under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which makes it illegal to publish obscene material. The act applies to written material, sound recordings, films, or pictures. A matter will be obscene if its effect is to 'deprave and corrupt' those who are likely to read, see, or hear it. Offences under the act could carry up to five years in prison.  Sentencing  Since there were no specific sentencing guidelines for offences under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the judge drew an analogy with the guideline for animal cruelty cases, characterising the offences as high culpability and Category 1 harm, with a starting point of two years in prison for a single offence and a range of up to three years and six months.  Taking into account Mr Stanley’s guilty plea and previous good character, the judge handed down a sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment.  In his sentencing remarks, the judge highlighted the severity of the offences. He described the images as ‘utterly repellent’ and said that they had no place in a civilised society. He further stated that engaging with these videos can stimulate the market for such ‘unlawful horror’, and it ‘encourages those who make those horrifying images to continue to carry out such depravity’.  Commentary  The use of the Obscene Publications Act in this context is an important development and something for animal charities who work on the proliferation of images depicting online suffering on the internet to consider going forward. Sarah Kite, a former mental health social worker and the manager of the advocacy group Action for Primates, provided witness evidence in the case, bringing to the court’s attention that the use of the media to post appalling videos about animal cruelty and killing has escalated in the last few years. In her evidence, she stated that graphic videos have now started to appear on Facebook and are accessible to all users, including children, with social media companies not sufficiently proactive and often failing to remove such content.  The enactment of the Online Safety Act 2023 marks a key step towards combating this type of content. The act imposes a duty of care on social media companies and search engines with regard to illegal content and content that is harmful to children. The offence of animal cruelty under section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 constitutes illegal content under the act, which means that social media companies now have a duty to remove this content provided that the content is live-streamed or it encourages others to commit animal cruelty. It remains to be seen how social media companies apply these requirements in practice.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Angie Van Dijk May 2025 ECLI:NL:CBB:2025:79 18 February 2025 https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:CBB:2025:79 Factual background In the Netherlands, broiler and layer chicks are born in hatcheries, in large incubators that only open after the vast majority of chicks have hatched. The time between the hatching of the first and last chick (the hatching window) can last up to 48 hours. After this, the animals are selected, vaccinated, and transported. Most chicks are only given food and water upon arrival at the barn. As a result, many chicks are deprived of food and water for up to 72 hours. Wakker Dier is of the opinion that this causes unnecessary suffering because the animals are hungry, thirsty, and show higher mortality rates. In 2013, Wakker Dier filed a request for enforcement action against this animal-unfriendly procedure at the regulator. The regulator dismissed the enforcement request. In 2018, the highest administrative court confirmed that research shows that chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours after hatching and ordered the regulator to take a new decision on Wakker Dier’s enforcement request.  In the new decision, the regulator stated that broiler chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours and granted the industry five years to terminate this violation. For layer chicks, the regulator argued that, because of their different physiology, they have different food and water needs, and that, therefore, the 36 hours do not apply. Wakker Dier appealed this decision (mostly because of the long compliance period and the refusal to enforce it at the laying-hen hatcheries). In the subsequent ruling, the court agreed that (i) for broiler chicks, the compliance period was indeed too long and that (ii) the regulator should carry out research to figure out the real food and water needs of laying hen chicks.  This was a rare moment in which a court ordered a regulatory body to do research because it was unclear how an open norm should be specified. In short, the regulator was ordered to carry out research into the food and water needs of laying hens and to take a new decision on the broiler-chicken hatcheries.  This research into the food and water needs of laying hens is ongoing and will most likely be finished by the end of the year. In the new decision (May 2022) on broiler chickens the regulator shortened the compliance period to nine months. Also, it decided to change the norm in such a way that broiler chicks should have access to food and water 36 hours after hatching or 6 hours after opening the incubator. The addition of 6 hours seemed to be in conflict with the 2018 court ruling, because this would entail that some chicks will be deprived of food and water for more than 50 hours. Wakker Dier appealed this decision in July 2022 and the court hearing took place in November of 2024.  The Law The relevant Dutch act is: Wet dieren Article 2.1 sub 1 states: 'It shall be unlawful to cause pain or injury to any animal or to adversely affect the health or welfare of any animal without reasonable purpose or in excess of what is permissible for the attainment of such purpose.' This article was introduced in 1996 (in article 36 of the GDWW), so prior to the publication of Directive 98/58. Article 2.2 sub 8 states:  ' The keeper of an animal is prohibited from depriving an animal of the necessary care.' Whilst these provisions existed prior to Directive 98/58, they are treated as implementation of relevant provisions in that directive, primarily Article 3.  