Animal rights activism often involves exposing wrongdoing and malpractice, but what can a person do if they find out their employer; or just someone they know of through work, is the one committing the wrong? ‘Whistleblowing’ is sometimes the only way such information can be brought into the public domain or even to the attention of a relevant authority with the power to remedy the situation. With the usual caveat that a post like this can never be a substitute for individual legal advice, guest writer and barrister Alan Robertshaw will briefly examine the law pertaining to whistleblowing. Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, often referred to as PIDA, provides some measure of protection for whistleblowers. It applies to ‘workers’; and workers is defined quite broadly. It would apply to agency staff for example. The act states that no one should suffer a ‘detriment’ as a consequence of making a protected disclosure. Detriment is any form of negative treatment; from being fired to just being ostracised. People who do suffer a detriment are able to bring a claim under the Employment Rights Act. This permits a range of remedies, from reinstatement to financial compensation. What is a protected disclosure? There needs to be a 'disclosure' within the meaning of the act; It must be a 'qualifying disclosure'; The disclosure must be made to a particular type of person or organisation. What is a qualifying disclosure? that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. Legality or morality? The act seems to be concerned with criminal wrongdoing. However, tribunals do seem to be becoming more receptive to the idea that moral or ethical failures could also be the subject of a qualifying disclosure. 'Serious failure' The act permits disclosure where there is a risk of 'exceptionally serious failure'. What amounts to such is dealt with on a case by case basis. Generally, though, any disclosure that is in the general public interest (which is not the same as ‘of interest to the public) will be protected so long as the person does not make the disclosure for personal gain. Whom is told will be a relevant factor. A disclosure to the police or a regulator may be warranted, where a tip-off to the press would not. Permissible recipients Generally, disclosure must be made to one of the following types of people or organisations: Employer or Other Reasonable person Employer includes anyone senior to the person disclosing, or any other person nominated by the employer. This could include a Health and Safety Representative, or a Union official. Where the wrongdoing is the responsibility of the employer, disclosure is permitted to an appropriate third party; such as an auditor or even a former director of the company, for example. Government Minister or Member of Parliament Prescribed persons There is a list of permissible recipients here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/blowing-the-whistle-list-of-prescribed-people-and-bodies--2/whistleblowing-list-of-prescribed-people-and-bodies Other organisations If a disclosure has been made to one of the above and no remedial action has been taken, or the person making the disclosure reasonably believes they would suffer a detriment for doing so; then they may make the disclosure to some other organisation or person; so long as they do not do so for personal gain. Facts, not opinion The disclosure must relate to a factual situation. Merely expressing a negative opinion as to the conduct of the employer would not be protected. Allegations can be information The wrongdoing need not be established or proven. A person who reported that there was a rumour at work that the company was involved in dangerous practices might be protected, even if it transpired that the rumour wasn’t true. Reasonable belief The person making a disclose of a criminal activity need not specify exactly which law is being broken. A general layperson’s assessment of the activity would be enough. The protection also applies where a person reasonably believes an activity amounts to a crime; even if the activity is not actually an offence in law. Method It is only the disclosure that is protected; not the way the information was obtained. So, if the information was obtained illegally, or even in breach of an employment contract, it might not be unlawful to take disciplinary action over that. Good faith There is no longer a requirement that the disclosure be made in good faith. A disgruntled employee who made the disclosure just to cause trouble for their bosses would still be protected. Any award of damages, though, could be adjusted to take into account the motivation behind the disclosure. Third parties The wrongdoing need not be by the employer. Disclosures relating to third parties, such as suppliers or subcontractors, are also protected. NDAs It will not be a breach of a non-disclosure agreement to make a protected disclosure, and any clause seeking to prohibit this would be invalid and unenforceable. Detriment 'Detriment' is widely defined. It is not limited to dismissal. Any negative consequences would count. A claim can also be brought against any co-worker of agent or the employer who subjects the person to a detriment. Common law public interest defence The act applies to a wide variety of workers. Some people, however, are excluded from its protections. They include police officers and people working in the intelligence and security services. There is, however, a common law public interest defence to ‘whistleblowing’. Further, people have Article 10 rights under the European Convention of Human Rights to free speech. It is a breach of Article 14 of the convention to treat people differently merely because of ‘status’. Thus, recently, a judge was able to bring a successful whistleblowing claim, despite being an ‘office holder’ rather than a worker as defined by the act. It would be interesting to see if other normally excluded persons could derive protection under the same principles; such as government employees in sensitive positions. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Successful criminal prosecutions can shut down abusive farms or cruel hunts and reclaim thousands from unlicensed breeders, poachers or wildlife traders. In this blog, Advocates for Animals paralegal Sam March will outline what the process is for bringing one yourself. Why prosecute privately? The criminal law imposes hard limits on how people can treat animals. The Animal Welfare Act 2006 outlaws specific behaviours such as animal fighting, and generally makes it illegal to cause 'unnecessary suffering' to domesticated or captive animals. Because the law considers domestic animals to be 'property,' animal offenders may sometimes be tried for property crimes such as criminal damage or theft. Wild animals are also protected by various general and species-specific statutes; these seek to prevent crimes like poaching, disturbing wild birds, persecuting badgers, holding salmon 'in suspicious circumstances', trapping wild animals illegally, ill-treating them or illegally importing or exporting endangered species. This is an ever-growing area of law. Last year, Parliament criminalised the use of wild animals in travelling circuses, and just this month the government introduced landmark new legislation to tackle the low-welfare, high-volume kitten and puppy farms by banning commercial third-party sales. By criminalising these behaviours, society hopes to deter potential offenders; but the criminal law only works as an effective deterrent when there is a real risk of being caught and convicted. The general approach to criminal law enforcement in England and Wales is that the police investigate and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) prosecutes. Unfortunately, these public authorities have limited resources: in 2018 the BBC reported that less than one in ten crimes led to anyone actually being charged. This is bad news for animals and their advocates. Animal crime is simply not the primary mandate of police or the CPS. To take just one example, only one in 100 dog theft cases last year resulted in the thief being charged and prosecuted, according to figures obtained under Freedom of Information laws. Wild animals fare little better: of 1,300 reported crimes involving bats, marine mammals, badgers and raptors in 2016 , only 22 were successfully prosecuted. Many people consider that we have a moral duty to protect the animals in our care and the wildlife that surrounds us from cruelty and neglect. In an ideal world, we could count on the state alone to provide this protection. Unfortunately, it is not always the state’s top priority, so it can fall to private players to fill the justice gap. Who can prosecute privately? More or less anyone can commence a private prosecution. Section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1995 enshrines the right of all private individuals, organisations and bodies to institute and conduct prosecutions. This includes non-profit organisations and even charities, who may use criminal prosecutions to further their charitable objectives, so long as they retain their sense of fairness, balance and impartiality. For animal charities and advocates, there can be many advantages to bringing private prosecutions: these include choosing specialist lawyers, investigators and forensic experts who can secure higher success rates than more generalist crown prosecutors. Some organisations regularly prosecute in this capacity, the RSPCA being an obvious example. In 2019, through private prosecutions, it secured 1,432 convictions relating to animal welfare offences, with a 93.7% success rate. However, the RSPCA operates in a delicate and controversial political landscape and has been encouraged to step back from acting as a prosecutor of first resort. This risks leaving animals unprotected: in 2016 an Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee found that the CPS is not 'suitably resourced and trained in the area of animal welfare' to take over the RSPCA’s work load. With this in mind, other animal advocates may need to step up to the plate. What is the process? The preliminaries to private prosecution can be thought of as a three step process: the investigation; the charging decision; and 'laying an information'. Investigation Impartial, fair investigation is elementary; it is impossible to bring a successful prosecution without evidence. There is a high burden of proof in criminal cases, and it rests with the prosecutor. Gathering evidence lawfully and impartially can be tricky in private prosecutions because the prosecutor cannot necessarily count on the police. Instead, evidence may need to be gathered by investigators and experts. There are strict rules of 'admissibility' and 'disclosure', so unless expert legal advice is sought early, there is a real risk that the evidence gathered cannot actually be used in court. Charge Once the evidence is gathered, the private prosecutor needs to face a serious and difficult decision: whether to charge and what charge to bring? It is inadvisable to bring a prosecution unless there is sufficient evidence against each suspect on each charge and unless it is required in the public interest. Unless expert advice is sought at this stage, the case risks being struck out or taken over and discontinued by the CPS before it even gets to trial. 'Laying an information' This is where the prosecution formally begins. Anyone can try to bring a private prosecution against anyone, but getting a foot in the door means getting a 'summons' or 'warrant' from the magistrates. This is the document which will require the defendant to answer the charge and ultimately attend trial. This is done by laying an 'information', a document setting out what the case is about, the factual background and the relevant law. If this is laid properly, the magistrates will generally issue the summons/warrant…and then the litigation really begins, proceeding much like a usual criminal trial. Who pays for all this? It is important to carefully consider the cost implications of bringing a private prosecution. The person or charity bringing the prosecution will need to fund it, but the good news is that generally a convicted defendant must pay at least a contribution to the prosecutor’s costs if not the whole sum; and that can include the costs of any investigation. If a defendant is acquitted then they can claim back costs. Normally in a criminal prosecution this is from ‘central funds’; that is to say the government. There can be cases where a successful defendant can claim costs from the prosecutor. That is when the charge arises by way of ‘complaint’ rather than ‘information’; although that is unlikely to be the case in most animal law offences. However, courts can also award costs against a prosecutor where the decision to instigate a private prosecution was an 'improper act' within the meaning of s.19, of Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (see Evans v Serious Fraud Office [2015] EWHC 263 (QB) and R. v Cornish (Errol) [2016] EWHC 779 (QB)) . That is, however, unlikely to be the case where a prosecutor acts in good faith. So worries about costs should not necessarily deter a person or organisation with a strong case from holding animal abusers to account. It is important to take legal advice early though; an improper or mismanaged prosecution can backfire, leaving the prosecutor paying both their own costs and the defendant’s. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Access to justice is a cornerstone of any fair and civilised society. It ensures that rights are not merely theoretical, but enforceable; that harm can be redressed; and that the vulnerable are protected against abuse. Yet one group remains conspicuously excluded from meaningful legal protection: animals. Despite being sentient beings capable of experiencing pain, fear, joy, and distress, animals are still largely treated as property under the law. This legal classification often strips them of the protections afforded to others in society, leaving them voiceless in systems designed for those who can speak for themselves. Recognising animals’ entitlement to justice is not only a moral imperative, it is a legal and societal necessity. The moral imperative of justice for animals Animals, from companion animals to farmed and wild species, are capable of suffering. Modern science has confirmed what many have intuited for centuries: animals are sentient. This basic fact makes the denial of justice to animals ethically indefensible. When humans harm other humans, legal systems step in. When humans harm animals, whether through neglect, cruelty, or exploitation, the response is often inconsistent, under-resourced, or absent altogether. Justice requires more than sentiment. It requires enforceable rights and meaningful consequences for violations. If animals are to be truly protected, they must be visible to the law, not merely as objects of concern but as beings with interests that deserve representation and remedy. The enforcement problem: Laws without teeth The UK, along with many countries, has animal welfare statutes on the books. These laws acknowledge animals’ need for protection from cruelty and neglect. However, enforcement remains an enormous challenge. Often, such laws are underutilised or applied selectively, and prosecutions are rare. This reveals a stark gap between the laws as written and the lived reality for animals. Without consistent enforcement, legal protections are symbolic at best. For justice to function, there must be mechanisms to monitor compliance, investigate harm, and bring offenders to account. Access to justice for animals requires that these mechanisms be resourced, professionalised, and applied with the same seriousness as human-related crimes. You can find out more about The Enforcement Problem and data on the scale of the issue here. A role for the legal system: Representation and reform Because animals cannot speak or act for themselves in court, they depend on human intermediaries to seek justice on their behalf. This introduces a crucial concept: legal representation for animals. Whether through organisations, public prosecutors, or designated guardians, there must be actors within the legal system whose role is to advance the interests of animals. Incorporating animals into the justice system involves recognising their unique status as sentient beings whose interests matter morally and legally. Legal systems can evolve to include such principles, just as they have evolved to recognise the rights of children, nature, and future generations. Why professionalisation matters Treating animal law as a professional legal discipline, rather than a passion project or moral sideline, is key to securing justice for animals. Professionalisation brings consistency, credibility, and long-term impact. It allows legal practitioners to specialise, advocate strategically, and bring about systemic change. Access to justice for animals is not merely about stopping individual acts of cruelty. It is about challenging the structural and institutional factors that allow harm to persist. This includes practices in farming, entertainment, science, and trade that operate with impunity due to the animals’ legal invisibility. Conclusion: A justice system worthy of the name A just society is measured by how it treats its most vulnerable. Animals, as sentient beings without a voice, fall squarely into this category. Extending access to justice to animals is not an act of benevolence, it is an act of legal consistency. It acknowledges that animals have interests worthy of protection, and that harm against them must not be tolerated or ignored. Animals deserve not just our compassion, but our justice. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Today, on the United Nations ' World Bee Day ', Sam March considers the extent to which the law protects these crucial pollinators in England and Wales. Our ecosystems, food security and survival all depend on bees. According to the United Nations , nearly 90% of the world’s wild flowering plant species depend entirely, or at least in part, on animal pollination, as do more than 75% of the world’s food crops and 35% of global agricultural land. According to Friends of the Earth the UK has lost 13 species of bee since 1900, and a further 35 are considered under threat of extinction. Considering their vital importance and falling numbers, it is sometimes supposed, as in this BBC article , that bees are protected by law. However, the truth behind this supposition is limited. Do our animal welfare laws protect bees? There are an estimated 274,000 honey bee hives in the UK; the majority of these hives are kept by approximately 44,000 amateur keepers. At the height of summer there is an average of 35-40,000 bees in the hive, meaning there can be billions of bees under human control at a given time. The legislation that is usually considered to protect animals under the control of man is the Animal Welfare Act 2006 . Amongst other things, the act makes it illegal to cause 'unnecessary suffering' to 'protected animals.' However, the act defines an 'animal' as 'a vertebrate other than man'. This means due to their lack of backbone and central nervous system, bees are afforded no protection under the act. Nor is their situation any better under the EU law, as Council Directive 98/58/EC explicitly excludes 'any invertebrate animal.' This is not an abnormal position, according to a recent study by Lukas Jasiunas , the welfare laws of most countries do not take insects into consideration. This is partly due to differing perspectives on whether insects have intrinsic moral value and the extent to which they are conscious or sentient. There are those who suggest bees do suffer and others who appear to suggest they do not . These are matters still to be resolved by scientists and philosophers. How about our wildlife protection laws? Many wildlife animals, including a number of insect species, are afforded a degree of protection under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 . However, only those animals mentioned in certain schedules are protected, and none currently contain any bee species. As for species-specific legislation, the Bees Act 1980 empowers Ministers to draw up Orders 'for the purpose of preventing the introduction into or spreading within Great Britain of pests or diseases affecting bees.' Under this act, the relevant ministers have issued The Bee Diseases and Pests Control Orders 2006 for England and Wales ( as amended ). Whilst these seek to protect bee populations generally from the introduction of new pests or diseases, they do not protect particular species or individual bees from destruction or maltreatment. So can I kill bees? In short, there are no laws that directly prevent people from maltreating or killing bees in England and Wales. Nevertheless, even pest controllers will do the utmost to avoid exterminating them 'unless there's a serious threat to human life'. The British Pest Control Association recommends always exploring all other avenues before considering eradication. If at all possible, the BPCA recommends leaving bee nests alone to thrive. Alternatively, they recommend using a swarm collector from the British Bee Keepers Association or getting in touch with the Tree Bee Society , who will normally collect the swarm free of charge. What other laws affect bees and those who work with them? The fact that bees can be legally killed does not mean that those working with them operate in a legislative vacuum. Pest control measures are subject to legislation pertaining to food and environmental protection, health and safety, and the use of hazardous substances, pesticides and biocidal products. So, whilst a person cannot be prosecuted for killing bees per se, prosecutions can be brought against those who, for instance, do so using the wrong chemicals. Furthermore, beekeepers and those in the honey business are subject to a wide variety of legislation and regulations pertaining to honey specifically and more generally to food labelling, food safety, food and environmental protection, and veterinary medicine. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

After three years since Advocates for Animals launched, Edie takes the opportunity to reflect on what we have learnt and why continued professionalisation in this area is so important. Current landscape Animal welfare has been a part of public discourse for a significant period of time, with impressive wins along the way. However, it is undeniable that the conversation of animal welfare and rights has grown louder in the past few years with ever growing public interest. The catalyst for this is not one thing, but more of a collection of things coming together to form the fertile ground for the discussion to grow. Such factors include the birth of the internet, an increasingly educated public and, most optimistically, an evolving collective conscience and consciousness. Undoubtedly, the increasing sophistication of animal groups has also played a significant role in this development. The activities of a standard animal group include campaigning, lobbying, outreach, undercover investigations, fundraising, and generally holding industry and government to account. Groups conduct all of these activities at an extremely high level and have been seen to reap the rewards, such as changes of law, changes in public opinion and, most importantly, changes in behaviour. How the law adds value As animal protection groups become increasingly sophisticated and undertake the above activities, it would be counterproductive to use anything other than professional and expert legal services. As a professional service, we have helped ensure undercover investigations are as watertight as possible, ensured campaign materials and activities are compliant with the law and provided thorough information and insights into animal laws. Through this guidance we have helped animal protection groups determine the direction of numerous campaigns. We’ve also used numerous channels to ensure wrongdoers and regulators are held to account and started to litigate against some of the worst systems animals are forced to endure. All of these activities have helped level the playing field, which is so often in favour of industry. Why it is important to ensure animal law is professional Prior to Advocates for Animals there were some firms that did some animal law; however, this was largely inaccessible to most groups and activists with limited funds. Other than that animal law was a volunteer-led practice area and still is in many countries. Volunteer support is important and we have been grateful to receive it (and have all spent our fair share doing it). However, it is only by establishing animal law as a professional area of law that animals can start to get their legal protections adequately enforced, whether that be through litigation or simply through providing expert and timely guidance; as would be the case in any area of law that affects humans. In areas that affect humans, it is professional and specialist lawyers you encounter, from property transactions and family disputes through to defending and prosecuting potential criminal activity and ensuring human rights are protected. It is an injustice that for so long animals have not had their legal protections covered in the same way. Even if animal legal protections exist on paper, can they be called law if they are not adequately considered or enforced? Having a professional area of animal law means time and expertise are made available to focus solely on the task of upholding animal legal protections, which, in turn, means an unparalleled depth of knowledge is being accumulated. It also means sustainable infrastructure is being built to ensure a continuity of the practice of animal law. None of this would have been possible if the practice area remained volunteer-led, as, unavoidably, animal law would be picked up and put down as and when other commitments dictate. It would also have meant a lack of honed expertise, time, resources and commitment, and a lack of status for animal legal protections. Finally, it is symbolically powerful to have a law firm highlighting that animal legal protections do matter. One could argue that animal law is not one field, but spans many, e.g. public, criminal, civil etc. However, whilst it is true that animal law spans many areas, it is our experience that without a firm solely dedicated to animal law, it remains a very small part of someone’s wider practice without sufficient expertise being developed towards the animal aspects of the law, which is only possible if fully specialised on this area. Our role At Advocates for Animals we work with a range of clients from NGOs and activists to individuals who just want to ensure justice for animals. Our work with these clients is extremely broad due to the nature of the field, which means we are more akin to highly specialised in house lawyers responding to all our clients needs; from proofing their campaign materials through to assessing legal opportunities to meet their campaigning objectives, this may involve possible prosecutions, judicial reviews, advising on undercover investigations and more. The role we take on serves the animal protection community, as it means that not only are we providing expert legal advice, but we understand the other considerations at play when it comes to our clients activities and their appetite for risk and impact. The highlights Since our launch we have received ongoing instructions from most of the well known animal groups and some smaller, but still effective, ones. We have advised on areas that have informed powerful campaigns, been involved in cases that have directly saved animals and worked on projects both in the UK and overseas. We have also spoken on animal law issues in the UK Parliament, the French Senat and the East African Legislative Assembly, and been grateful for positive media coverage. As we go forward we hope to continue to provide professional legal assistance on some much needed work and continue to build the much needed infrastructure to ensure legal services remain sustainable and efficient. Advocates for Animals’ sole goal is to ensure it provides the best service possible to help animal groups, activists and animals now and in the future. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Complaints to the Advertising Standards Authority can be an effective way for animal advocates to hold animal industries to account. However, standards cut both ways, so animal protection campaigners or cruelty-free companies, particularly those who make bold or controversial claims in their adverts, risk finding themselves on the defensive. In this blog, Advocates for Animals paralegal, Sam March, and food science and legal blogger, Imogen Allen, provide a brief introduction to advertising standards and discuss cases that have made headlines in recent years. What are advertising standards? In order to protect consumers, people advertising products cannot just say whatever they like about the things they are selling. Marketing communications are regulated by a patchwork of 'hard' law and 'soft' law. Advertising content can have implications in contract law, and fraudulent statements can give rise to tortious or even criminal matters. Much of the blackletter law underpinning advertising standards can be found in the provisions of regulations such as The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277) ( CPUT ) or The Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1276) ( BPR ) . These regulations impose binding legal duties and sanctions that can be enforced by statutory regulators, such as Ofcom (for broadcast communications) or Trading Standards (for non-broadcast advertising). In reality, however, the first course of action for anyone concerned about the content of an advert will generally be to complain to the Advertising Standards Authority ( ASA ). Advertising standards complaints are sometimes called a form of 'soft' law. This is because, unlike Ofcom or Trading Standards, the ASA is a 'self-regulatory' body – meaning the industry has voluntarily established and paid for its own regulation. The ASA applies the provisions of two self-regulatory industry codes, written and issued by the Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP). These are The UK Code of Non-broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct Marketing ( CAP Code ) and The UK Code of Broadcast Advertising ( BCAP Code ) . The advertising standards system in the UK, therefore, blurs the lines between state regulation and self-regulation. Although the ASA is technically an industry-led body, it operates closely with the state regulators and can, if necessary, refer cases to them. The system has been described as 'self-regulation within a co-regulatory framework.' Who can complain and what can they complain about? The general public, competitors, or other groups with an obvious interest (such as campaigning organisations) can lodge complaints with the ASA. Despite being industry-led, the ASA’s codes and rulings are not something that advertisers can opt-out of; this means that any advert within the ASA’s remit can potentially be the subject of a complaint. This remit is broad, and includes adverts in the press, on radio, TV, cinema, digital platforms, posters, billboards, leaflets, brochures and even direct mail, email and text messages. It should be noted, however, that the ASA is not the appropriate body for complaining about editorial content, fly posting, some types of medical advertising, or political advertising where the purpose of the ad is to persuade voters in a local, national or international electoral referendum. For in-store advertising or shop window displays, the situation is complicated and will often need to be reported to Trading Standards, although the ASA can look into complaints where leaflets in store are handed out to be taken away, or sales promotions appear in the window. The types of things that can be complained about also vary and there are differences between the rules for broadcast and non-broadcast advertising. In general terms, the sorts of things that can be complained about include, inter alia, adverts that are misleading (or likely to be), adverts that cause serious or widespread offence, adverts that cause excess distress without justifiable reason, and adverts that cause harm in other ways (including for instance, TV ads that harm animals in their production.) What powers does the ASA have? The ASA is not a court, and so does not have the same powers as a court would to grant remedies or enforce sanctions. Nevertheless, if the ASA finds that the rules have been broken, it can declare that the advert must be withdrawn or amended. Most advertisers will quickly comply. Where an advert is broadcast, it will be a term of the broadcaster’s licence that it complies with ASA rulings at the risk of being referred by the ASA to Ofcom. For non-broadcast adverts, the CAP can issue 'Ad Alerts' to members, such as Royal Mail, who could, in turn, withdraw its bulk mail discount. Similarly, the ASA can ask paid search websites to remove adverts or refer Video-On-Demand providers to Ofcom. One of the most effective sanctions, and a real incentive to campaigning groups seeking to use advertising standards to hold industry to account and raise awareness, is the adverse publicity that marketers risk when they break the rules. The ASA website has a section dedicated to breaches of the rules and will publish the name of the advertiser and the details of the breach: these are often picked up by the news, or appear high up in search engine results when the advertiser’s name or product is searched. How difficult is it to make a complaint? Making a complaint is not like bringing a court case. Someone with a potentially meritorious complaint need not necessarily be deterred by the same evidential issues, cost or resource concerns that sometimes apply when considering litigation. One significant advantage is that the ASA complaints process partially reverses the burden of proof in some cases. Rather than the onus being on the person making the complaint to prove breaches, companies that make absolute statements about things such as animal welfare have to be able to produce evidence to back their claims up. For example, an advert which claimed that none of an advertiser’s cows suffered from mastitis was found to be misleading because the advertiser did not supply the ASA with evidence to substantiate the claim [ HaLove, 1 May 2013 ]. This means that if you have a reasonable suspicion that something is false or misleading, you can potentially complain successfully even if you do not have any evidence to substantiate it. Advertising standards complaints are also likely to be much cheaper than court cases because it does not cost anything to lodge a complaint. If the complaint makes it through the filtering process and is assessed favourably against the ASA’s prioritisation principles, then it will be the ASA who takes on responsibility for any investigations and puts the case to the ASA Council (an independent jury) for a final decision and ruling. It is possible to get through the whole process without paying a penny. Nevertheless, it may be wise to consult a lawyer to discuss the merits of your complaint so as to maximise the chances of it making it through the filtering process and to avoid the disappointment of having your complaint backfire, thus accidentally giving good publicity to the advertiser in question. How long does the process take? The ASA tries to resolve complaints as quickly as possible, but the time it takes to resolve a complaint can vary significantly depending on the merits and complexity of the matters in issue. For instance, unmeritorious or misdirected complaints may be resolved in a few days, whereas complex cases can take six months to complete. The ASA helpfully explains the 11 step process on their website. Why should animal advocates care? Many low-welfare animal industries are driven by profits and consumer demand. For instance, the profits associated with ever-increasing demand for cheap meat continues to drive the intensification of farming; the number of large industrial-sized pig and chicken farms in the UK continues to rise, with close to 2,000 currently across the country. It is not easy for businesses to reconcile this with the growing perception that farm animal welfare should be protected and improved or the fact that animal-friendly products are perceived to be healthier, safer, tastier, more hygienic, authentic, environmentally friendly, and traditional by many consumers. It is clear, therefore, that there is an incentive for advertisers to make positive claims, or give favourable impressions, about the welfare properties of animal products that could be false or misleading. As campaigning group Compassion in World Farming explains : 'it’s not in the interests of the government or the food industry for consumers to get wise to the miserable reality of much of today’s farming – after all, people might simply refuse to buy certain products.' ASA complaints are potentially a powerful tool that can be used by animal advocates to prevent companies from making misleading claims and to publicly name and shame false advertisers. In the case of ten recent complaints against BKUK Group Ltd t/a Burger King, 15 April 2020 , three adverts promoting the supposedly 'plant-based' 'Rebel Whopper' were considered to be misleading. This was because they gave the impression that a burger was suitable for vegetarians and vegans, despite containing mayonnaise and being cooked alongside animal products. In the case of Organic Trade Board t/a Why I Love Organic, 13 July 2011 , the ASA upheld complaints against an ad that suggested that organically farmed animals experienced better conditions than non-organically farmed animals. Although the advertiser provided evidence that showed organically farmed animals experienced high animal welfare conditions, the ASA did not consider that it showed that in all cases that organically farmed animals experienced better conditions than non-organically farmed animals. In the case of Waitrose Ltd, 20 October 2010 , the ASA upheld complaints against a press ad which described pigs as 'outdoor bred', because the pigs used to produce the product did not spend the duration of their lives outdoors. The ASA’s approach was to consider how the ‘average consumer’ would interpret an ad, so even though the advertiser argued that there was a technical distinction (in industry speak) between 'outdoor bred' and 'outdoor reared', the ASA considered that the average consumer would not be aware of this and would have considered the ad misleading. Animal products can also be the subject of successful complaints where they make claims about other issues, such as the environment. In Arla Foods Ltd 07 June 2017 , a claim that organic milk was 'good for the land' and 'help[ed] support a more sustainable future' was held to be misleading. The ASA did not consider that the respondent 'had substantiated that organic milk production had an overall positive impact on the environment, taking into account its full life cycle'. What about complaints against animal protection campaigners? Being on the losing side of a ruling can harm a campaign’s credibility, be humiliating for the advertiser, and provide fodder for their adversaries. So, Animal protection groups, particularly campaigning ones, need to be wary of the rules when considering what claims to make in their own content. For instance, the ASA upheld a complaint against People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) Foundation, 04 September 2019 last year, challenging the claim that 'wool is just as cruel as fur'. The ASA considered DEFRA’s Code of Recommendations for the Welfare of Livestock: Sheep . Based on the provisions of the code it held 'that the main method of obtaining wool from sheep by shearing would not be regarded by consumers as being cruel'. This does not mean that provocatory statements should necessarily be avoided at all costs. In fact, when a campaigning group is successful in seeing off a complaint, particularly where the message is provocatory, this can be a vindication of that campaign’s central message. Examples of this include the ASA Ruling on Eden Farmed Animal Sanctuary t/a Go Vegan World 26 July 2017 , in which an advert which included the central message 'Humane milk is a myth. Don’t buy it' was not found to breach the rules. It was of great value to the campaign that the ASA, an objective, mainstream body, found that it was not misleading to say that there is no such thing as humane milk. Findings such as this make their way into the press and spark important conversations on social media. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

