On 14 February 2025, Adriana Orme and Holly LeGresley were sentenced to 15 months and two years of imprisonment, respectively, for their involvement in the creation, distribution, and viewing of disturbing and extreme animal cruelty content, specifically depicting the torture of primates. They both engaged in chat rooms dedicated to causing torture to monkeys. Orme and LeGresley pleaded guilty to offences under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the Serious Crime Act 2007.  Facts Adriana Orme, a 56-year-old woman, pleaded guilty to the offence of publishing an obscene article and encouraging another to cause unnecessary suffering to a protected animal. Orme shared extreme animal cruelty videos on an online chat group. The material shared by Orme depicted the torture and killing of monkeys, showing disturbing violence and sadistic behaviour. Orme also made payments to an individual who ran the online groups, made comments on the videos, and saved videos depicting the torture of infant monkeys on her devices. According to Orme, her involvement in these online groups started with an innocuous search, and her initial motivation for joining the groups was to research and gather evidence on the videos so that they could be taken down, but she did not raise the issue with the police.  Holly LeGresley, a 37-year-old woman, was more actively involved, acting as the administrator of the chat groups, sharing similar content, making payments for specific videos of torture to be made, and making several comments in support of the content and showing explicit approval. She engaged in particular with a man who self-styled himself as ‘Torture King’, who then identified her as playing a key role in one of the online groups. LeGresley also had interactions with other members of the group organising cruelty towards animals, including detailed suggestions about how to harm monkeys. LeGresley played a significant role in contributing to the dissemination of such content within the group, having gained the respect of its members and being entrusted with cataloguing and distributing videos of the torture. These videos, which depicted the torture of monkeys, were visually recorded outside the UK before being shared, usually for payment, across online platforms worldwide. During police interviews, LeGresley stated that she became involved due to a deep-seated phobia of pregnancy and childbirth, which she claimed was triggered by baby monkeys because of their resemblance to human infants. She admitted to channelling her fear and anger into the abuse of these animals, which led her to become increasingly engaged in online communities that shared and encouraged violent content. Both individuals were found to have displayed a prolonged and repeated engagement with disturbing articles. Their offence represents a course of conduct that ‘can only be described as depraved, sickening, and wicked’, said His Honour Judge Burbidge KC.  The law Both defendants were convicted under section 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which criminalises the distribution of obscene materials with the potential to corrupt or deprave others.  Additionally, they were convicted under Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which criminalises intentionally encouraging or assisting the causing of an offence.  Each offence carries a maximum sentence of five years' imprisonment. Sentencing  Both Orme and LeGresley were convicted of multiple offences and sentenced accordingly: LeGresley received two years' imprisonment for her involvement in the crimes, taking into account her important contribution to the online group and the extreme nature of her actions. Her sentence was considered to be within the range for offences involving serious cruelty, with a starting point of four years reduced for general mitigation and psychiatric factors Orme was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment, with a starting point of three years reduced for her involvement, medical conditions, and mitigating factors such as her lesser degree of participation compared to LeGresley Both sentences were to be served concurrently, and each defendant will serve half of the sentence, with the possibility of release on licence after this period, assuming no further offences are committed. While there are no specific sentencing guidelines for this case, the court used the sentencing guidelines for animal cruelty offences. The harm caused was considered to be in Category 1 because death or grave life-threatening injuries occurred. Both offenders were found to have a high level of culpability, with LeGresley, in particular, playing a more prominent role in the distribution and encouragement of such content. Sentencing remarks His Honour Judge Burbidge KC emphasised the horrific nature of the crimes, stating that both Orme and LeGresley had engaged in a pattern of sadistic and depraved behaviour, which led to further illegal behaviour in the form of animal cruelty.  A psychiatric assessment of both defendants revealed that they are likely to have undiagnosed autism spectrum disorders, combined with mixed anxiety and depressive disorders. Judge Burbidge noted that their psychological profiles did not absolve them of responsibility but considered the sentencing guideline on offenders with mental disorders, developmental disorders, or neurological impairments.   LeGresley was described as having a leading role in the group, not only watching and sharing videos but also actively contributing to the discussions and encouraging others to participate.  In one chilling statement, she remarked, 'Got sliced up good and proper, and it survived long enough to suffer. What's the point in just killing them? That's no fun.'  Although Orme’s involvement was lesser than LeGresley’s, the judge considered that her offences still merit condemnation.  The judge concluded that the sentences should not be suspended, despite both individuals’ personal circumstances, as the public interest in deterring such behaviour outweighed the mitigating factors. Commentary  The Orme and LeGresley case is another example of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 being used to tackle online cruelty against animals. A similar case of charges brought under this act was the case against Peter Stanley. This is an important space to watch as we observe the police, the CPS, and judges becoming more comfortable with applying this legal framework to online cruelty against animals. The case highlights how commonplace content that depicts extreme cruelty against animals is becoming, with users starting to engage with this content on mainstream social media platforms like YouTube and Facebook and then moving to encrypted platforms like Telegram. The need to take action against this type of content appears to be what underpinned Parliament’s decision to include the offence of animal cruelty as illegal content under the Online Safety Act 2023. The act imposes a duty of care on social media companies and search engines with regard to illegal content and content that is harmful to children. Social media companies now have a duty to remove animal cruelty content, provided that it is live-streamed or it encourages others to commit animal cruelty. It remains to be seen how social media companies apply these requirements in practice. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

On 24 September 2024, Peter Stanley was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment to be served concurrently, having pleaded guilty to three charges of publishing obscene articles under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. He was charged for uploading three videos depicting extreme animal cruelty to a Facebook group dedicated to monkey torture. Despite claiming that he had yielded to morbid curiosity, the sentencing judge determined that Mr Stanley’s actions encouraged the creation and distribution of such material, which warranted a harsh sentence.  Facts Peter Stanley, a 42-year-old man with no prior convictions, became an active member of a monkey torture social media group called ‘Monkey Sauce’ because he hated monkeys. The group shared disturbing content depicting bestiality, pornography, and images of tortured monkeys and extreme animal cruelty acts resulting in the death of primates. He viewed many of these images, including 26 linked to torture.  Stanley was charged for uploading three videos showing the torture and killing of baby monkeys, including horrible acts of mutilation and extreme violence that the sentencing judge found 'have no place in any civilised society’. He also made comments in the videos, such as ‘A fave of mine, this one’ or ‘Now, do as you are told.' His participation in these groups was voluntary, and he admitted to engaging with such images due to ‘morbid curiosity’. His psychological assessment indicated he had low self-esteem, difficulty forming relationships, and a susceptibility to harmful online communities and would benefit from mental health treatment. As a result of his actions, he lost his job and a long-term relationship.  