Finding During this hearing, the regulator emphasised that it was impossible for them to enforce the 36-hour rule because they cannot know when the first chick hatches. This is in part true, because the incubators are closed systems, that are only opened when the vast majority of chicks have hatched. When chicks start hatching, there is an increase in humidity. But this increase will only be picked up by sensors when around 10-20% of the chicks have hatched. The hatcheries, together with the regulator, were able to convince the court that it is impossible to know exactly when the first chick hatches and that therefore it is impossible to enforce the 36-hour rule. In its most recent and final ruling in March 2025, the court upheld its norm that chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours, but accepted the arguments of the regulator (that this was impossible to enforce) and therefore allowed the additional 6 hours. The court also ruled that if new technology becomes available that would allow the regulator to determine the start of the hatching window, the regulator should incorporate this in its enforcement policy.  Commentary While the last ruling is quite disappointing, Wakker Dier is awaiting the conclusions of the research into the food and water needs of laying hens. This research includes more parameters than mortality, it also considers hunger, thirst, and other welfare parameters. Wakker Dier is hopeful that these conclusions will be more clear than older research that the court has used so far and that it will be useful for advancing welfare for both laying hens and broiler chickens. Wakker Dier will decide on the strategy after the research is finished. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Case name: Animal Equality UK v North East Lincolnshire Council & ASL New Clee Limited [2025] EWHC 1331 (Admin) Citation: [2025] EWHC 1331 (Admin) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1331.html Advocates for Animals acted for Animal Equality in this recent appeal concerning the relevance of animal welfare during planning permission decisions. Advocates for Animals instructed Alex Shattock of Landmark Chambers. Background This case concerns the judicial review brought by Animal Equality UK, an animal protection NGO, against the decision of North East Lincolnshire Council to grant planning permission for what would be the UK's first wholly onshore salmon farming facility. The farm, proposed by ASL New Clee Ltd, would involve intensive fish rearing in land-based tanks in Cleethorpes. Animal Equality objected to the application, raising issues including environmental impact and fish welfare. The central question in the judicial review was whether the Council’s planning committee had been misled into believing it could not consider animal welfare concerns as part of its decision-making process. Facts The planning application for the salmon farm was submitted in June 2023. Animal Equality submitted objections citing high water and energy use, effluent discharge, and fish welfare concerns, relying on expert evidence of suffering, disease, and risk of mass mortality due to power outages. The Officer’s Report (OR) to the Council's planning committee stated that animal welfare and moral objections were 'not considered to be material land use planning considerations'. The proposal was approved by a 7–4 vote on 29 November 2023. Animal Equality recorded the meeting, and the transcript showed similar oral advice being given: that fish welfare and moral concerns were not material. Judicial review proceedings were initiated, alleging that the planning committee was misdirected and therefore the decision was unlawful. Law Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, planning authorities must have regard to all 'material considerations'. It is established law that material considerations can include issues that aren’t usually considered to be planning matters, such as in the case of R (Copeland) v Tower Hamlets [2010] EWHC 1845 (Admin) , where the healthy eating implications of a fast food restaurant next to a school were deemed a material consideration. A key legal principle is that where a material consideration is not mandatory, the planning authority has discretion over whether to take it into account, provided it acts rationally. However, the planning officers’ reports must not materially mislead the planning committee. Judgment The claim was dismissed. The Court held that the Officer’s Report did not amount to a misdirection in law. The judge interpreted the OR’s statement that welfare concerns 'are not considered to be material' as expressing a planning judgment, not a categorical legal rule. It was further noted that even if there was ambiguity, planning committee members are expected to be trained and competent to interpret officer advice. Commentary This judgment underscores the discretionary nature of non-mandatory material considerations like animal welfare in planning law. It affirms that while animal welfare is legally capable of being a material consideration, planning authorities are not required to take it into account unless it is so obviously material that excluding it would be irrational. The case reflects the broader tension in planning between land-use considerations and ethical objections. Importantly, the judgment leaves open that, in future similar cases, councils can consider animal welfare if they choose to, and NGOs may wish to focus future efforts on influencing local policy and training to encourage such consideration. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Deblase v Hill , Index No. 521147/2023 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, June 14, 2024) Link: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Deblase-v-Hill-decision.pdf Background The case of Deblase v Hill  was filed in Kings County Supreme Court, New York. It centres on the emotional and legal ramifications of a dog’s death after being struck by a car. The plaintiffs, Trevor Deblase and his mother, Nan Deblase, brought claims against Mitchell Hill, the driver involved in the incident. The case presents a novel legal question: whether New York’s 'zone of danger' doctrine can be extended to allow emotional distress claims arising from the death of a companion animal. Facts On July 4, 2023, Nan Deblase was walking her son’s dog, Duke, across a marked crosswalk in Brooklyn. Mitchell Hill, operating a vehicle, failed to stop at a stop sign and made an illegal turn, hitting and killing the dog. Nan, who was holding the dog’s leash at the time, was within physical proximity to the danger. She witnessed Duke’s death and claims to have feared for her own safety. The plaintiffs assert: Trevor Deblase  suffered emotional distress and property loss due to the death of Duke. Nan Deblase  experienced emotional distress from the event, which occurred while she was in the 'zone of danger'. Law Under New York law, dogs are traditionally treated as personal property. Emotional distress claims for witnessing harm are generally restricted to plaintiffs