Edie Bowles and Sam March Advocates for Animals, the UK’s first animal protection law firm, has found that crimes against animals can take many forms and can, unfortunately, be a lucrative business for offenders. This is true for a wide variety of animal and wildlife offending, including: puppy farms, illegal wildlife trade, unlawful agricultural practices, dog theft, food fraud and property developers cutting corners and destroying habitats. Unfortunately, despite being widespread and often shockingly brutal, animal and wildlife crime is often overlooked or undetected, and enforcement is piecemeal at best. For instance only one in 100 dog theft cases in 2019 resulted in the thief being charged and prosecuted, according to figures obtained in a Freedom of Information Act request. Wild animals fare little better: of 1,300 reported crimes involving bats, marine mammals, badgers and raptors in 2016 , only 22 were successfully prosecuted. In 2020, Advocates for Animals was pleased to see the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s (SRA) showing its interest in animal and wildlife crime by exploring how proceeds may be laundered. Given solicitors’ legal and professional duties in respect of reporting suspected proceeds of crime, it is important that solicitors working across a wide range of sectors are aware of, and able to identify potential proceeds from crimes against animals. It is hoped that increased awareness amongst regulated professionals would lead to more disclosures and better monitoring. This would disincentivize criminal activity involving and harming animals and hopefully decrease the prevalence of these offences. Money laundering and proceeds of crime Money laundering is the process by which criminal property (i.e the proceeds of crime) is given the appearance of legitimate funds, making 'dirty' money indistinguishable from 'clean', with no evident criminal origins. The principal money laundering offences in Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ('the Act') involve someone doing something with criminal property (i.e. proceeds of crime). These principle offences are: the concealing offence , which involves a person concealing, disguising, converting or transferring what they or suspect to be criminal property or removing what they know or suspect to be criminal property from the jurisdiction (s.327); the arranging offence , which involves a person entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement that they know or suspect facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property, by or on behalf of another person (s.328); and the acquisition, use or possession offence , which involves a person acquiring, using, or possessing what they know or suspect to be criminal property (s.329). As defined in s.340 , property is criminal property if— it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct, or it represents such a benefit (in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit. Notably, it is immaterial who carried out the criminal conduct and who benefited from it (s.340(4)). Solicitors will therefore be at real risk of committing offences if they deal with client assets that they know, or suspect constitutes the proceeds of crime (unless one of the limited s.338 defences applies). S.330 also creates an obligation on persons operating in the regulated sector, which includes relevant law firms, to report to the appropriate authorities suspicions of money laundering of criminal proceeds. Unlike the principle offences, which are only made out if subjective knowledge or suspicion is established, the s.330 offence requires only objectively 'reasonable grounds' for knowing or suspecting that another person was engaged in money laundering. It is not enough for a regulated person to turn a blind eye; they should ask questions and consider where the money has come from as part of their due diligence. SRA-regulated firms who are subject to the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 ('the Regulations') are also required to take steps to identify the risks of money laundering. In short, solicitors need to be alert to signs of money laundering and watchful of attempts by clients to use their legitimate services to conceal or convert the proceeds of crime. Law firms are an attractive way for clients to launder money, this could be done, for instance, by setting up sham litigation by paying money into a firm to fund it and then asking to withdraw the funds claiming the matter is resolved. Conveyancing Solicitors need to be particularly vigilant, as the purchase of property is a common way to launder the proceeds of crime. It may also be the case that the client is simply using proceeds from a crime to pay for ostensibly legitimate legal activities, which may also constitute money laundering (see the acquisition, use or possession offence). The proceeds of animal and wildlife crime The laws of England and Wales criminalise many forms of animal and wildlife mistreatment. Some of the most common forms of animal offending are widespread and highly profitable on a commercial scale. Just like with any other profitable offence, the proceeds of crimes against animals will constitute criminal property for the purposes of the concealing, arranging and acquisition, use or possession offences. Further, in the circumstances discussed above, a solicitor or a law firm will be committing an offence if they fail to take the requisite steps. In order to fulfil their obligations in respect of proceeds of animal and wildlife crimes, solicitors will benefit from being aware of some common and profitable offences to look out for, and the kinds of questions to ask. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Farming The value of total farmed animal output in 2019 was £14 billion . Animal farming is a fiercely competitive industry, with at least 73% of animals now reared on intensive farms to supply our major retailers and supermarkets. The Animal Welfare Act 2006 makes it illegal to cause 'unnecessary suffering' to domesticated or captive animals and supporting regulations set minimum species-specific standards, prohibiting cruel practices such as crates for pigs or keeping hens in barren cages. However, ensuring even these minimum legal welfare standards can be expensive and, in a competitive marketplace, there are vast sums of money to be made by cutting corners or making dishonest claims about standards or origins. Unlawful activity tends to be detected by undercover investigations, which are sometimes published by the media. Entertainment Dog fighting has been illegal for over 180 years; however, animal protection groups still investigate and prosecute dog fighting offences, with fights often arranged for profit by organised criminal gangs. In 2019, The League Against Cruel Sports reportedly received nearly 100 calls about dogfighting to a confidential hotline it runs. But such obviously criminal practices are not the only way animal offences are committed for entertainment. On a much wider, more profitable scale, horse racing and greyhound racing businesses may also be fruitful sources of criminal profits. These industries are self-regulated, making it harder to spot unlawful activity as there is not a public run licensing and monitoring system. This does not mean unlawful activity is not taking place though. It is therefore important to consider whether any money made from such industries could be linked directly or indirectly to criminal activity, such as welfare violations or misuse of drugs offences. Companion animals 2020 was a record year for pet theft. Results of a BBC freedom of information request showed that five policing areas saw a double-digit increase in the number of dog thefts reported between January and July 2020, compared with the previous year. Most of the dogs being stolen are female and are used for breeding, so that criminal gangs can maximise their profits. Although third party selling of dogs was made unlawful in 2020, essentially outlawing puppy farming, it regrettably remains a lucrative business. In February 2020, a mother and daughter who bred dogs without a licence, rearing at least 193 litters, were ordered to pay back more than £600,000 following a prosecution brought by Winchester City Council. Something to look out for if someone is making money through puppy sales is whether they are a licensed breeder and, if they are advertising online, whether they appear to be selling an excessive number of animals. Illegal puppy farms will likely be advertising several litters of different breeds at any one time. Another area to stay watchful of is the exotic pet trade, where again any profit from unlawful sales will be proceeds of crime. ‘Hobby breeders’ are exempt from requiring a pet shop licence to sell surplus animals; however, individuals and organisations in the exotic pet trade have been known to hide behind this exemption when they are in fact operating a business and as such should be licensed. Just because someone claims to be a hobby breeder (as they often hide behind) does not mean they are one. Furthermore, even if someone is a hobby breeder it does not mean they will not also be carrying out a licensable activity. The test will come down to whether it is a commercial activity. Ways to spot unlicensed and therefore illegal activity is to see if the sellers advertise online, the relevant questions as to whether it is commercial will be: Is there a fixed fee? How many animals are sold? How often are animals sold? How much do the animals cost? How much advertising is used? How many sites are used for animals? Are different species sold? Is there any evidence that it is a hobby? Are they registered with Companies House? Wildlife There are many examples of wildlife crimes, from illegal hunting to disrupting habitats. The ways individuals and organisations benefit from such activities range from charging for participation in illegal hunting activities to profiting from corner-cutting building works. For instance, building developer Bellway Homes was recently convicted and fined £600,000 for damaging and destroying a breeding and resting place for bats at a construction site in Greenwich. Although the actual proceeds of crime recovered in that case were agreed at a comparatively meagre £5,000, it is possible to envision a case in which any profit made as a result of such works could be considered criminal proceeds. Other potential proceeds from wildlife crimes can be very high , for example the value of rhino horn is currently estimated at £40,000 per kilo, and a single 20kg carp can fetch £12,000 or more. Other regulated persons Law firms and solicitors are not the only regulated sectors, others that should be considering and asking the same questions as above are: Banks and credit institutions Stock brokers and investment firms Insurance companies and insurance intermediaries Auditors, accounts, book-keepers, tax advisers Property dealers and estate agents Trust or company formation and management Legal services Those trading in goods for cash of at least £13,000 Casinos Auction platforms It is crucial that regulated sectors are considering whether a client or customer is involved in money laundering. Indicators will include unexplained wealth, a history or coverage of criminal activity or suspicion that criminal activity is taking place. If you would like any more information on crimes against animals and their proceeds please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com . Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

This is an updated version of a previous article , published prior to the enactment of the Internal Markets Act. The Internal Markets Act seeks to promote frictionless trade and avoid regulatory divergence between parts of the UK following the end of the Brexit Transition Period, now that EU law has fallen away. In this blog, Advocates for Animals paralegal Sam March discusses what this means for local bans on products such as fur or microbeads and potential future restrictions on trade in products that either involve or cause harm to animals. What is the Internal Market Act? Although the UK technically left the EU at Midnight on 31 January 2020, virtually nothing changed in terms of the laws governing the free movement of goods and services until 31 December 2020. Up until that date there was a 'Transition Period' which was agreed upon in the Withdrawal Agreement, under which the UK essentially remained bound by EU law. Following the end of that period, EU law began to fall away. Hundreds of powers previously exercised at EU level flowed directly to the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast. That could potentially have given these administrations more power than they have ever had before. Generally, the powers enjoyed by these devolved administrations are contained in the acts of devolution; a series of acts passed between 1998 and 2006. These acts came into force over two decades after the primacy of EU law in UK law took effect in the UK under the European Communities Act 1972. This means that, for as long as there has been devolution in the UK, integration and frictionless trade between the home nations has been ensured by the same free-trade laws that govern integration and frictionless trade between the member states of the EU. Without some new legislation, a power surge to the devolved legislatures after December 31st could have seriously impacted the way goods and services were traded between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: each of the home nations would have been free to set their own standards or even enact protectionist regimes, thus creating new barriers and additional costs and uncertainty for businesses. In response to this risk of regulatory divergence, the UK Government introduced The UK Internal Markets Bill ('the Bill'). That Bill was enacted on 17 December 2020 and The United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 ('the Act') has now come into effect. The government claimed this legislation would 'protect our highly integrated market by guaranteeing that companies can continue to trade unhindered in every part of the UK after the Transition Period ends'. It sought to do this by giving force to the UK’s own version of the kind of market access principles that govern free trade between unions such as the EU. Of particular importance is the principle of 'mutual recognition'. S.2(1) and s.2(3) provide that goods which can be sold without contravening 'relevant requirements' in the originating part should be able to be sold in any other part of the UK, without being held to contravene 'relevant requirements' that would otherwise apply to their sale in the destination part. Essentially, if goods can be lawfully sold in one part of the UK, they will be able to be lawfully sold in other parts of the UK, even if on the face of it they do not comply with local laws or standards. Why is this relevant to animal law? One approach that animal advocates have often taken to advancing animal protection law is to push for bans or stronger regulations on products that are either dangerous to animals or wildlife or involve harming animals during their production, or products which indicate low welfare standards. Nationwide advances in laws that protect animals and their environments are often slow and hard fought, so sometimes progress has to be made incrementally through regional or local measures. Such measures may be rolled out by devolved legislatures, or even trailblazing local authorities. For instance, at the level of a devolved legislature, The Environmental Protection (Microbeads) (Scotland) Regulations 2018 , criminalised the manufacture and supply of rinse-off personal care products which use microbeads as an ingredient in Scotland. At the local authority level, clause 38 of Islington Council’s Street Trading Licence Conditions included 'products containing real fur' on the list of goods that cannot be sold in Islington market. The fear for animal protection groups is that the mutual recognition principle would invalidate these kinds of measures, or render them ineffective. What will The Act mean for local measures that restrict trade in lower welfare products? The good news is that the Act does not seem to interfere with the kind of powers that have been used by