The law  Stanley was charged under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, which makes it illegal to publish obscene material. The act applies to written material, sound recordings, films, or pictures. A matter will be obscene if its effect is to 'deprave and corrupt' those who are likely to read, see, or hear it. Offences under the act could carry up to five years in prison.  Sentencing  Since there were no specific sentencing guidelines for offences under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the judge drew an analogy with the guideline for animal cruelty cases, characterising the offences as high culpability and Category 1 harm, with a starting point of two years in prison for a single offence and a range of up to three years and six months.  Taking into account Mr Stanley’s guilty plea and previous good character, the judge handed down a sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment.  In his sentencing remarks, the judge highlighted the severity of the offences. He described the images as ‘utterly repellent’ and said that they had no place in a civilised society. He further stated that engaging with these videos can stimulate the market for such ‘unlawful horror’, and it ‘encourages those who make those horrifying images to continue to carry out such depravity’.  Commentary  The use of the Obscene Publications Act in this context is an important development and something for animal charities who work on the proliferation of images depicting online suffering on the internet to consider going forward. Sarah Kite, a former mental health social worker and the manager of the advocacy group Action for Primates, provided witness evidence in the case, bringing to the court’s attention that the use of the media to post appalling videos about animal cruelty and killing has escalated in the last few years. In her evidence, she stated that graphic videos have now started to appear on Facebook and are accessible to all users, including children, with social media companies not sufficiently proactive and often failing to remove such content.  The enactment of the Online Safety Act 2023 marks a key step towards combating this type of content. The act imposes a duty of care on social media companies and search engines with regard to illegal content and content that is harmful to children. The offence of animal cruelty under section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 constitutes illegal content under the act, which means that social media companies now have a duty to remove this content provided that the content is live-streamed or it encourages others to commit animal cruelty. It remains to be seen how social media companies apply these requirements in practice.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Angie Van Dijk May 2025 ECLI:NL:CBB:2025:79 18 February 2025 https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/details?id=ECLI:NL:CBB:2025:79 Factual background In the Netherlands, broiler and layer chicks are born in hatcheries, in large incubators that only open after the vast majority of chicks have hatched. The time between the hatching of the first and last chick (the hatching window) can last up to 48 hours. After this, the animals are selected, vaccinated, and transported. Most chicks are only given food and water upon arrival at the barn. As a result, many chicks are deprived of food and water for up to 72 hours. Wakker Dier is of the opinion that this causes unnecessary suffering because the animals are hungry, thirsty, and show higher mortality rates. In 2013, Wakker Dier filed a request for enforcement action against this animal-unfriendly procedure at the regulator. The regulator dismissed the enforcement request. In 2018, the highest administrative court confirmed that research shows that chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours after hatching and ordered the regulator to take a new decision on Wakker Dier’s enforcement request.  In the new decision, the regulator stated that broiler chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours and granted the industry five years to terminate this violation. For layer chicks, the regulator argued that, because of their different physiology, they have different food and water needs, and that, therefore, the 36 hours do not apply. Wakker Dier appealed this decision (mostly because of the long compliance period and the refusal to enforce it at the laying-hen hatcheries). In the subsequent ruling, the court agreed that (i) for broiler chicks, the compliance period was indeed too long and that (ii) the regulator should carry out research to figure out the real food and water needs of laying hen chicks.  This was a rare moment in which a court ordered a regulatory body to do research because it was unclear how an open norm should be specified. In short, the regulator was ordered to carry out research into the food and water needs of laying hens and to take a new decision on the broiler-chicken hatcheries.  This research into the food and water needs of laying hens is ongoing and will most likely be finished by the end of the year. In the new decision (May 2022) on broiler chickens the regulator shortened the compliance period to nine months. Also, it decided to change the norm in such a way that broiler chicks should have access to food and water 36 hours after hatching or 6 hours after opening the incubator. The addition of 6 hours seemed to be in conflict with the 2018 court ruling, because this would entail that some chicks will be deprived of food and water for more than 50 hours. Wakker Dier appealed this decision in July 2022 and the court hearing took place in November of 2024.  The Law The relevant Dutch act is: Wet dieren Article 2.1 sub 1 states: 'It shall be unlawful to cause pain or injury to any animal or to adversely affect the health or welfare of any animal without reasonable purpose or in excess of what is permissible for the attainment of such purpose.' This article was introduced in 1996 (in article 36 of the GDWW), so prior to the publication of Directive 98/58. Article 2.2 sub 8 states:  ' The keeper of an animal is prohibited from depriving an animal of the necessary care.' Whilst these provisions existed prior to Directive 98/58, they are treated as implementation of relevant provisions in that directive, primarily Article 3.  Finding During this hearing, the regulator emphasised that it was impossible for them to enforce the 36-hour rule because they cannot know when the first chick hatches. This is in part true, because the incubators are closed systems, that are only opened when the vast majority of chicks have hatched. When chicks start hatching, there is an increase in humidity. But this increase will only be picked up by sensors when around 10-20% of the chicks have hatched. The hatcheries, together with the regulator, were able to convince the court that it is impossible to know exactly when the first chick hatches and that therefore it is impossible to enforce the 36-hour rule. In its most recent and final ruling in March 2025, the court upheld its norm that chicks should have access to food and water within 36 hours, but accepted the arguments of the regulator (that this was impossible to enforce) and therefore allowed the additional 6 hours. The court also ruled that if new technology becomes available that would allow the regulator to determine the start of the hatching window, the regulator should incorporate this in its enforcement policy.  Commentary While the last ruling is quite disappointing, Wakker Dier is awaiting the conclusions of the research into the food and water needs of laying hens. This research includes more parameters than mortality, it also considers hunger, thirst, and other welfare parameters. Wakker Dier is hopeful that these conclusions will be more clear than older research that the court has used so far and that it will be useful for advancing welfare for both laying hens and broiler chickens. Wakker Dier will decide on the strategy after the research is finished. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Case name: Animal Equality UK v North East Lincolnshire Council & ASL New Clee Limited [2025] EWHC 1331 (Admin) Citation: [2025] EWHC 1331 (Admin) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1331.html Advocates for Animals acted for Animal Equality in this recent appeal concerning the relevance of animal welfare during planning permission decisions. Advocates for Animals instructed Alex Shattock of Landmark Chambers. Background This case concerns the judicial review brought by Animal Equality UK, an animal protection NGO, against the decision of North East Lincolnshire Council to grant planning permission for what would be the UK's first wholly onshore salmon farming facility. The farm, proposed by ASL New Clee Ltd, would involve intensive fish rearing in land-based tanks in Cleethorpes. Animal Equality objected to the application, raising issues including environmental impact and fish welfare. The central question in the judicial review was whether the Council’s planning committee had been misled into believing it could not consider animal welfare concerns as part of its decision-making process. Facts The planning application for the salmon farm was submitted in June 2023. Animal Equality submitted objections citing high water and energy use, effluent discharge, and fish welfare concerns, relying on expert evidence of suffering, disease, and risk of mass mortality due to power outages. The Officer’s Report (OR) to the Council's planning committee stated that animal welfare and moral objections were 'not considered to be material land use planning considerations'. The proposal was approved by a 7–4 vote on 29 November 2023. Animal Equality recorded the meeting, and the transcript showed similar oral advice being given: that fish welfare and moral concerns were not material. Judicial review proceedings were initiated, alleging that the planning committee was misdirected and therefore the decision was unlawful. Law Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, planning authorities must have regard to all 'material considerations'. It is established law that material considerations can include issues that aren’t usually considered to be planning matters, such as in the case of R (Copeland) v Tower Hamlets [2010] EWHC 1845 (Admin) , where the healthy eating implications of a fast food restaurant next to a school were deemed a material consideration. A key legal principle is that where a material consideration is not mandatory, the planning authority has discretion over whether to take it into account, provided it acts rationally. However, the planning officers’ reports must not materially mislead the planning committee. Judgment The claim was dismissed. The Court held that the Officer’s Report did not amount to a misdirection in law. The judge interpreted the OR’s statement that welfare concerns 'are not considered to be material' as expressing a planning judgment, not a categorical legal rule. It was further noted that even if there was ambiguity, planning committee members are expected to be trained and competent to interpret officer advice. Commentary This judgment underscores the discretionary nature of non-mandatory material considerations like animal welfare in planning law. It affirms that while animal welfare is legally capable of being a material consideration, planning authorities are not required to take it into account unless it is so obviously material that excluding it would be irrational. The case reflects the broader tension in planning between land-use considerations and ethical objections. Importantly, the judgment leaves open that, in future similar cases, councils can consider animal welfare if they choose to, and NGOs may wish to focus future efforts on influencing local policy and training to encourage such consideration. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Deblase v Hill , Index No. 521147/2023 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, June 14, 2024) Link: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Deblase-v-Hill-decision.pdf Background The case of Deblase v Hill  was filed in Kings County Supreme Court, New York. It centres on the emotional and legal ramifications of a dog’s death after being struck by a car. The plaintiffs, Trevor Deblase and his mother, Nan Deblase, brought claims against Mitchell Hill, the driver involved in the incident. The case presents a novel legal question: whether New York’s 'zone of danger' doctrine can be extended to allow emotional distress claims arising from the death of a companion animal. Facts On July 4, 2023, Nan Deblase was walking her son’s dog, Duke, across a marked crosswalk in Brooklyn. Mitchell Hill, operating a vehicle, failed to stop at a stop sign and made an illegal turn, hitting and killing the dog. Nan, who was holding the dog’s leash at the time, was within physical proximity to the danger. She witnessed Duke’s death and claims to have feared for her own safety. The plaintiffs assert: Trevor Deblase  suffered emotional distress and property loss due to the death of Duke. Nan Deblase  experienced emotional distress from the event, which occurred while she was in the 'zone of danger'. Law Under New York law, dogs are traditionally treated as personal property. Emotional distress claims for witnessing harm are generally restricted to plaintiffs who are: Within the 'zone of danger' and Immediate family members of a human victim (see Greene v Esplanade Venture ). The plaintiffs argue for an evolution of this rule, asserting that companion animals hold a special familial role and emotional value. The defence moved to dismiss the claims, stating the current law does not permit emotional damages for the loss of a companion animal, nor does it recognise companion animals as qualifying victims under the zone-of-danger doctrine. Decision Nan Deblase was entitled to recover emotional distress damages under New York’s zone-of-danger doctrine after witnessing her son’s dog, Duke, being fatally struck by a vehicle while on a crosswalk. The court recognised that dogs may, in certain legal contexts, be considered as immediate family members. Trevor Deblase’s claim remains pending; the decision did not yet finalise his recovery, pending a trial on damages. Reasoning Justice Maslow emphasised evolving societal and legal appreciation for companion animals. He found that treating Duke as mere personal property failed to reflect modern views 'based on facts and reason, not outdated legal fictions'. The court acknowledged that Ms. Deblase was within the zone of danger and suffered foreseeable emotional harm. It departed from older precedents, opting instead for a more flexible, compassion-driven approach consistent with amicus briefs supported by the Nonhuman Rights Project Commentary Whilst a very narrow holding; this case stands at the frontier of evolving tort law, addressing the growing public view of companion animals as family members rather than mere property. It also significantly broadens the scope of emotional distress claims in New York and influences national jurisprudence. The outcome of Deblase v Hill  is a landmark decision determining whether the legal system should adapt its treatment of non-human companions in personal injury and emotional distress contexts. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Though Canada has recently made incremental progress on animal protection laws, guest writer Kira Berkeley, who just founded Canada’s first intersectional animal and environmental law organisation, explains how there is still a lot of work to be done. Unfortunately, Canada is known to have some of the worst animal protection laws in the western world. According to the Animal Protection Index (API) , Canada has received a D grade for animal welfare laws. Federal legislation The main federal animal protection laws in Canada are found under the Criminal Code (the 'Code'), which governs animal cruelty offences throughout the country. The Code criminalises animal cruelty generally, including offences involving killing or injuring an animal and/or causing unnecessary suffering to an animal (though there are various exemptions, such as farm animal practices). Notably, the Code has recently been amended to include: - Banning whale and dolphin captivity in Canada (section 445.2); and - Broadening the scope of beastiality and animal fighting offences (sections 160 and 445.1). Apart from the Code, several other pieces of federal legislation touch on animal welfare. Some positive recent federal animal law developments include: Amending the definition of 'family violence' to include killing or harming an animal (or threatening to do so) under the Divorce Act (section 2); Prohibition on import/export of shark fins under the Fisheries Act (section 32); and Adding judicial training on the Violence Link (that is, the connection between violence towards animals and humans) under the Judges Act (section 3). Hopefully, these recent federal law developments will set an example for greater things to come. Provincial legislation The laws differ from province to province, making inconsistencies and loopholes more likely to arise in the animal protection context. According to a review conducted in 2015 , Manitoba ranked highest for animal protection laws because veterinarians in the province must report suspected animal abuse, including psychological harm. In many provinces, the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals ('SPCA') enforces provincial animal welfare laws. That is, rather than a public body (such as police officers) enforcing these laws, it is left up to a private charity. However, Ontario moved away from the SPCA model in 2019 and enacted the Provincial Animal Welfare Services ('PAWS') Act, which provides strong protections for companion animals. Yet, it still falls short of protecting animals from harmful 'generally accepted practices' in the agriculture industry and other animal-use industries. While provincial legislation falls short in many ways, a few positive provincial laws include: - Nova Scotia’s law outlawing cosmetic surgeries on animals (Animal Protection Act, section 27); - Quebec’s Civil Code recognising the sentience of animals (Animal Welfare and Safety Act, B-3.1); and - PEI’s law outlawing cosmetic surgeries on animals and prohibiting animal fights ( Animal Welfare Act, sections 5-6). Worringly, agricultural