who are: Within the 'zone of danger' and Immediate family members of a human victim (see Greene v Esplanade Venture ). The plaintiffs argue for an evolution of this rule, asserting that companion animals hold a special familial role and emotional value. The defence moved to dismiss the claims, stating the current law does not permit emotional damages for the loss of a companion animal, nor does it recognise companion animals as qualifying victims under the zone-of-danger doctrine. Decision Nan Deblase was entitled to recover emotional distress damages under New York’s zone-of-danger doctrine after witnessing her son’s dog, Duke, being fatally struck by a vehicle while on a crosswalk. The court recognised that dogs may, in certain legal contexts, be considered as immediate family members. Trevor Deblase’s claim remains pending; the decision did not yet finalise his recovery, pending a trial on damages. Reasoning Justice Maslow emphasised evolving societal and legal appreciation for companion animals. He found that treating Duke as mere personal property failed to reflect modern views 'based on facts and reason, not outdated legal fictions'. The court acknowledged that Ms. Deblase was within the zone of danger and suffered foreseeable emotional harm. It departed from older precedents, opting instead for a more flexible, compassion-driven approach consistent with amicus briefs supported by the Nonhuman Rights Project Commentary Whilst a very narrow holding; this case stands at the frontier of evolving tort law, addressing the growing public view of companion animals as family members rather than mere property. It also significantly broadens the scope of emotional distress claims in New York and influences national jurisprudence. The outcome of Deblase v Hill  is a landmark decision determining whether the legal system should adapt its treatment of non-human companions in personal injury and emotional distress contexts. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Though Canada has recently made incremental progress on animal protection laws, guest writer Kira Berkeley, who just founded Canada’s first intersectional animal and environmental law organisation, explains how there is still a lot of work to be done. Unfortunately, Canada is known to have some of the worst animal protection laws in the western world. According to the Animal Protection Index (API) , Canada has received a D grade for animal welfare laws. Federal legislation The main federal animal protection laws in Canada are found under the Criminal Code (the 'Code'), which governs animal cruelty offences throughout the country. The Code criminalises animal cruelty generally, including offences involving killing or injuring an animal and/or causing unnecessary suffering to an animal (though there are various exemptions, such as farm animal practices). Notably, the Code has recently been amended to include: - Banning whale and dolphin captivity in Canada (section 445.2); and - Broadening the scope of beastiality and animal fighting offences (sections 160 and 445.1). Apart from the Code, several other pieces of federal legislation touch on animal welfare. Some positive recent federal animal law developments include: Amending the definition of 'family violence' to include killing or harming an animal (or threatening to do so) under the Divorce Act (section 2); Prohibition on import/export of shark fins under the Fisheries Act (section 32); and Adding judicial training on the Violence Link (that is, the connection between violence towards animals and humans) under the Judges Act (section 3). Hopefully, these recent federal law developments will set an example for greater things to come. Provincial legislation The laws differ from province to province, making inconsistencies and loopholes more likely to arise in the animal protection context. According to a review conducted in 2015 , Manitoba ranked highest for animal protection laws because veterinarians in the province must report suspected animal abuse, including psychological harm. In many provinces, the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ('SPCA') enforces provincial animal welfare laws. That is, rather than a public body (such as police officers) enforcing these laws, it is left up to a private charity. However, Ontario moved away from the SPCA model in 2019 and enacted the Provincial Animal Welfare Services ('PAWS') Act, which provides strong protections for companion animals. Yet, it still falls short of protecting animals from harmful 'generally accepted practices' in the agriculture industry and other animal-use industries. While provincial legislation falls short in many ways, a few positive provincial laws include: - Nova Scotia’s law outlawing cosmetic surgeries on animals (Animal Protection Act, section 27); - Quebec’s Civil Code recognising the sentience of animals (Animal Welfare and Safety Act, B-3.1); and - PEI’s law outlawing cosmetic surgeries on animals and prohibiting animal fights ( Animal Welfare Act, sections 5-6). Worringly, agricultural gag ('ag-gag') laws have been spreading across the provinces in recent years. These laws aim to criminalise animal advocates, investigative journalism, and/or whistleblowers from exposing the horrid truth of the agricultural industry to the public. These laws are now prevalent in Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba and PEI. What’s next for animals? Canada’s national animal law advocacy organisation, Animal Justice, has launched a constitutional challenge to Ontario’s ag-gag legislation. Ideally, Ontario’s ag-gag laws will be struck down as unconstitutional, setting a strong precedent to combat the ag-gag laws in other provinces as well. Additionally, several candidates in this year’s federal election addressed animal welfare in their campaign platforms. Now that the liberal government has been re-elected, we must hold them accountable to their animal protection platform promises , which were set out as follows: Introduce legislation to end cosmetic testing on animals as soon as 2023 and phase out toxicity testing on animals by 2035; Work with partners to curb illegal wildlife trade and end elephant and rhinoceros tusk trade in Canada; Introduce legislation to protect animals in captivity; Ban the live export of horses for slaughter; and Work with our partners to help women and children fleeing violence stay united with their companion animals. Conclusion While there is much more work to be done, Canada is slowly moving in a better direction for animals. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com  If you'd like more information about animal protection laws in Canada, please contact admin@aeladvocacy.ca