individual local authorities to adopt this kind of progressive measure. Although in everyday usage, Islington market might well be considered a 'part of the UK', it seems fairly clear from the way sections s.4(2) and s.58 is drafted, that there are only four 'parts' of the UK for the purpose of this Act: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This Act is about statutory requirements that restrict or prohibit trade in certain types of goods in an entire 'part of the UK'. As local authorities are not 'parts of the UK' in their own right and local measures are not the kind of statutory requirements at which the Act takes aim. It seems unlikely that the Act would prevent, for instance, a hypothetical local council from amending the lease for shops in a council-owned covered market to prohibit the retailing of live decapod crustaceans. The risks for animal protection appear instead to lie in the effect that the Act will have on 'relevant requirements' effective at the level of an entire home nation. With a few limited exceptions, the Act prevents an individual home nation from enforcing 'relevant requirements' against products originating from another home nation wherein such requirements do not apply. The Act’s definition of 'relevant requirements' is broad: unless explicitly excluded within the Act, a statutory requirement that prohibits the sale of goods (or amounts to or results in one in practice) will be a 'relevant requirement' if it relates to the characteristics of the good, presentation, labelling, certification, registration, approval, authorisation, inspection, assessment, documentation, production (explicitly including the rearing, keeping and slaughtering animals), matters relating to the identification of animals (such as microchipping) or 'anything else which must or must not be done to or in relation to the goods before they are allowed to be sold'. In order for a relevant requirement in one part of the UK to be effective against products originating from another part, it would need to fall within one of the limited and exhaustive exceptions set out in the Act. There are a number of categories of exempted requirements specified in an exhaustive list in Schedule 1. This includes: Threats to human, animal or plant health; This would have limited use for welfare or the health of individual animals. This is about preventing or reducing the movement of a pest or disease which poses ;a serious threat' to the health of humans, animals or plants. There must be a reasonable belief, supported by evidence that has been provided to the other administrations, that the originating part is affected and that it is significantly less prevalent in the destination. The legislation must be reasonably justified as necessary [Para 1]. Unsafe food or feed; This relates to food or feed that poses a serious threat to the health of humans, animals or plants, and has similar conditions to the above [Para 2]. Public health emergency; meaning a situation reasonably considered to post 'an extraordinary threat to human health in the destination part' [Para 5]. Chemicals; this is an exception limited to certain goods covered by the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (retained EU law) [Para 6]. Fertilisers and pesticides; this is an exception limited to goods covered by certain retained EU law pertaining to fertilisers and pesticides [Para 9]. Taxation; the principles do not prohibit tax/rates/duties/charges [Para 10]. The relevant requirement has effect in more than one part of the United Kingdom [Para 11]. The list is exhaustive, and does not include the welfare of individual animals, or even environmental protection: whether fur, microbeads, live lobsters, chlorinated chicken, non-stun slaughtered meat, it is difficult to see how any of these kind of low-welfare goods could be brought within the limited exceptions above. England, for example, could ban Salmon farming in England, but it could not stop Scottish salmon producers from trading their products in England. In fact, an attempt to enact such a ban would simply mean Scottish manufacturers would be free to inundate the English market, with no local competition. The only other exemption relates to requirements which pre-date the Act. A requirement which on the face of it would be relevant will not be treated as such if, on the day before the Act was enacted, there was no corresponding requirement in 'each of the other three parts of the United Kingdom' [s.4(1)]. The conditions are also met if such a requirement is re-enacted or changed without change to its substance. This suggests that Scotland’s existing prohibition on microbeads in personal hygiene products would stand and continue to apply to products containing microbeads even where produced in another part of the UK. However, it would seem that an attempt to roll out the restriction to new uses of microbeads would apply only to products produced and sold solely in Scotland, leaving companies from England, Wales and Northern Ireland free to do business in Scotland as they would at home. Were devolved countries able to implement tougher measures whilst in the EU? Market access principles are not new to the UK and have been effective at the EU level for decades. However, in EU law, unless a product is covered by a specific harmonisation directive, states can rely on slightly broader categories of exception to justify restrictive measures on certain goods notwithstanding that they may be lawfully produced and sold in other states. Except where a product or industry falls under a specific harmonization directive, Art 36 TFEU ensures that EU free movement laws do not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit which are justified as necessary and proportionate on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. These exceptions are somewhat broader and leave more room for debate than those that would come into force in the UK under the new Act. Furthermore, where the restrictive measures are indistinctly applicable (meaning that they apply to all products irrespective of their natural origin), the measures can be justified either under the Art 36 exceptions above or alternatively by relying on the approach set out in the 'Cassis de Dijon' case ( Case 120/78 ) . That case is the textbook case on mutual recognition in EU law, it clarified the general rule that established the general principle, similar to that introduced by the UK Internal Markets Act, that products sold lawfully in one Member State may not be prohibited from sale in another. However, in EU law, where a requirement would prohibit such a sale, the Member State could justify the prohibition if it was necessary to fulfil a 'mandatory requirement of the state'. Such requirements include the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions or the defence of the consumer. Unlike the list in The UK Internal Markets Act, this list is not exhaustive. In Case 302/86 , which concerned a mandatory system of returnable containers for beer and soft drinks in Denmark, the list of exceptions was held to include the protection of the environment. This may explain how Scotland has been able to enact its ban on microbeads in cosmetics. In Case C-219/07 , the Court noted that the protection and welfare of animals can be a legitimate objective in the public interest. It also stated that the importance of this objective was reflected, in particular, in the adoption by the Member States of the Protocol on the Protection and Welfare of Animals, annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community. Given the narrow categories of exception under the UK Act, it does seem like it will be more difficult for individual home nations to justify unilaterally-imposed progressive bans. The end of the Transition Period could be an opportunity to see more progressive animal protection laws coming out of the UK than even before. As the UK will no longer be bound by the market access principles at the EU level, it could use this opportunity to enact higher standards or more stringent bans than could previously have been effective under EU free-trade laws. Recent reports suggest fur sales could be banned after the Transition Period ends under plans being considered by the Department for Environment. The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto also claimed that the UK would be able to ban live shipments after Brexit, although it did not go as far as making a pledge to do so. It would be a shame if, just as the UK is faced with an unprecedented opportunity to raise standards, its new internal market structure incentivises a race to the bottom between the home nations. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

In March 2021, the government proposed a Bill that would broaden police powers when responding to public protests. The response was mixed and included concerns that the Bill would unduly curb our civil liberties. In September, we submitted an open letter on behalf of our clients to Members of Parliament and the House of Lords, outlining our objections to the proposals as advocates for animals. We requested that the recipients vote against the Bill in relation to its provisions on protest and nuisance. In this post, guest writer Siobhan Ballan looks at where the Bill is now, and why animal advocates should keep the pressure on to ensure that the offending provisions do not end up being enshrined in statute. What were the problems with the proposed Bill? The existing law already places wide restrictions on peaceful procession, assembly and protest. For example, the police are able to ban demonstrations with permission from the local authority and can arrest those who use threatening language or behaviour under the Public Order Act 1986. Details of planned marches must be given at least a week in advance, including the proposed route and names and addresses of at least one organiser. However, the proposed Bill sought to take these powers further, for example, by introducing an offence of ‘public nuisance’ carrying a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. It also proposed to remove the need to knowingly breach conditions imposed by the police in order to commit an offence and to place new conditions on both static (standing) protests and marches. The wording of these conditions was vague and included whether the noise level from the protest would cause, or was even just at risk of causing, ‘serious distress’ or alarm. A primary concern from our point of view was that the government would be able to define these terms without parliamentary scrutiny. Which amendments to the Bill were defeated? The Bill came up for debate in the House of Lords on 17 January 2022. A total of fourteen of the government’s proposals were rejected during the vote which followed. In particular, the plans to give police more powers to cancel protests on the grounds of them being too noisy or disruptive were voted down by 261 votes to 166. The proposal to allow police to stop and search a person or vehicle if it was suspected that they were planning an offence, such as causing serious disruption, was also rejected. Further, police will not be empowered to stop and search anyone at a protest ‘without suspicion’, and peers voted to protect Parliament Square as a place to protest. Finally, in another rejection of the proposals, those with a history of causing disruption will not be banned from attending future protests. In all, the debate resulted in a victory for all who opposed the proposed measures in light of the serious concerns they raised about the status of our civil liberties in the UK. There was cross-party support for rejecting many of the proposals, with Conservative peer Lord Deben commenting that 'we are a democratic society and if I can’t go outside and make a noise to point out that I think that a whole range of things that the Government or any government does are unacceptable, then my human rights are very seriously impugned.' This sentiment was backed by Green Party peer Baroness Jones, who commented that the Government’s attempts to curb protests on grounds of noisiness were 'plain nasty.' What happens next? It is likely that some of these provisions will re-emerge in subsequent debates on the Bill during what’s known as ‘ping-pong’, this being the ongoing exchange of proposed amendments and votes between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The current parliamentary session finishes in late March or April. MPs have until then to decide on the final details of the Bill. Advocates should be aware that although some of the most concerning elements of the proposed Bill were defeated, they may still find their way into law. The government may try to frame its rejected proposals as part of a free-standing public order Bill, as opposed to being part of the already expansive Police, Crime, Sentencing & Courts Bill. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