gag ('ag-gag') laws have been spreading across the provinces in recent years. These laws aim to criminalise animal advocates, investigative journalism, and/or whistleblowers from exposing the horrid truth of the agricultural industry to the public. These laws are now prevalent in Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba and PEI. What’s next for animals? Canada’s national animal law advocacy organisation, Animal Justice, has launched a constitutional challenge to Ontario’s ag-gag legislation. Ideally, Ontario’s ag-gag laws will be struck down as unconstitutional, setting a strong precedent to combat the ag-gag laws in other provinces as well. Additionally, several candidates in this year’s federal election addressed animal welfare in their campaign platforms. Now that the liberal government has been re-elected, we must hold them accountable to their animal protection platform promises , which were set out as follows: Introduce legislation to end cosmetic testing on animals as soon as 2023 and phase out toxicity testing on animals by 2035; Work with partners to curb illegal wildlife trade and end elephant and rhinoceros tusk trade in Canada; Introduce legislation to protect animals in captivity; Ban the live export of horses for slaughter; and Work with our partners to help women and children fleeing violence stay united with their companion animals. Conclusion While there is much more work to be done, Canada is slowly moving in a better direction for animals. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com  If you'd like more information about animal protection laws in Canada, please contact admin@aeladvocacy.ca

Introduction The European Union (EU) often touts its animal welfare legislation as among the most progressive in the world. The European Commission, the EU’s executive branch, has itself proclaimed that the EU 'is leading' on animal welfare. This week's guest writer and founder of Animal Law Europe, Alice Di Concetto will look at animal law in the EU. While it is true that the EU can boast the most numerous legislative acts pertaining to the treatment of animals, quantity does not equal quality. EU agricultural legislation in the realm of animal protection, historically and in more recent times, does little beyond codify common industry practices. As a result, EU legislation only limits the poor treatment of animals to a marginal degree on farms and in laboratories and zoos. Facing societal pressure, and as the result of the EU Green Deal for a more sustainable agriculture, the EU announced it would undertake a sweeping revision of farm animal welfare legislation by 2023. This revision presents a valuable occasion for animal advocates given the many shortcomings of EU legislation as it currently stands. Moreover, if carried out properly, this revision represents a chance to bring EU legislation in alignment with the EU Constitution, which recognises animal sentience and requires the Union and the Member States to take animal welfare into account when regulating agricultural, scientific, and other activities. Farmed animals Today, EU farm animal welfare legislation is comprised of seven laws: One general act that sets minimum rules for all farmed animals – for all farming purposes (Directive 98/58), which covers all animals farmed for food, fibre, or fur purposes, except invertebrates. This act sets general principles regarding space allowance, building specifications and access to feed and water. However, the language of the provisions is vague and almost always allows for broad exemptions to general principles through the enactment of species-specific acts. Four 'species-specific' acts that cover hens (Directive 1999/74), calves (Directive 2008/119), pigs (Directive 2008/120), and broiler chickens (Directive 2007/43). These species-specific acts set a very low bar for the protection of animals by allowing the use of cages for egg-laying hens, as well as for sows and calves. The Broilers Directive further allows extreme density levels for broiler chickens of up to 42 kg/m2, which is the equivalent of nine animals per square metre. All these acts also allow for the mutilation of animals, such as the dehorning of calves, the debeaking of chicks, and the tail docking, tooth grinding, and castration of piglets without the use of anaesthesia or analgesia. Two acts that regulate the treatment of animals during transport (Regulation 1/2005) and slaughter (Regulation 1099/2009). The Slaughter Regulation allows for virtually all methods of killing, including chick grinding. It also allows the use of CO2 for stunning for pigs and waterbath stunning for poultry, both of which, by the European Commission’s own account, cause disproportionate suffering to animals. The Transport Regulation sets limits on the duration of long-distance transport, but such limits can go as high as 24 hours for pigs. A 2015 ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) further required that Member States had to ensure that all convoys would comply with EU rules on the transport of live animals, even those that travel outside EU borders. The ECJ case law has never been codified into EU legislation, and the European Commission never undertook efforts to ensure its proper enforcement. Overall, EU legislation for farmed animals suffers from low standards, vague and incomprehensible language, and under-enforcement. Another shortcoming is that there are no species-specific regulations for aquatic animals or dairy cows, both of which are covered under the General Farming Directive, as well as the two regulations on transport and slaughter. This is an issue because dairy cows and aquatic animals are subject to specific types of treatment which are not addressed in the General Farming Directive. A final issue is the lack of consistency across EU legislation in other fields of animal welfare. For instance, cephalopods such as octopi are not protected under the General Farming Directive, but they are included in the scope of the EU legislation on animals used for scientific purposes. Animals used for scientific purposes The EU’s Directive 63/2010 on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes is arguably the most ambitious of all EU animal welfare laws. The scope of this directive is quite large since it includes all live, non-human vertebrate animals and cephalopods. The directive further sets an objective of complete transition to animal-free research, and, until that goal is achieved, this legislation sets specifications for the housing of animals, as well as which methods are lawful to use in their killing. Under the Directive, the testing on non-human primates and great apes is subject to especially tight restrictions . Finally, the directive outlines a thorough inspection system. However, as evidence of the numerous shortcomings of this Directive, some EU Member States did not implement the derogation allowing for the use of great apes for experimentation purposes. The Italian rules also prohibit the raising of dogs, cats, and monkeys for experimentation purposes. Italian law further restricts experimentation on animals for military purposes. Animals in zoos Although the EU does not have competence to regulate the use of animals in other entertainment settings, circuses and on film sets for example, the EU Legislature does regulate the keeping of animals in zoos based on the purported role these establishments play in the conservation of animals. Directive 1999/22/EC on the keeping of wild animals in zoos thus sets rules for the licensing and inspection of zoos to ensure they comply with the EU law on the conservation and protection of wild animal species. However, the Directive fails to specify standards on the enrichment of enclosures and, in fact, provides no regulation on the treatment of animals whatsoever. Most importantly, this directive supports the industry idea that zoos contribute to species conservation, something which is contested by many animal advocates. Wild animals (conservation and hunting regulations) The EU legislature has been proactive in banning cruel hunting methods on the grounds of species conservation. First, the Birds Directive (Directive 2009/147/EC) bans traditional hunting methods, such as glue trap hunting. Such a prohibition was confirmed in an ECJ ruling against France in 2021, which further recognised that, in addition to serving conservation purposes, traditional hunting methods harm the welfare of birds. Since 1991, the EU has also prohibited the use of leghold traps on wild animals hunted for their fur by way of Council Regulation 3254/91. This ban has extraterritorial effects since it further prohibits the import of pelts and other wild animal-source products that come from non-EU countries where hunting with leghold traps is legal. Finally, Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products bans the imports of so-called 'seal products' originating from seal hunting, which the EU considers to be an immoral practice. Canada issued a challenge against the EU, claiming that the ban on the importation of seal products amounted to an unfair trade barrier. However, in a 2014 opinion, the World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body sided in favour of the EU; thus, the EU ban on products made with hunted seals remains. What’s next for animals? In 2020, the European Commission committed to propose a new legislation on farm animal welfare by 2023. The following year, in June 2021, the European Commission further committed to end the use of cages for laying hens, rabbits, pullets, broiler breeders, layer breeders, quail, ducks, and geese; farrowing crates for sows; and sow stalls and individual calf pens. This commitment followed the signature of the European Citizens’ Initiative – an official petition to the EU – which gathered 1.4 million signatures. Conclusion Although the EU claims to be leading on animal welfare, a closer look at the standards in the legislation reveals that, in practice, EU laws are too accommodating towards industry practices, to the detriment of animals. The EU farm animal welfare legislation is in particular need of reform, as it has limited itself to codifying into law common industry practices typical of industrial farm animal production. The upcoming revision of EU farm animal welfare is an opportunity for the EU to live up to the reputation it seeks. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com You can find more information about animal protection laws in the European Union here:   AnimalLawEurope.com  and here:   Calf.law