In certain circumstances, powers of arrest are exercisable not just by police officers but by ordinary citizens, similarly conduct that might otherwise be unlawful can become lawful. Samuel March, a Barrister at 9 King’s Bench Walk and a volunteer paralegal at Advocates for Animals, examines what powers ordinary people have to intervene in animal abuse cases, and in particular a perhaps unforeseen consequence of the recent Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021. For animal advocates, seeing an animal suffering or being abused is likely to foster a powerful urge to intervene. Seeing any crime in progress sparks fight or flight reflexes, events can play out in a matter of seconds, and witnesses don’t always have time to call the police, still less seek legal advice or research their powers. This makes knowing what to do difficult, because citizens’ powers to arrest or otherwise intervene are incredibly fact specific and involve striking delicate balances in these split-second decisions. This article is not intended as legal advice or a comprehensive guide, but as a top-level overview of some of the key powers ordinary people may have, in certain limited circumstances, to step into a situation and stand up for animals Citizen's arrest There is no definitive legal definition for what constitutes an 'arrest'. It is not defined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or indeed any other legislation, and the caselaw is not entirely consistent. Nevertheless, a broad definition was given in the case of Spicer v. Holt [1977] A.C. 987 at p1000: ' "Arrest" is an ordinary English word … Whether or not a person has been arrested depends not on the legality of the arrest but on whether he has been deprived of his liberty to go where he pleases.' Adding to this, it was held in Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke [1984] A.C. 437 at p441 that 'arrest is a continuing act; it starts with the arrester taking a person into his custody, (sc. by action or words restraining him from moving anywhere beyond the arrester's control), and it continues until the person so restrained is either released from custody or, having been brought before a magistrate, is remanded in custody by the magistrate's judicial act.' The vast majority of arrests are executed by trained police officers, using specific powers of arrest that apply only to them. However, neither a warrant nor rank are always prerequisites for arresting a suspect. As of the 29 June 2021, a bystander who witnesses someone mistreating their dog in the park may, in some circumstances, have the power to perform a citizen’s arrest. The conditions in which 'a person other than a constable' may arrest without a warrant are set out at s.24A Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 . Essentially, there must be 'grounds' for the arrest and the arrest, the arrest must be 'necessary' for one of a limited number of reasons. Furthermore, the arrest will only be lawful if it appears to the person making the arrest that it is not reasonably practicable for a constable to make it instead. Grounds for arrest in animal welfare cases The first condition is that there must be grounds for the arrest. In this context, that means at the time of the arrest the suspect must have committed or must be committing an indictable offence; or the person arresting must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the suspect has committed or is committing an offence. A couple of important takeaways about grounds for arrest: the first is that, unlike police officers’ powers, the citizen’s arrest powers do NOT cover situations in which a suspect is (or is reasonably believed) to be about to commit an offence. It applies only to offences that have already or are currently being committed. The second takeaway, and one that is easily lost on the non-lawyer, is that unlike a police officer who can arrest a suspect for any type of offence, citizens can only perform an arrest on suspicion of an 'indictable' offence. Under the law of England and Wales, offences can be grouped into two categories depending on their 'mode of trial': summary offences (which are tried in the magistrates’ courts) and indictable offences (which can be tried in the Crown Court). If an offence is a summary only offence (such as speeding), then the citizen’s arrest powers do not apply. This makes the decision to attempt a citizen’s arrest tricky. Even lawyers sometimes have to double check their textbooks to see whether a particular offence can be tried on indictment in the Crown Court or not. Citizen’s arrest powers therefore need to be exercised with great caution and are particularly risky unless confident of mode of trial of the offence in question. Given that citizen’s arrest powers are really intended to cover situations where a crime is ongoing, playing out second by second or just concluded, an ordinary citizen may struggle to check such procedural technicalities. Get the mode of trial wrong, and the arrester risks themselves being guilty of a criminal offence against the person, or liable for damages for trespass against the person (although see the broader powers below). What is particularly interesting in the context of animal welfare is that, until recently, the main animal welfare offences were all summary only offences. This would mean that if you were in the park and witnessed someone causing unnecessary suffering to an animal contrary to s.4 Animal Welfare Act 2006 ('the 2006 Act'), only a police officer would have the power to arrest them. That position changed last year with the introduction of the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021 ('the 2021 Act'). The primary intention of the 2021 Act was to increase the maximum penalty for a small number of animal offences (causing unnecessary suffering, mutilation, docking of dogs’ tails, administration of poisons etc and fighting etc) from 6 months to 5 years. In order to do this, the 2021 Act had to turn these offences from summary only offences to indictable offences, because only the Crown Court can impose such lengthy custodial sentences. This means that, as a potentially unintended consequence, some of the main animal welfare offences can now give rise to lawful grounds for a citizen’s arrest. A word of warning: even with the introduction of the 2021 Act, some animal welfare offences remain summary only offences. So whilst causing unnecessary suffering contrary to s.4 of the 2006 Act could give rise to grounds for a citizen’s arrest, a breach of s.9 (duty of person responsible for animal to ensure welfare) would not be sufficient. It is beyond the scope of this article to try and detail each of the elements of each of these offences or provide a comprehensive list of animal offences by mode of trial. It is stressed again that citizens’ arrests engage a multitude of legal technicalities, and a great deal of caution is required to avoid criminal and/or civil liability. Necessity for arrest Grounds alone do not empower any person on the street to arrest a suspect. The person making the arrest must also have reasonable grounds for believing that the arrest is 'necessary' for one of four reasons specified in s.24A(4). According to that subsection, a citizen’s arrest must be necessary to prevent the suspect from '(a)causing physical injury to himself or any other person; (b)suffering physical injury; (c)causing loss of or damage to property; or (d)making off before a constable can assume responsibility for him.' These reasons are exhaustive. They curtail in important ways the situations in which it might be legal to perform a citizen’s arrest in an animal welfare case. There will be some animal abuse cases concerning animals capable of responding aggressively; in which subsections (a) or (b) may be engaged. However, it is important to note that - unlike in some more progressive jurisdictions - no court in England and Wales has yet held that a non-human animal is a legal 'person'. So unlike cases in which an indictable offence against a child is witnessed, the limb concerning preventing 'physical injury to […] any […] person' does not apply when stepping in to safeguard an animal. Whilst animals are not legal 'persons', they can be legal 'property', and so subsection (c) is more likely to be relevant in cases where companion or farmed animals are abused. Interestingly, the statute does not explicitly specify that the property must belong to someone other than the suspect, and it may raise an interesting (and to the author’s knowledge as of yet undecided) question of law if an animal advocate were to perform a citizen’s arrest on a suspect to prevent the suspect damaging his or her own companion or farmed animal. In many cases, the most appropriate limb will be subsection (d). If a suspect is challenged and informed that the police are being called, and then goes to make off, it may be appropriate to detain them if there is no other way of obtaining their identity or address for the police. Subsection 4(d) ties in closely with subsection 3(b) which species that citizen’s arrest powers are exercisable ONLY if '(b)it appears to the person making the arrest that it is not reasonably practicable for a constable to make it instead' The lesson here is that if it is practicable to call the police, then that must be the first port of call. It will generally only be appropriate for a citizen to make the arrest if there is a degree of urgency that renders this impracticable, because of risk to people or property detailed above, or to prevent escape. It is a limited and technical power; not a broad-brush permission for vigilante justice. Reasonable force in the prevention of crime This article has focussed primarily on citizens’ arrests, due to the interesting technical change that the 2021 Act appears to have brought about. However, given how narrow and technical the power to execute a citizen’s arrest is, it bears mentioning that there is a broader power under s.3 of the Criminal Law Act which provides that a person (any person) 'may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime'. Unlike the citizen’s arrest powers, this power may apply where a person honestly believes that a crime is about to be committed, so long as they use no more force than is reasonable to prevent it. This is a much less technical power, and what is considered 'reasonable in the circumstances' will always hang on the specific facts of a given case. What is 'reasonable' is an 'objective' test, meaning it is not about whether the person themselves believed that what they were doing was reasonable, but whether a hypothetical ordinary and fair-minded person would consider the degree of force used was reasonable in the circumstances. This is, therefore, also a power to be exercised with great caution and restraint, because different tribunals (different judges, magistrates or juries) may take very different views about what is reasonable in a given situation. It may be that a passionate animal advocate would honestly believe that it was acceptable to use a great deal of force to save a suffering animal from unlawful harm, but a tribunal might take the view that it would rarely be appropriate to lay a finger on a human in order to save a factory farmed chicken, even if they were being mistreated. Sadly, lawyers working on animal cases will all have experienced cases in which courts have given human interests exponentially more weight than animal interests. Offence-specific defences Whilst some powers to intervene are broad, others apply only as defences to specific offences. To discuss all offence-specific offences is beyond the scope of this article, but one example frequently raised in animal cases is the question of when preventing animal suffering can render lawful behaviour that would otherwise constitute criminal damage. The basic offence of destroying or damaging property is set out at s.1(1) Criminal Damage Act 1971 . It is a crime for a person 'without lawful excuse' to destroy or damage any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property, or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged. In ordinary circumstances this would include breaking the window to someone else’s car, but a possible exception to this might be if, on a hot day, all the car doors and windows were closed, and the car owner had left a dog inside. According to the RSPCA , even when it's only a pleasant 22 degrees Celsius outside, the car could reach an unbearable 47 degrees within an hour. It is not uncommon to hear of dogs dying in such conditions. The question then arises of whether it is lawful to break the window to rescue the dog. Again, this will always be case specific and there is no general right answer. The first step clearly is to assess the dog’s condition. Even if the dog is showing signs of heatstroke, the safest course of action legally is generally to call the police and see how long it would take officers to attend. However, it may not always be possible for officers to get there in time. There may be limited circumstances in which it would be appropriate to break a window. The term 'without lawful excuse' is expanded on in s.5 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and includes some non-exhaustive examples of lawful excuses that could potentially serve as a defence to a person accused of criminal damage in this scenario. The first is if the accused believed the owner of the car would consent if they knew about the circumstances. Depending on the state of the dog, one might well believe that a car owner would rather have their window smashed than allow their dog to die. The second is if the accused breaks the window in order to protect property (as explained above dogs are legally property) belonging to himself or another (which could include the car owner) and he believed that the property was in immediate need of protection and the means adopted were reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. Seizure The instinct of many an animal advocate, on seeing an animal being mistreated, may be to seek to take the law into their own hands, intervene and take the animal away from the person mistreating it, even if the abuser is the legal owner of the animal. There is no clear statutory power of 'citizen’s seizure' equivalent to the power to effect an arrest. So, whilst it may be lawful to intervene in some circumstances, for the average citizen to attempt to do so is potentially to stray into a legal minefield. Because companion and farmed animals are property, ordinary citizens attempting to seize an animal on welfare grounds could potentially lead to them finding themselves facing criminal proceedings for theft or, in the future if the Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill is enacted, the new proposed 'taking of pets' offence. The offence of theft has, in the past, been used to prosecute animal activists involved in appropriating (generally with the intention of freeing or re-homing) animals from laboratories or farms. That being said, s.1 of the Theft Act 1968 makes it clear that taking someone else’s property is not theft unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was both 'dishonest' and had the 'intention to permanently deprive' another of their property. If the court believed that a defendant was (or may be) only temporarily removing the animal, then theft would not be made out. Similarly, depending on the nature of the abuse witnessed, the court might take the view that there was no dishonesty involved. Unlike theft, the new 'taking of pets' offence set out at s.43 Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill , if enacted, would require neither dishonesty nor intention to permanently deprive. Subject to a few quite technical exceptions, a person would commit an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, that person took or detained a dog (the proposed bill applies only to dogs) in England so as to remove it from the lawful control of any person, or so as to keep it from the lawful control of a person who is entitled to have lawful control of it. The key issue in this case would be 'reasonable excuse'. Once more, each case would turn heavily on its own facts, the quality of the evidence, and different tribunals’ assessments of what is 'reasonable' in the circumstances. Even if criminal liability can be escaped, the intervener runs the risk of being sued in a civil court for the tort (civil wrong) of 'conversion' (which is broadly concerned with excluding the legal owner from access to their own property), or 'trespass to goods' (which is generally concerned with more minor interference with goods). Because animals are considered 'chattels', 'goods' or 'property', they fall within the ambit of 'wrongful interference with goods' for the purpose of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 . That being said, there is a general principle in tort law that claimants cannot recover where their loss occurred while they were engaged in serious wrongdoing. This is often referred to by the Latin maxim ex turpi causa non oritur action: no cause of action arises from illegal or flagrantly immoral acts. This maxim does not, it should be stressed, mean that the mere fact that a claimant was involved in immoral or criminal conduct will be an absolute barrier to any claim. Whether or not an animal abuser has an action against someone who remove the animal from him would come down to the court’s assessment of various factors including how reprehensible the treatment of the animal was and whether it is proportionate to deprive the owner of a civil remedy (see cases such as Joyce v O’Brien [2012] EWHC 1324 (QB) and Cross v Kirkby [2000] EWCA Civ 426.) As ever, before taking the law into one’s own hands the safest course is always ask first whether it is practicable to call the authorities instead. Under the S.18 of the Animal Welfare Act , constables or inspectors who reasonably believe that an animal is suffering have certain powers to take, or arrange the taking of, such steps as appear to be immediately necessary to alleviate the animal's suffering. This can involve, if certain criteria are met, taking the animal into a place of safety, arranging care for it or if necessary, putting the animal down to end its suffering. These authorities only apply to officers or inspectors, not ordinary citizens, and many of the powers under the 2006 Act require a certificate from a veterinary surgeon. Given the express powers bestowed on constables and inspectors, it will seldom be appropriate for a citizen to intervene unless the urgencies of the situation make it impracticable to call the police. Conclusion In appropriate cases, it may be perfectly legal for ordinary people to step in and stand up for an animal in distress, even if this means using force, but it is not something to be undertaken lightly. Every case turns closely on its own facts and questions of 'necessity' and 'reasonableness', although supposedly 'objective' tests, can mean different things to different people. As a result, it is generally risky to use force against people or property, because even slightly misjudging the circumstances can lead to someone with good intentions having to justify, and potentially be punished for, their actions in court. This piece has focussed on the legal risks and has not touched on the general safety risk that suspects very often fight back. There are many reasons that the use of force is, where possible, safer to leave to officers with appropriate training and the authority and resources of the state to fall back on. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

The recent Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021 increased the maximum custodial sentence for several key animal welfare offences from six months to five years, but will it result in more prison sentences for animal welfare offences? Samuel March, a Barrister at 9 King’s Bench Walk and a volunteer paralegal at Advocates for Animals, considers this question in light of the Sentencing Council’s new draft sentencing guidelines for animal welfare offences. The 2021 Act In 2021, the Animal Welfare (Sentencing) Act 2021 ('the 2021 Act') came into force. The 2021 Act increased the maximum sentence for specific offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 ('the 2006 Act') from six months’ to five years’ custody. A predecessor of the Bill proposing substantially the same changes was first introduced by Environment Secretary (as he was then) Michael Gove in 2017 and supported by Government press releases enthusiastically promising that 'animal abusers could face up to five years in prison'. The 2021 Act was many years in the making and followed years of campaigning from some of the UK’s leading animal protection groups, who voiced a sense of distress shared by many voters that prison sentences were rarely imposed in animal protection cases. The release noted that, at the time, while on average about 1,150 people per year are convicted for animal cruelty, fewer than five of them received the (then) maximum sentence of six months in custody. The move itself is not without controversy. There are a broad range of well-intentioned philosophies across the animal protection movement, from the tireless and committed organisations who campaigned in favour of the legislation, to thought leaders who argue that carceral approaches can do more harm than good and the interests of people and animals alike is better served by moving ' beyond cages '. However, such a debate is beyond the scope of this article, which instead will focus only on whether the 2021 Act will actually result in more people actually going to prison for longer, as the press releases and news stories around it will have led many to expect. The draft guidelines The reason I ask this question now is in light of the Sentencing Council’s ongoing consultation on its new draft sentencing guidelines for animal offences. At any sentencing hearing the court will hear about the facts of an offence that has been admitted or proved and then consider the question of how to deal with the offender. In order to assist sentencing courts and ensure a degree of consistency between courts, the Sentencing Council publishes sentencing guidelines for some offences. These generally encourage the court to determine the level of 'culpability' of the offender and the 'harm' caused by the offence. These two factors are then plotted against each other to determine the appropriate starting point, which can then be increased or decreased to account for aggravating factors (such as previous similar convictions) or mitigating factors (such as previous good character or genuine remorse). The guidelines can be departed from, but courts will do so only in rare cases. Taking a look at the new draft guidelines for animal welfare offences, the point to note is that, notwithstanding the five year statutory maximum, the guidelines suggest that in practice the 'offence range' would be between a Band A fine (50% of relevant weekly income) and 3 years custody. It is not uncommon for sentencing guidelines to suggest a range that stops well below the statutory maximum, but what it means - if implemented – is that even under the 2021 Act, it would take an exceptional case for a court to impose a sentence anywhere near the five years that was widely announced in the press. An offence can be expected to be classed as 'high culpability' if it demonstrates one of more of the following: 'Prolonged and/or repeated incidents of serious cruelty and/or sadistic behaviour Use of very significant force Leading role in illegal activity' And an offence can be expected to be classed in the highest category for harm ('Category 1') if it demonstrates one or more of the following 'Death (including injury necessitating euthanasia) Particularly grave or life-threatening injury or condition caused Very high level of pain and/or suffering caused' 'Category 1A' is therefore concerned with truly reprehensible behaviour. Not merely deliberate, but repeated or sadistic behaviour resulting in the most serious outcomes imaginable for the animal in question. Nevertheless, the draft offence matrix suggests a 'starting point' for a Category 1A offence would be a custodial sentence of 18 months. The 'category range' would be 26 months to three years. It is important at this stage to note that not all custodial sentences involve actually going to prison. Two factors give reason to doubt whether the guidelines (if implemented) will result in more animal offenders actually spending time behind bars: Firstly, sentencing courts have the power to 'suspend' any sentence of two years or less, meaning that the defendant stays in the community so long as they commit no further offences and comply with conditions similar to those attached to a community order; and Secondly, any defendant who pleads guilty at the first appearance is automatically entitled to a reduction by 1/3 of any custodial sentence imposed. The operation of the suggested offence range and these two points of sentencing law, means that so long as a defendant enters an early guilty plea, all but the most exceptional cases will still fall below that critical two-year mark. . So, the most important question at most sentencing hearings will remain much the same as it was before the 2021 Act, namely 'can the sentence be suspended?' The court is given clear guidelines on answering this question. It does not particularly matter whether the underlying sentence is measured in weeks, months or years, the determinative factors will be whether the offender presents a risk/danger to the public, whether appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody, compliance with previous orders, prospects of rehabilitation, personal mitigation and whether custody would result in significant harmful impact on others. Courts will very often impose suspended sentences where they are available; unless there are strong reasons not to (such as multiple previous convictions or breaches of current or previous community-based orders). There are very often good and compelling reasons to impose community-based sentences, and in many cases, they are very effective. Merits of suspended sentences aside, their availability gives reason to doubt that 2021 Act and new guidelines will result in a significant increase in custodial sentences for animal welfare offences. Move animal cases to the Crown Court More prison sentences occur as a function not just of the maximum sentence and relevant guidelines, but of the number of cases prosecuted and the percentage of those resulting in convictions. One possible effect of the 2021 Act may be to reduce both the number of prosecutions brought, and the conviction rate when they are. Under the law of England and Wales, offences can be grouped into two categories depending on their 'mode of trial': summary offences (which are tried in the magistrates’ courts) and indictable offences (which can be tried in the Crown Court). The maximum custodial sentence that can be imposed in the magistrates’ courts is six months for a single offence (or up to twelve months on summary conviction for multiple indictable offences). So, in order to increase the maximum sentence to five years, the 2021 Act had to turn the main animal welfare offences from summary only offences to indictable offences, because only the Crown Court can impose such lengthy custodial sentences. This change could impact the number of animal welfare convictions for three reasons. The first reason is that the conviction rates in the magistrates’ court are consistently significantly higher than in the Crown Court. Between 2015 and 2018 the overall conviction rate in the magistrates’ courts was 84.8%, compared to 79.9% in the Crown Court. Part of this is because people are more likely to plead guilty when the likely sentence is lower, but there is also a significant difference in conviction rate after trial. According to CPS statistics from 2018, 16.8% of prosecutions at the Crown Court resulted in a trial, with a conviction after contest rate of 54.0%; compared to 9.1% of magistrates’ courts prosecutions with a conviction after contest rate of 62.1%. Possible explanations may be that magistrates are a self-selecting group with certain socio-economic groups disproportionately over or under represented; or that because they hear similar defences day-in-day-out they become cynical and less likely to believe defendants. Contrast this to jurors who are randomly selected and very often have never been involved in a criminal trial before and, in light of the higher stakes, may be more likely to give defendants the benefit of the doubt. Whether juries or magistrates produce more just outcomes is again beyond the scope of this article, but the statistics suggest that moving animal welfare offences to the Crown Court is likely to result in a lower conviction rate. The second reason is that Crown Court prosecutions require more time, more money, and often more expensive lawyers to prosecute them. Crown Court trials can easily be four or five times more expensive than a magistrates’ court trial. This pressure on resources is likely to lead to fewer prosecutions being brought, because the sums involved may mean that the state feels it needs to prioritise crimes against human beings, and private prosecutors feel they can no longer afford the up-front costs. The third reason is the coincidence of the 2021 Act with the decision of the RSPCA to step back as the prosecutor of first resort in animal welfare cases. Prior to the 2021 Act, the vast majority of animal welfare prosecutions were not brought by the state, but were private prosecutions brought by the RSPCA and other charities. For information on how animal protection groups can bring private prosecutions for animal welfare and wildlife crime, see our previous blog post . The RSPCA’s teams were trained and resourced to bring magistrates’ court cases effectively. In 2019 the RSPCA secured 1,432 convictions relating to animal welfare offences, with a 93.7% success rate. The RSPCA’s past successes illustrate some of the advantages of private prosecutions by specialist organisations. As well as high success rates, private players are able to instruct specialist lawyers, investigators and forensic experts. However, since the introduction of the 2021 Act, the 2021 RSPCA Strategy sets out the charity’s plan for the coming decade. The RSPCA has now set out to 'review [its] role as a prosecutor and look at the potential to transfer this responsibility to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).' One of the reasons for this was set out by Chris Sherwood (chief executive of the RSPCA) for this was the movement of animal welfare offences moving from the magistrates’ courts to the Crown Court. Sherwood acknowledged the responsibility involved in trials on indictment and suggested that the RSPCA believed that that responsibility should sit with the CPS. The various advantages and disadvantages of the CPS taking over from the RPSCA as the animal welfare prosecutor of first resort raises a number of other delicate issues and are the subject of a previous article ; but in summary, there are reasons to believe that it will result in fewer animal welfare prosecutions and to doubt whether the CPS is suitably trained and resourced to take on the RSPCA’s workload and bring the same number of convictions with the same success rate. Will the 2021 Act and guidelines result in more custodial sentences? The pros and cons of carceral approaches are beyond the scope of this article; however, there are reasons to doubt that the effect of the 2021 Act and the proposed sentencing guidelines will be to put significantly more people in prison for animal welfare offences. For the reasons set out above, it is entirely possible that there will be fewer prosecutions, with lower conviction rates and with suspended sentences still being passed in all but the most exceptional cases. The consultation runs until 1 August 2022: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/item/animal-cruelty-consultation/ Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