From low-lying rivers running through the land, sky-searching mountaintops, and meandering rainforests tracing the south, Bangladesh is rich in biodiversity . This, no doubt, extends to its vast animal life . Elephants often roamed freely, the Bengal tiger once stood proud in its majesty, and the gaur moved freely without threat. As of now, all are deemed threatened  or endangered  by the IUCN. Often the target of poaching and habitat destruction, Bangladesh’s unique animal population is facing an epidemic of inaction. Though protective legislation exists, there are often seething gaps in textual language that reduces their effectiveness. Coupled with sporadic enforcement, animal rights are too frequently rendered a secondary consideration. Nonetheless, there has been, however slow-paced, positive change, often stemming from increased awareness and engagement through the court system. This week guest writer Nafisa Ehsan will provide an overview of what protections exist for animals in Bangladesh. Current legal framework Bangladesh is a dualist common law  jurisdiction. As such, animal laws are guided through statutory material, case law, as well as the Constitution. Obligations stemming from international agreements must, if they are to have effect within Bangladesh, be translated into domestic statute.  It should be importantly noted that Bangladesh, both from political and legal perspectives, has recognised the necessity of protecting animals. This is most suitably demonstrated through the Constitution . Indeed, Article 18A specifies that, as a State, ‘it shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment’, including specifically protecting ‘biodiversity’ and ‘wildlife for the present and future citizens’. Correspondingly, honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina  has expressed that human behaviour has “aggravate[ed]…loss of biodiversity” and declared that such actions “are not only causing extinction of other species” but contribute to the “ultimate extinction of human beings if our current actions continue to be unchecked”. Though these sentiments are somewhat reflected in Bangladesh’s legal framework, most existing legislative efforts remain limited in their obligations and often lack credible enforcement mechanisms.  Prevention of cruel treatment Bangladesh’s efforts for preventing maltreatment of animals have been concentrated on the Cruelty to Animals Act 1920 and the Animal Welfare Act 2019. Though the latter repeals the former, it is important to note how legal efforts were shifted over almost a century.  The Cruelty to Animals Act 1920  (‘CRA 1920’) sought to reduce the suffering of farmed animals. It, somewhat vaguely and less scientifically, defines an animal as ‘any domestic or captured animal’ (Art. 3(1)). For animals, the CRA 1920 imposes a metric for cruelty, provides limitations on killing, and details penalties for such offences. It does not ban cruelty or infliction of pain outright; rather, the CRA 1920 specifically states that any individual who imposes ‘cruelty or unnecessarily beats’, ‘ill-treats any animal’, or ‘subject[s] the animal to unnecessary pain or suffering’ has committed a punishable offence (Art. 4(a)-(c)). The relevant penalty was a fine of up to 100 taka, a prison sentence of up to 3 months, or a combination of both (Art. 4(c)). Similar penalties follow for killing ‘any animal in an unnecessarily cruel manner’, for a fine extending up to 200 taka, a maximum prison sentence of 6 months, or both (Art. 7). If an ‘unfit’ animal is used for labour, a fine of 100 taka may be imposed (Art. 10). What is most glaringly limited is what constitutes treatment in an ‘unnecessarily cruel manner’ or what specifically may render an animal ‘unfit’. Such interpretation provides leeway for abuse. Complementarily, there is no concrete obligation  to take action on the Government’s part. Enforcement ‘may’ be instilled through Veterinary Inspectors, if the Government wishes (Art. 15(a)). Additionally, if 3 months have passed since the commission of unnecessary cruelty to an animal, there can be no prosecution (Art. 32). The ambiguous textual language, lack of obligations, and deprivation of efficient enforcement measures undermine the very essence of the CRA 1920.  The CRA 1920 was repealed by the Animal Welfare Act 2019  (‘AWA 2019’) to remedy such defects. Namely, through stronger textual language. This includes more wider and accurate definitions, more nuanced description of offences, and higher penalties. In the AWA 2019, an animal encompasses non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, ‘aquatic animals other than fish’, and any which the Government may recognise via the Official Gazette (Art. 2(11)). Among such definitions include that of a ‘sick animal’ (Art. 2(2)), a ‘captive animal’ (Art. 2(3)), ‘domestic animal’ (Art. 2(6)), and an ‘unowned animal’ (Art. 2(16)).  The AWA 2019 seeks to also clarify unelaborated metrics that were initially mentioned in the CRA 1920. What constitutes ‘unnecessary cruelty to animals’ now includes ‘any act or omission’ that results in the animal suffering disease (Art. 6(a)), beating or overworking (Art. 6(b)), depriving said animal with insufficient sustenance (Art. 6(c)), and the injection of harmful drugs (Art. 6(h)). This remains a non-exhaustive list. It is now formally the responsibility of every ‘owner or keeper of every animal’ to ensure the animal is treated benevolently, humanely, and without undue cruelty (Art. 4). There are also increased traceability and registration measures for commercial production of pets (Art. 9(1)). Those who impose ‘unnecessary cruelty’ on the animals or kills ownerless animals ‘shall be punished’ with maximum 6 months imprisonment, a fine of up to 10,000 taka, or both (Art. 16(a)). Disfigurement (Art. 10(1)) or poisoning (Art. 11(1)) may result in imprisonment up to a term of 2 years, a fine of 50,000 taka, or both (Art. 16(b)). In an extension of liability, companies can also be held responsible (Art. 17). The improved enforcement measures also now empower authorities to ‘inspect all registered and unregistered farms’ ‘at any time’ (Art. 13). It also details that when an animal is seized, any costs of assisting in maintaining and recovering the animal shall be borne by relevant authorities or supervisors (Art. 15(3)). However, clarity on precisely how enforcement  will practically operate still linger. This is due to limited explanation on how widespread monitoring will occur and flexible obligations on authorities  to realise the expectations under this law. The AWA 2019’s obligations often remain unimpressed, presenting challenges to realising the improved demands. Though the AWA 2019 is an important demonstration of changing social attitudes and receptiveness to widespread protective measures, there continues to be limited enforcement.  The slaughtering of animals for the purpose of meat consumption is governed by the Animal Slaughter & Meat Quality Control Act 2011 (Act No. 16 of 2011)   (‘2011 Act’). This act repealed the previous Animals Slaughter (Restriction) and Meat Control Act 1957  (‘1957 Act’). The 1957 Act defines an ‘animal’ as ‘any bull, bullock, cow, ox, heifer, [calf, buffalo, goat and sheep]’ (Art. 2(a)). Restrictions under the 1957 Act included no slaughtering or sale of such animals on prohibited days (Art. 3) and restrictions on killing animals below a certain age. For example, no ‘she-goat or ewe’ under 2 years old ‘or any other female animal below the age of three years’ can be slaughtered (Art. 5(a)). The penalty for violating these provisions included imprisonment of up to 6 months, a fine of up to 1,000 taka, or both (Art. 7(a)). Exceptions to these slaughtering prohibitions, included religious festivals (Art. 9(1)(a)), scientific research purposes (Art. 9(1)(b)), and at the Government’s discretion (Art. 9(2)). Enforcement, such as location inspections, would occur from authorised Officers (Art. 6).  These provisions were updated by the Animal Slaughter & Meat Quality Control Act 2011 (Act No. 16 of 2011) . The 2011 Act, though containing similar provisions to its predecessor, elaborates significantly. This is, firstly, demonstrated through the definitions provided. For example, by describing what an ‘animal’ is, what an ‘animal fit for slaughter’ constitutes, and what a ‘slaughterhouse’ is. An ‘animal’ under the 2011 Act has a flexible definition, naming some examples as ‘ducks, chickens, quails, pigeons, turkeys, etc’, as well as any other animal declared as such by the Government (Art. 2(12)). An ‘animal fit for slaughter’ is described as ‘any healthy animal’ as so declared by a Veterinary Officer or a veterinarian (Art. 2(7)). A ‘slaughterhouse’ is defined as any Government approved building for the purposes of slaughter, and examining animals pre and post-slaughter (Art. 2(8)). Such slaughterhouses require a licence to operate (Art. 8-10). There are more stringent prohibition mechanisms, ensuring that animals (for the purposes of human consumption) cannot be slaughtered outside of a Government approved slaughterhouse (Art. 3(1)). There are exceptions to this, such as for religious festivals (Art. 3(1)(a)). Animals may also be protected from slaughter on specific days (Art. 15).  For monitoring purposes, designated Veterinary Officers or veterinarians are required to examine the animals brought to the slaughterhouse (Art. 5(2)). The Director General and authorised Veterinary Officers are able to inspect the premises of slaughterhouses and establishments that sell meat, taking action when necessary (Art. 12). If there has been slaughtering of animals in contravention to the 2011 Act’s provisions, then authorised officials can seize the meat products or the vehicles in which they are being transported (Art. 22). The penalty for contravening the 2011 Act includes imprisonment between 1-5 years, a fine between 1,000 – 25,000 taka, or both (Art. 24(1)). Repeat offenders suffer higher sentences (Art. 24(2)).  Whilst the 2011 Act contains stringent rules, punitive measures, and enforcement mechanisms, there is often lack of formal accountability. These weak traceability and recordation mechanisms  for slaughtered animals means that there continues to be unchecked mistreatment of animals. Such weak enforcement mechanisms often exacerbate the illegal cattle trade  occurring between India and Bangladesh, where up to 2 million cattle are shifted per year. This only reduces the already sparse protections afforded to animals fit for slaughter. Though the recent 2011 Act is an important step forward for animal protection, it is rendered largely ineffective because of sparse monitoring, illegal trade, and inflexible solutions.  Protection of wildlife Bangladesh possesses an abundance of wildlife. At present, there are 56 protected areas , 15 of which are wildlife sanctuaries. The Sundarbans, one of the world’s largest mangrove forests, is categorised as a World Heritage Site . Accordingly, Bangladesh rightly devotes several statutes and international instruments to the protection of both animals and their habitats. This confluence of both national and international law has established an impressive regime for wildlife protection. However, as seen before, enforcement and monitoring mechanisms are few and far between, undermining the protective obligations of these laws.  The Bangladesh Wild Life (Preservation) Order 1973  (‘1973 Order’) focuses on limiting the hunting and sale of wildlife animals. To do so, the 1973 Order defines and classifies wildlife animals, limits hunting, and establishes the Bangladesh Wild Life Advisory Board. In comparison to the earlier CRA 1920, the 1973 Order defines a ‘wild animal’ as ‘any vertebrate creature, other than human beings and animals of usually domesticated species or fish’ (Art. 2(o)). A ‘wild life sanctuary’ is a restricted area that protects animals, provides for their growth and breeding, and bans any form of ‘hunting, shooting, or trapping of wild animals’ (Art. 2(p)). This latter definition also provides the Government with the freedom to introduce new wildlife sanctuaries (Art. 2(p)). In addition to prescriptive definitions, this Order also lists several ‘Protected Animals’ under the Third Schedule (Art. 5(2)), including the Bengal tiger, panther, sloth bear, and common Dolphin.  Enforcement would fall to the Government and the Wild Life Advisory Board. The Government can deem certain areas wildlife sanctuaries (Art. 23(1)). This provides several protections to this area, including the prevention of human access (Art. 23(2)(i)) and prevention of hunting (Art. 23(2)(iv)). The Wild Life Advisory Board is required to ‘perform such functions as the Government may assign to it’ (Art. 4(2)). Though such a broad remit may have been an opportunity to enhance the Board’s role, it has also infused their role with uncertainty.  This 1973 Order was repealed by the Wildlife (Conservation and Security) Act, 2012 (No. XXX)  (‘WCSA 2012’).  Again, the WCSA 2012 only limits the hunting of wild animals by requiring a licence or permit to do so (Art. 6(1)). The definition of ‘wild animals’ was slightly more broad, and referred to ‘different types and species of animals or different stages of their life cycle, the source of which is considered as wild’ (Art. 2(25)). The WCSA 2012 also clarified the duties of the Wildlife Advisory Board, which now includes having ‘to review the activities’ (Art. 3(2)(b)) ‘and provide directives in the matter of conservation, development and management of biodiversity, wildlife and forests’ (Art. 3(2)(a)). Enforcement will be supplemented by a wildlife control unit ‘to ensure strict compliance’ (Art. 31(1)). Higher penalties also exist. For example, for killing animals mentioned under Schedule I, such as a tiger or elephant, without a licence is rendered an offence, ‘shall be non-bailable’, and may result in a prison sentence between 2-7 years, accompanied with a fine of 1-10 lakh (Art. 36(1)). Complementarily, the imposition of international law has helped steer and improve Bangladesh’s legislative progression. This is exemplified by the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992  (‘the CBD 1992’). Having been ratified by Bangladesh in 1994 , the CBD 1992 primarily requires parties to support ‘the conservation of biological diversity’ (Art. 1). This includes establishing ‘national strategies, plans or programmes’ for this purpose (Art. 6(a)). The bound States have a duty not to backslide and would be held accountable through reporting obligations (Art. 26), such as National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (‘NBSAP’). Bangladesh’s NBSAP 2016-2021  details its efforts, such as ‘the updating of the Red-list of animals’ (pp. 5), recognising the impact of human behaviour (pp. 15), and reflections on current laws and policies. This includes identifying gaps in policies, of which there are many, including lack of protection of endangered animals for the purposes of export in the Export Policy .  To meet the obligations of the CBD 1992, Bangladesh has implemented the Biodiversity Act 2017   (‘BA 2017’). The BA 2017 also specifically encapsulates ‘species diversity’ within its definition of biodiversity (Art. 2(11)). The designated National Committee on Biodiversity (Art. 8(1)) includes helping to recognise ‘areas of biodiversity importance’ and declare Biodiversity Heritage Sites (Art. 10(d)). The Government are able to declare such areas through a notice in the Gazette (Art. 32(1)). For the purposes of monitoring and awareness, some of the functions of the Municipal Biodiversity Management and Monitoring Committee include registering the biodiversity of such municipal areas and encouraging local preservation efforts (Art. 24). The BA 2017 continues the NBSAP obligations originally envisioned in the CBD 1992 on a much looser scale, requiring an update on conservation efforts only from ‘time to time’ (Art. 31(1)). There are more wide-ranging restrictions on activities that could adversely affect ‘endangered species or wildlife’ (Art. 33). The penalty for carrying out such activities or interference ‘will be a crime’ and can result in imprisonment of up to 5 years, a fine of up to 10 lakhs, or both (Art. 41).   Bangladesh has also utilised international conservation efforts to assist in localised protections. This is highlighted through the Memorandum of Understanding between India and Bangladesh on Conservation of the Sundarban 2011  (‘MoU’). Focusing specifically on the Sundarban region, India and Bangladesh have sought to ‘consider and adopt appropriate joint management and joint monitoring of resources’ (Art. 2(a)). Despite this engagement, conservation efforts in the area have been undermined by the building of large infrastructures nearby, such as the coal-burning Rampal Power Station . With this Power Station being a collaboration between both India and Bangladesh, the weight of their MoU has significantly been reduced and places the local environment and wildlife at risk.  Conclusion Bangladesh’s legislative landscape indicates an awareness and increasing support from animal welfare. This is evident through the recent Biodiversity Act 2017 and Animal Welfare Act 2019. Such Acts are complemented by international obligations and instruments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992. However, the reach and capabilities of these legal instruments are often undermined by weak enforcement measures and inefficient public engagement. For a more robust landscape of animal rights to develop, there must be an evolution in public awareness, legislative clarity, and increased accountability for violators.  Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This week guest writer Charlotte Morrish explores animal law in The Cayman Islands. Introduction The Cayman Islands is a British Overseas Territory in the Caribbean, consisting of three islands which are home to approximately 80,000 people. Being small islands with limited agriculture, the legal framework pertaining to animals is primarily aimed at protecting native species (notably the blue iguana) and preventing cruelty to other animals, the majority of which are cats and dogs. Like many of its Caribbean neighbours, the Cayman Islands is home to numerous unwanted companion animals, and cultural attitudes against spay and neuter and in favour of allowing dogs to roam , for example, expound the overpopulation issues.       With a substantial expatriate population due to its status as a global financial services centre, and a thriving tourism industry, the Cayman Islands government collected a record-breaking CI$1 billion in revenue in 2022, resulting in a substantial operating surplus . Cayman is one of the world’s highest ranked countries based on real GDP per capita . However, despite the country’s relative wealth, poor animal welfare remains a significant challenge. The Animal Welfare and Control Services Agency falls within the remit of the Department of Agriculture but operates with limited personnel and resource (a Freedom of Information ('FOI') Request Response from Department of Agriculture 22 November 2023 confirmed that, as at that time, they only employed one Animal Welfare Officer and the budget for the Animal Welfare and Control Services agency was KYD$14,400 (approx. £14,000), meaning that the burden of addressing the overpopulation of cats and dogs, and the consequent animal welfare problems, falls largely on local animal charities. A lack of suitable homes due to pervasive 'no-pet' rules in the rental market and a transient population exacerbate the overpopulation issues. The Cayman Islands Humane Society , the Islands’ largest animal welfare charity and operator of the Islands’ only animal shelter, rescued 540 dogs and cats in 2023. It also conducted 906 spay/neuter surgeries, treated 139 animals for heartworm and administered 3620 vaccinations and de-wormers .  Animal welfare law The primary piece of legislation concerning animals, including their welfare, in the Cayman Islands is the Animals Act (2024 Revision)  ('the Act'). The Act is divided into a number of parts dealing with particular areas including: Import and Export of Animals; Control of Diseases of Animals; Improvement of farmed animals; Licensing of Dogs; Nuisances by, and Control of, Animals; Protection of Animals and Wild Life. The Act also establishes an Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (section 66), comprising six members including the Director of the Department of Agriculture, a member from the Cayman Islands Humane Society, the Cayman Horse Association, the Agricultural Society, the Police, and a member of the general public with a demonstrated interest in animal welfare. The Committee is mandated to meet at least once every two months (section 69) and is responsible for, amongst other things, advising the minister responsible for agriculture on policy matters relating to the care of animals, and educating the public on the care of animals (section 67). Sections 70-77 of the Act are concerned with preventing cruelty to animals. Section 70(1) creates the offence of cruelty and specifies the ways in which this may be committed, including by 'wantonly or unreasonably' causing unnecessary suffering (section 70(1)(b)) and by tethering or confining an animal in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering (section 70(1)(f)). Section 70(3) goes some way to imposing a positive duty, but stops short of being akin to the UK equivalent in section 9 of the Animal Welfare Act. It requires that the 'owner of an animal who leaves an animal on premises shall ensure that there is a person on the premises or a person who will visit the premises to maintain that animal, and that the animal- (a) has access to drinking water and food; (b) has access to accommodation which is suitable as regards drainage, size, cleanliness and ventilation; (c) is able to move freely; and (d) has reasonable shelter against the sun and rain.' The use of the word 'maintain' suggests that the Act is focused on ensuring the basic survival needs of the animal, rather than its welfare needs.  Despite the Cayman Islands Government stating that all animals 'are entitled to a standard level of care… in accordance with the principles of the Five Freedom ' the legislation falls short of enshrining the Five Freedoms and there is a notable absence of any requirement for animals to be able to express normal behaviours. An area of significant concern in terms of animal welfare is responsible dog ownership. Here, there is a conflict between equally concerning issues: dogs who are left to roam the streets freely, and dogs who are tethered outside 24/7. The Department of Agriculture’s own guidance recommends tethering dogs instead of allowing them to roam , but this is perhaps at odds with the reference to freedom of movement under section 70(3)(c) and the offence of cruelty by tethering which causes unnecessary suffering under section 70(1)(f). All the aforementioned offences are triable summarily and punishable by a four thousand dollar fine and imprisonment for one year.  Other offences in the Act include fighting or baiting (section 71), transporting an animal in a manner which causes avoidable or unnecessary pain or suffering (section 72), causing unnecessary suffering whilst killing (section 74), and tail docking of horses (section 75), all of which are triable summarily and punishable by a five hundred dollar fine and imprisonment for six months. Of particular concern is the lack of an enforced licensing regime for breeders. Despite section 29 of the Act making it an offence to breed 'pet animals' without a licence (punishable by a fine of up to ten thousand dollars) the government was slow to implement a licensing regime , and in response to an FOI request in October 2023 asking how many breeding licenses were held at that time, the response was 'assume nil'. This lack of effective oversight and enforcement has significant implications for the overpopulation issues, and for the welfare of bred animals.  Recent developments In February 2023 a new set of Regulations came into effect pertaining to 'alien species ' which include, inter alia, feral cats. In fact, the definition of 'alien species' is very broadly drawn to essentially include any animal not present on the Islands prior to their discovery by humans (and on one reading, could even include humans!). The regulations make it illegal to feed these alien species (section 18) or to trap, neuter and release them back into the wild (section 17). The effect is therefore to mandate the necessary suffering of feral cats but prohibiting members of the public from feeding them, and further to prohibit 'trap neuter release' programmes by animal welfare organisations. The regulations also permit private persons to destroy alien species themselves, including feral cats.  The regulations were condemned by the Cayman Islands Humane Society  and widely criticised by the public. They are currently stayed pending a judicial review by another animal welfare NPO, Feline Friends, on the grounds that they are unlawful, irrational and incompatible with the Cayman Islands Constitution. Leave was granted and the full hearing is awaited.   Enforcement Despite a general lack of enforcement of animal cruelty offences in the Cayman Islands, according to a statement from the Government, the community 'wants to see animals better protected and appropriate consequences administered for those who fail to comply with their legal requirements ' . In a recent case involving a dog called Wilbur who was found extremely emaciated and died shortly after being rescued, the owner was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment following a trial. In sentencing the defendant for an offence under section 70(1) of the Animals Act, Magistrate McFarlane observed that this was 'one of the most serious cases of animal neglect that she had seen and that the sentence was designed to 'send a clear message, that of deterrence ' . Another case which received widespread local attention concerned the death of a police dog, K9 Baron, who died after being left in the sun without access to food or water when a police constable failed to raise a sliding gate separating the indoor and outdoor sections of the kennel. The constable was acquitted of a charge under section 70(1)(b), the Magistrate having found that the reference to 'wantonly and unreasonably' in the statement of offence required the prosecution to prove ill intent on the part of the defendant, a burden which they failed to discharge in the circumstances of this case .  Despite the acquittal in K9 Baron’s case, the investigation and prosecution of these two offences demonstrate an increased public demand that animal welfare laws will be enforced.  Conclusion Notwithstanding its relative wealth, the Cayman Islands faces similar animal welfare challenges to other small island nations. Whilst it benefits from having animal welfare laws in place, including to establish an Animal Welfare Advisory Committee, and a robust judicial system, with very few cases resulting in prosecution to date, the effectiveness of this legislation has not been properly explored through the Courts. In any event, there appears to be scope for significant improvement in the protections afforded to animals in the Cayman Islands through further legislation which expressly enshrines the Five Freedoms, and, as with the UK, expressly recognises animal sentience. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

29 November 2022 Following the launch of The Animal Law Foundation, we think it is important to explain how the new charity will work, particularly in relation to Advocates for Animals and Advocates for Animals’ much valued clients. Advocates for Animals is so proud of all the work it does with its clients and would like to provide reassurance that this work and service will remain entirely unaffected, save for perhaps being bolstered by another animal law entity with a new pool of expertise. How The Animal law Foundation started Through the work conducted at the law firm Advocates for Animals, it has become apparent that the laws that are passed through Parliament are grossly under-enforced in practice, rendering the value of those laws questionable at best and redundant at worst. Following this realisation, a new venture was required to monitor the implementation and enforcement of animal law. Having secured some funding and actively seeking additional support, The Animal Law Foundation will research neglected areas of animal law and where appropriate instruct solicitors to bring challenges to ensure that any system in place to protect animals, functions as it should. The UK still has some of the best animal welfare laws in the world, yet the opportunity for vast improvements contained within these laws is rarely explored. Through exploring these opportunities, the whole system for animals can be improved and set global examples. For its first groundbreaking project, it has co-authored and published a report with Animal Equality UK called The Enforcement Problem, which explores the issues surrounding the enforcement of farmed animal welfare laws. The findings include: Fewer than 3% of UK farms were inspected (2.95%) Upon receiving a complaint, just half (50.45%) of farms were then inspected Of those inspections, approximately one-third (31.38%) identified non-compliance on the same site Just 0.33% of farms were prosecuted following initial complaints of non-compliance The report received coverage in The Guardian and The Mirror and can be found here: https://animallawfoundation.org/reports How the relationship will work with Advocates for Animals and its clients Advocates for Animals remains a professional law firm that works with its clients to assist with animal protection issues. In the event The Animal Law Foundation identifies a legal challenge, The Animal Law Foundation may become a client of Advocates for Animals. The Animal Law Foundation will not duplicate the legal work Advocates for Animals does for its clients, but rather it will explore neglected areas. It is of vital importance that the laws that exist to protect animals are understood and applied. 'Despite their sentience and all the incredible attributes animals possess, they are extremely vulnerable in our society, both at the hands of commercial interests and the sadistic. It is therefore essential that a framework is in place to prevent certain treatment. You do not have to be an animal lover or an activist in this area to recognise that animals deserve protection under the law and that those laws need to be enforced. How can we justify the proclamation that we are a nation of animal lovers and that we have some of the highest animal welfare standards on farms and slaughterhouses in the world, if these standards only exist on paper?' Edie Bowles

As we approach what we expect to be our biggest year yet, we want to take this moment to reflect on another year at Advocates for Animals and all the growth we have seen. Some highlights from 2022 include: We won the first private prosecution we have brought regarding cruelty towards dogs. You can find out more here We were granted permission for two judicial reviews against the government, one to challenge fast growing chickens bred for meat and one challenging cosmetic testing on animals. Permission is achieved in only 5% of cases. You can find out more here and here We provided legal assistance to help close a huge reptile market with significant animal welfare concerns. You can find out more here We provided legal advice to almost all of the major animal groups in the UK We had our work featured in major news outlets, including The Guardian , The BBC and The Mirror We have welcomed new members to our growing team We welcomed The Animal Law Foundation to the UK animal law family 2022 was our best year yet, but we are determined to make 2023 even better. To provide a taster for 2023: We are advising on two prosecutions regarding cruelty on farms We will be attending the hearings for our two judicial reviews We will be working with The Animal Law Foundation to prevent systemic illegality We will be welcoming new team members. Find out more here Thank you to all of those who support us, you have made this vision a reality. We couldn't do it without you. 2023 here we come!

Advocates for Animals, the UK’s first Animal Law firm, has won Boutique Law Firm of the Year from the prestigious Legal Business Awards 2023. On 19 September 2023 Advocates for Animals, amongst a group of esteemed legal professionals gathered at a glitzy event in Mayfair, London, won an award granted by Legal Business. Other winners included TLT, Dentons, Latham and Watkins and Macfarlanes. This award not only recognises Advocates for Animals and the vital work the firm does for animal protection, but it puts animal law on the map as a distinct and important legal discipline worthy of respect. This in itself is groundbreaking and The Legal Business Awards should be commended for recognising this. The practice of animal law has been present in other countries like the US and Canada for decades, yet in the UK it has only really gained momentum since Advocates for Animals was launched in 2019. The UK is a nation of animal lovers and often pats itself on the back for its relatively high standards and animal laws in the statute books, but with a lack of lawyers specialising in animal law these laws were left to be grossly underenforced and interpreted in a way that has not always had the animals’ best interests at heart. Advocates for Animals has worked across a variety of cases, all with the intention of ensuring that animal laws are applied in practice. It is currently involved in a high profile judicial review challenging the UK government over the use of fast growing chickens that make up 90% of the chicken meat in the UK; these chickens experience a range of health and welfare issues. 'We are over the moon to have won this award. Animal law is not easy—fighting to help animals in the courts and witnessing the cruelty is hard. This award is a reminder that change is happening, people see the value in this important work. We would like to dedicate this award to our wonderful clients who truly have made this possible and most importantly the animals who we will continue to fight for.' - Edie Bowles, Managing Director, Advocates for Animals 'Edie and her team are thoroughly deserving of this award. The firm’s work is truly integral to the animal protection movement; thanks to their team of experts, animal groups and activists are now better positioned than ever before to recommend robust legislation, publicly scrutinise the government and corporate animal welfare policies, conduct powerful investigations into animal industries and more. By providing a high-quality and affordable legal service in this space, animal groups and activists are able to make informed decisions that, in turn, spare animals from suffering. Awareness of animal protection is growing at pace and, thanks to the work of Advocates for Animals, it is also growing in its legal knowledge too.' Abi Penny, Executive Director, Animal Equality (client of Advocates for Animals We would like to dedicate this award to our wonderful clients who truly have made this possible and most importantly the animals who we will continue to fight for.