The recent Beavers (England) Order 2022 granted the Eurasian beavers increased legal protection against persecution and habitat destruction, however will this result in a key part of British wildlife being adequately protected? Rob Espin, Co-chair of the Wildlife Working Group at the UK Centre for Animal Law (' A-LAW '), considers this question within the scope of England’s wider wildlife welfare regime. Beavers – a very british (re)introduction Once a widespread and key part of British ecosystems, the Eurasian Beaver (castor fibre) was unfortunately made extinct in the wild in Great Britain over 400 years ago primarily caused by human persecution through hunting. The loss of such an emblematic species represented a national shame given the beaver’s key role in forming natural habitats throughout the UK. Scientific evidence has established that beavers are ecosystem engineers , creating a mosaic of habitats though damning rivers to create wetlands rich in biodiversity. Beavers are also masters of helping managing our waterways during extreme weather conditions, with research showing their activities can reduce water flows by 73% during flooding whilst keeping 60% more open water pools during droughts. Despite such localised extinction, following the discovery of wild beavers living in the River Tay catchment area in Scotland, a beaver reintroduction trial was licensed for 5 years in 2009. This trial was widely considered a success when it concluded in 2014 and was followed by a trial in the River Otter area in Devon, England. This trial concerned a population of wild beavers of unconfirmed origins which was managed by a group of organisations led by the Devon Wildlife Trust. The scientific report at the end of the trial concluded that the reintroduction had been a success with beaver populations increasing nearly seven-fold and the families benefiting from increased public perception. After the conclusion of the successful River Otter trial, the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (' DEFRA ') announced that the beavers in Devonshire could stay and launched a public consultation concerning how best to facilitate beaver reintroductions as part of the UK Government’s 25 year environmental plan . Beavers still however occupy a precarious status in the UK as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (' IUCN' ) red list classifies beaves as critically endangered in England. The old position Before the enactment of the Beavers (England) Order 2022 (the ' Beavers Order' ), beavers received similar protections to other wild mammals under the English wildlife welfare regime. There is no single piece of legislation containing all the welfare protections for wildlife in England meaning the protections are piecemeal and stem from various different laws. For beavers in the wild, it is an offence under the Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996 (' WMPA ') for any person to (amongst other things) beat, stab or mutilate a beaver if they intend to cause unnecessary suffering. Anyone convicted of causing cruelty to beavers in contravention of WMPA is liable for up to 6 months imprisonment in England. WMPA alone did not prevent persons from shooting beavers however, nor did it prevent persons setting using dogs to hunt the species. Beavers also draw some protection pursuant to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (the ' WCA '), which provides different levels of protection against persecution for different types of wildlife. As beavers are listed as a Schedule 6ZA WCA species, it is illegal to place traps or snares with the intention of capturing, killing or injuring beavers. In addition to the WCA, beavers also draw protection from the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 (the ' Habitat Regulations '). Under the Habitat Regulations it is a criminal offence for someone to be in possession of a beaver, whether live or not, or to offer them for sale. The Habitat Regulations also outlaw the use of certain methods of killing or capturing beavers, including poisons, explosives, crossbows and automatic weapons. Anyone convicted of contravening either the WCA or the Habitat Regulations faces up to 6 months in prison. The above paragraphs discuss the protections for wild beavers, however beavers which find themselves 'under the control of man' (for example in a licensed zoo or wildlife collection) are subject to much more comprehensive protection under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (the ' AWA '). Beavers kept by humans are protected against unnecessary suffering caused intentionally or negligently and their keepers have to actively promote their welfare. On the basis that most beavers in England are not kept by humans this article will focus on the law relating to wild specimens. Why were beavers vulnerable? Even with the protections discussed above, prior to the Beavers Order there were significant holes in the English legal regime protecting beavers. It was not illegal for anyone to shoot or kill beavers generally as long as they did not use a prohibited method. This meant that beavers were at the mercy of the local populations and landowners they interacted with as they could easily be killed by self-interested individuals or groups. Another key risk was that beavers’ habitats were not protected. Beavers form a complex array of damns across water, burrows dug into riverbanks, larger bank lodges accessed by underwater tunnels and food caches of branches to store food for winter. Allowing people to damage or destroy these carefully constructed habitats threatened the sustainability of beaver populations as beaver 'kits' (young beavers) are dependent on this natural infrastructure for survival. Protection following the Beavers Order The above position changed significantly on 1 October 2022 when the Beavers Order came into force in England as this expanded the scope of certain further protections available under the Habitat Regulations to beavers. This is on top of the existing protections explained above, which were complemented instead of replaced by the Beavers Order. The first protective change was to create an offence to deliberately capture, injure, kill or even disturb any wild beaver, unless done pursuant to a licence granted by the relevant authority (discussed further below). Secondly it is now an offence for anyone to damage or destroy beavers’ breeding and resting sites without authority pursuant to a licence. Anyone who is convicted of breaching these prohibitions faces a maximum punishment of 6 months imprisonment. The final protective change was to effectively exempt beavers from the potential scope of species control orders , which are special powers given to environmental authorities allowing them to enter land without consent to carry out 'species management' activities, which may include killing or removing wildlife. In addition to enhancing their welfare protections, the Beavers Order also amended the rules concerning reintroduction and management of beavers into the wild, by changing the beavers’ classification to ' Native Animals ' under the WCA. The impact of such change is that conservation groups will now need to seek consent from Natural England before conducting rewilding where beavers are released into the English countryside. Such consent will only be granted where reintroduction groups prepare plans which satisfactorily address certain issues including ecological impact, local community stakeholder support and resolution of conflicts with human interests. Are beavers adequately protected now? The enactment of the Beavers Order can be seen as a stride forward in ensuring that beavers are protected against meaningless persecution in the wildlife. Preventing beavers generally being killed or taken should stop persons who do not like the presence of beavers nearby from killing or removing the animal. Protection of their habitat is also a positive development and addresses a previous lacuna in wellbeing safeguards. The Beavers Order also has consequences for proposed development and construction which may impact the animal’s habitat. Whilst beavers largely currently occupy wildlife enclosures and certain areas on wetlands which developers would not target for construction in any case, this may not always be the case as beavers’ natural range expands over time. Ecologists supporting construction will need to consider the animal in their survey and, should the proposed development impact beaver habitats, special authority will need to be sought from either Natural England or DEFRA in addition to the usual local planning authority process. This could result in planning permission being refused, or conditioned upon development businesses taking certain action to avoid harm or disturbance to protected species and their habitats, mitigating for the effect on them if that is not possible and to compensate for harm as a last resort. Even with the positive steps forwards, how much difference these enhanced safeguards will make to the protection of beavers in the wild will depend on a number of more practical issues. Firstly, Natural England has the power to issue licences to persons to either kill or take Beavers or to break up their habitats under certain conditions where beavers clash with certain human interests. Provided that people take actions strictly under the auspices of such licences, any acts invasive towards beavers will not be punishable by criminal offence. The UK has already seen legal challenge in the form of a successful judicial review in Scotland (which this author was involved in with alongside the Lifescape Project ) determining that the Scottish regulator had been incorrectly issuing licences and therefore allowing persecution of the animal when this should not have been permitted. It is therefore critical that English authorities only licence action which might be invasive to beavers subject to strict conditions set out by law, including that there is no less harmful satisfactory alternative which could be taken to protect human interests. Secondly, as has been frequently previously highlighted by organisations including the Wildlife and Countryside Link , the success of any wildlife welfare legislation depends upon how it is enforced . Key to enforcement include reporting and detection mechanisms and the resourcing and training of enforcement authorities including the police. The Beavers Order therefore needs to be supported by proper prioritisation of wildlife crime as a national issue in order for beavers to be adequately protected in England. Finally the Beavers Order also contains some inconsistencies in the protections it bestows to beavers. The WCA usually makes it a criminal offence to recklessly disturb protected species which are listed in Schedule 5 to the WCA whilst such species occupy their habitat or for a person to obstruct access to natural structures such animals use for shelter or protection. This is beyond the prohibition within the Habitat Regulations which only outlaws deliberate disturbance of the species. Beavers were, for some reason, not added to Schedule 5 of the WCA despite being granted other protections. There is no clear rationale in the supporting documentation to the Beavers Order for this exception and this creates a risk that people, who have not specific qualifications or training, try to block beavers’ lodges and burrows, causing them distress through disturbance and negatively impacting their welfare. This lacuna is a shame, and this author encourages the Secretary of State to take action to address this. Conclusion It is undoubtedly positive to see the Government taking action to shore up the legal welfare protections concerning a critically endangered species which is increasingly forming the spearpoint of Britain’s rewilding efforts. Whether this will in reality result in beavers being shielded from persecution will depend upon a variety of factors including the degree the relevant authorities choose to licence action prejudicial to beavers for the purpose of furthering certain anthropocentric interests and the prioritisation given to the tackling of wildlife crime. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .