Currently, there is no specific legislation covering companion animals in rental homes for assured shorthold tenancies. There is no specific mention of companion animals in the Housing Act1988 . There are, however, still some legal nuances when it comes to keeping animals in your home under a tenancy agreement. Tenancy agreements The tenancy agreement might say companion animals are not allowed. Under Section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 'unfair terms' in a contract are prohibited. It is unknown whether a blanket ban on keeping companion animals under a tenancy agreement would be deemed an unfair term. Alternatively, the tenancy agreement might say the landlord’s permission should be sought if the tenant intends to keep a companion animal. In this case, the landlord’s permission should not be unreasonably refused. What amounts to a reasonable refusal will vary with the circumstances. For example, it might be reasonable to refuse permission to keep a large dog in a small flat. Where a tenant feels that a landlord has unreasonably refused their request, they will be able to escalate their complaint to the Private Rented Sector Ombudsman or they could take the case to court. The Ombudsman or court will make the final decision based on the evidence provided by both parties. Private landlords have discretion to use a Model Tenancy Agreement drafted by the government. The latest version was published on 28 January 2021. Where this agreement is used the default position is for landlords not to unreasonably withhold consent where a tenant asks for permission to keep a companion animal. Paragraph 3.5 states: 'A Tenant must seek the prior written consent of the Landlord should they wish to keep pets or other animals at the Property. A Landlord must not unreasonably withhold or delay a written request from a Tenant without considering the request on its own merits. The Landlord should accept such a request where they are satisfied the Tenant is a responsible pet owner and the pet is of a kind that is suitable in relation to the nature of the premises at which it will be kept. Consent is deemed to be granted unless the written request is turned down by a Landlord with good reason in writing within 28 days of receiving the request.' The guidance on this clause says: Clause C3.5 prohibits a landlord from exercising a blanket ban on pets. A responsible pet owner will be aware of their responsibilities in making best efforts to ensure their pet does not cause a nuisance to neighbouring households or undue damage to the Property. A landlord should take steps to accommodate written requests from responsible tenants with pets. They should only turn down a request in writing within a 28 day period if there is good reason to do so, such as large pets in smaller properties or flats, or otherwise properties where having a pet could be impractical. Landlord consent is therefore the default position unless otherwise specified in writing by a landlord. If consent is given on the condition that additional deposit is paid by the tenant, the total deposit must not breach the deposit cap introduced under the Tenant Fees Act 2019 and must be protected in an authorised tenancy deposit scheme. The tenancy agreement (contract) might not mention companion animals, in which case it will likely be harder for landlords to argue that they are not allowed. A guide or assistance dog Under the Equality Act 2010 , service providers (including landlords) must not directly or indirectly discriminate against people with a disability. Section 20(3) says they must make reasonable adjustments where a provision, criterion or practice puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage compared to a non-disabled person. What amounts to a reasonable adjustment will depend on individual circumstances. The future – renters Reform Bill The Renters (Reform) Bill 2022-23 , introduced to parliament on 17 May 2023, contains measures to amend the Housing Act 1988 to make it an implied term of an assured tenancy (with some exceptions) that a tenant may keep a companion animal with the landlord’s consent unless the landlord reasonably refuses. There is useful information on the Bill here . Advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

The Competition Markets Authority has referred the supply of veterinary services for household pets in the United Kingdom for a market investigation  due to a concern that consumers are not getting a fair deal.  Our work at Advocates for Animals has led us to the conclusion that the veterinary industry is both unfair to consumers and animals alike.  Veterinary negligence  Veterinary negligence is a common complaint that we deal with. Members of the public have experienced their companion animals suffering and even dying at the hands of veterinary malpractice. We have also come across complaints involving falsifying records and denying a customer’s version of events. Meaningful accountability and establishing the scale of the issue are impossible due to the structure of accountability mechanisms currently in place.  Accountability mechanisms When people experience the loss or poor treatment towards an animal they would often consider a family member, they are provided with limited options to obtain any sense of justice or accountability.  The main options are:   A complaint to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons   A civil claim through the courts Settlements, which in our experience is rare due to the fear of admitting responsibility  RCVS A complaint to the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is the direction most are pointed in, it is free and it has the appeal of a less burdensome process than going to court. However, there are several reasons why a complaint to the RCVS is often unsatisfactory.  Firstly, the RCVS is a self-regulator, which, of course, runs the risk of conflicts of interest.  Secondly, the RCVS will only deal with serious professional misconduct. Where malpractice is concerned, the RCVS have described this as 'very poor professional performance where there are serious departures from the standards set out in the RCVS Code of Professional Conduct'.   This means that anything that is just standard poor practice will not be investigated.  Thirdly, when making a complaint about malpractice to the RCVS, the standard of proof is that of the criminal standard, when other regulators use the civil test of the balance of probabilities. This means a complainant must prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt, rather than the lower threshold of balance of probabilities. This has likely resulted in the number of disciplinary hearings being kept low. During 2023, only 12 out of more than 3,300 individual issues, including 620 which progressed to become formal complaints, were the subject of full disciplinary hearings during 2023. Finally, even in the event the RCVS did find against a professional, it has limited powers and cannot offer compensation. The RCVS has also stated it has no power to compel vets to hand over documents. Civil claim Another option available to the recipient of veterinary malpractice is a civil claim.  Veterinary services will need to ensure that they act in accordance with the contract of the supply of service and in accordance with their professional duty of care (and also with their obligations under the Consumer Rights Act 2015). The consequence of breaching these legal duties means a claim in the civil courts is an option. The cost consequences of pursuing a civil claim, however, make this option inaccessible to most. Pursuing any legal claim can be costly and requires serious thought before going into it; however, what makes pursuing a claim against a veterinary service provider unique is the status of animals under the law.  Animals are seen as property under the law, which means that in almost all veterinary negligence cases, due to the material value of the claim, including that of the animal and veterinary bills, it is likely the claim will end up in the small claims court.  The small claims court is designed to deal with straightforward issues involving relatively small sums. It is not intended to deal with complex legal and scientific questions that turn on expert opinion with huge emotional investment.   Claimants should be able to represent themselves through the small claims procedure; however, in a veterinary negligence case, this would require instructing an expert or experts and making complex arguments regarding questions such as specific cause of injury or death. All the while the defendant may have lawyers and experts funded by their insurers, as their professional credibility is on the line. As such, to have a real shot at success, the claimant would need to hire a lawyer, the fees of which are not recoverable, who in turn would need to instruct an expert or experts, the fees of which have limited recoverability.   It is a possibility that a small claims district judge may consider the matter too complex for a small claims hearing and refer it up to the fast-track county court procedure. In which case the risk of paying the other side's costs order if the claimant does not succeed is substantial due to the above costs involved in a claim of this nature.  We have also experienced real difficulty finding veterinary experts willing to speak out against the alleged malpractice of one of their peers, all the while the other side has access to a pool of experts willing to defend them. This is simply not a level playing field for any lay person.   Even in the event that the claimant was successful against these challenges, the claimant could not expect to receive any significant payout, which, where an animal is concerned, will likely mean their material value rather than their emotional value. This means a claimant could spend thousands, if not tens of thousands of pounds, pursuing a claim and receive a far smaller amount back if successful. Due to the poor viability of a civil claim, it is often advisable that a client complain to the RCVS, which, for the above reasons, is far from satisfactory.   Conclusion For the above reasons there is not adequate accountability for providing poor veterinary services. This not only means a consumer does not have any access to suitable redress, but also that the market itself is distorted by having unsuitable practitioners still allowed to practise, as a result of shielding poor service providers. Following a submission from Advocates for Animals and others, we are very pleased to note however that the CMA in its’ recently published (July 2024) statement of issues,  has noted that they will be looking into the regulatory framework for vets and whether in fact there are sufficient mechanisms in place for ensuring that the Code of Conduct is enforced.  We believe that both for the sake of consumers and for the welfare of animals, this needs to be closely and carefully scrutinised and the lack of enforcement addressed. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

19 May 2020, Samuel March Judgment: [Friends of Antique Cultural Treasures Ltd v DEFRA [2020] EWCA Civ 649] ( https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/649.html ) On 18 May 2020 the Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that the restrictions imposed by the Ivory Act 2018 ('the Act') do not violate the EU rules on the free movement of goods, nor the fundamental rights to respect for property rights. The facts The Act, not yet in force, will introduce wide ranging prohibitions on the ivory trade. The Appellants, a company incorporated for the sole purpose of representing the interests of antique ivory dealers and collectors in this matter, sought to directly challenge the provisions of the Act, arguing that these prohibitions went too far and were disproportionate. At first instance, Mr Justice Jay in the High Court dismissed the challenge. The Appellants appealed, mounting a series of challenges to his reasoning. The issues In brief, the question on appeal was whether the judge at first instance had applied the proportionality test correctly. EU law continues to apply in the UK until 31 December 2020. Articles 34 and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibit import and export restrictions on trade in goods between the EU Member States. However, these articles do not apply where the restrictions are a necessary and proportionate way to pursue one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 36, which includes safeguarding the welfare of animals. The Appellants argued that there was insufficient evidence supporting the Respondents’ justification, and further or alternatively that less restrictive and intrusive measures could have been adopted by Parliament to achieve their aim. The appellants further relied on the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Protocol 1 Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as the right to freedom to conduct a business per Article 16 of the Charter. The decision Finding for the Respondents, the Court of Appeal could detect no errors in the approach adopted or in the findings made by the Judge about the evidence. At [56]-[57], they concluded that he was right to find that the Act was proportionate and lawful: 'In his considered and careful analysis the Judge applied the correct approach to the evidence. He concluded that he had to make an objective appraisal of the evidence before him, even where it included evidence not before Parliament. He reviewed that evidence individually and collectively and attached to each strand of evidence appropriate weight. He found that in some respects the evidence was lacking but, when viewed overall, there was sufficient evidence to support the justifications advanced for the trading bans. He applied a variegated approach to the margin of appreciation or discretion that the court should attach to the assessment conducted by the state and concluded that, where matters of international politics and diplomacy are in issue, a broader margin is appropriate. He considered that the Act was justified, taking into account the evidence and the margin that Parliament was entitled to in adopting legislation in this field. In arriving at his conclusion, he took account of the fact that the Act did intrude significantly into fundamental property rights and the right to conduct business, but this did not mean that the Act was disproportionate.' [56] Commentary The judgment is likely to be welcome news to animal and environmental campaigners, as well the 85% of the British public who supported the ban. Speaking prior to the appeal, Mary Rice, the Executive Director of the Environmental Investigation Agency had said : 'It would be a tragedy for endangered elephants in Africa and Asia if the UK Ivory Act were to be cut down at this final hurdle, not to mention a slap in the face for the vast majority of British citizens who quite clearly put elephant welfare far above the right to make money off blood ivory.' Unsurprisingly, the judgment was welcomed by DEFRA, a spokesperson for whom said : 'We welcome the Court of Appeal’s ruling, which upholds the High Court’s decision and dismisses the claim against the Ivory Act. We are committed to bringing the ivory ban into force as soon as practicable to help protect the world’s endangered species and halt biodiversity loss.' However, there have been suggestions of a possible appeal. Richard Pike, partner at Constantine Cannon, the law firm acting for the appellants, was reported in the Antiques Trade Gazette to have said 'We've got seven days to seek permission to appeal - and there is a possibility that this will happen.' Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

22 May 2020 ,Samuel March Judgment: Islamabad Wildlife Management Board v Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad W.P. No.1155/2019 On 21st May 2020, Chief Justice Athar Minallah sitting in the High Court in Islamabad, Pakistan, issued a landmark 67-page judgment which found, inter alia, that the animals in Marghazar Zoo had legal rights, and should be moved to appropriate sanctuaries. The facts The case concerned the Marghazar Zoo of the Federal Territory of Islamabad ('the Zoo'). The Zoo housed and exhibited 878 non-human living creatures, including 89 of 15 different species, 769 birds of 38 species and 20 of three species. Notably, the zoo was home to ' Kaavan ', the solitary elephant. The zoo was under the control of the respondent corporation, which had 'neither the resources nor the capacity and will to safeguard the wellbeing and welfare of the captive animals' [2]. A report submitted by the amicus appointed by this Court as well as the Board highlighted 'extremely disturbing conditions in which the non-human living beings have been kept in captivity and in complete disregard for their respective natural habitats. The animals, because of these conditions, are definitely suffering pain, distress and agony. The animals have been kept in small cages and enclosures without basic and necessary facilities required for the needs of this non-human living species. There can be no denial that these non-human living beings have been kept in conditions which cause distress and pain and thus amounts to cruel treatment.' The judgment at [4] deals with the specific conditions endured by the animals with a four to five-page emphasis on Kaavan’s three decades of 'unnecessary pain and suffering' [4(a)]. The issue At [2] the judge set out what he perceived to be seven issues before the court. The most pressing being whether the animals had independent rights, whether there was a duty on the part of humans, through the state, to protect, preserve and conserve them, or whether the cruel treatment of animals could amount to a breach of the right to life of the public at large. The decision Finding 'without any hesitation' for the claimants, the judge considered at [7] that the animals had legal rights. He held, 'After surveying the jurisprudence developed in various jurisdictions it has become obvious that there is consensus that an "animal" is not merely a "thing" or "property".' This conclusion came after a wide-ranging exploration at [6] of the jurisprudence, both domestically and internationally, pertaining to the rights of animals and the duties of humans and states towards them. The cases cited will be familiar to animal advocates around the world. These detail the varying successes and failures of animal advocates to raise the legal status of animals. Notable successes cited include, Sandra the Orangutan, who was declared a ‘non-human person’ by a Criminal Appeals Court in Argentina; Cecilia the Chimpanzee, who was declared a 'non-human legal person' by Judge Maria Alejandra Mauricio of Tercer Juzgado de Garantias in Mandoza; Sonu the Elephant, whose right to live in its natural habitat was recognised by the High Court of Chhattisgarh; A case from The Kerala High Court, which recognised a 'fundamental duty' to show compassion and 'recognise and protect' the rights of animals; and A case from The Indian Supreme Court, which held that 'every species has an inherent right to live and shall be protected by law, subject to the exception provided out of necessity.' The court also cited concessions, allowances and sympathetic obiter from judges in cases where rights or personhood were not directly recognised; noting, for instance the 'regretful' tone of Judge Alison Tuitt’s judgment concerning the Bronx Zoo’s Happy the Elephant . Having reviewed the jurisprudence, the judge went on to consider the treatment of animals under various religions. The Judge cited several Quranic verses and Ahadith, and concluded at [6(c)] that 'It is inconceivable that, in a society where the majority follow the religion of Islam, that an animal could be harmed or treated in a cruel manner.' The judge also considered the relationship between the treatment of animals and the right to life of humans, noting the context and roots of the present pandemic, and concluding at [6(f)] that it was an obligation of the State and its authorities to 'jealously guard against cruel and illegal treatment of animals'. The various declarations and directions are then set out at [8], including at [8(iii)] that the Board would forthwith make arrangements, preferably in consultation with and the consent of the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka, to relocate Kaavan to a suitable sanctuary within thirty days, and per [8(iv)] all the remaining animals are to be relocated their respective sanctuaries within 60 days. Commentary The ruling has naturally been celebrated by those who have campaigned for the release of Kaavan and the other animals. One of the claimant advocates has called the judge 'an absolute legend and a symbol of hope'. American singer Cher, who had campaigned ardently for the animals, tweeted that the judgment was 'one of the greatest moments' of her life. For the time being, there has been no indication to the author’s knowledge that the ruling is to be appealed. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court of Pakistan has the power to decide appeals arising out of cases decided by the High Courts of Pakistan, including the High Court in Islamabad which decided this case. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

1 July 2020, David Thomas This case was about Sylvie, a blind cross collie rescued from a ‘killing’ shelter in Romania and sent to a UK rescue charity. Advocates for Animals (AfA) represented the defendant, June Lane, in the appeal proceedings. AfA would not normally act against an animal charity. However, the case had unusual features and presented an opportunity to chip away at the legal principle that, as chattels, animals are subject to the same rules of property law as inanimate objects. The facts The charity fostered Sylvie to Ms Lane, an experienced fosterer, while they sought a suitable permanent home. The parties entered into a fostering agreement, which was silent about when the charity could demand Sylvie’s return, save if they thought she was not getting proper care (the charity acknowledged in fact that Ms Lane had given Sylvie ‘wonderful care’). One adoption had already failed, and Sylvie was in a distressed state before she came to Ms Lane. Her confidence improved, but unfortunately, in time her health deteriorated. A veterinary neurologist later suggested that she had a canine form of dementia and that it would be better not to move her. In June 2018, the charity asked for Sylvie back, but Ms Lane declined. She was concerned that, given Sylvie’s combination of conditions, moving her at this time would exacerbate the distress and disorientation she was exhibiting. She offered to adopt Sylvie, but the charity refused. The charity brought proceedings for Sylvie’s return and was successful before the district judge. The judge said that, in law, Sylvie was ‘essentially the same as a car or something else’ and that therefore she could not take her welfare into account. Ms Lane was eventually given permission to appeal. The issues There were really two issues on the appeal. First, although a fostering agreement is by its nature temporary, should a term be implied here that the charity could not demand Sylvie’s return if that would be significantly detrimental to her welfare? The whole point of the agreement was to safeguard her welfare. (Whether there would in fact be significant detriment would depend on all the evidence, including veterinary evidence, in the normal way). Second, if there was no such implied term and the charity was entitled to demand Sylvie’s return whenever they wanted, should the court in the exercise of its discretion instead order Ms Lane to pay damages to the charity? Whenever an owner brings proceedings for the return of their chattel, the court can order damages instead if that would compensate the owner adequately. The decision Judge Godsmark indicated that the fostering agreement was an example of what the law calls a bailment. This is where someone temporarily transfers possession but not ownership of a chattel to someone else. He said the agreement had some features of a bailment at will, which arises where there is no agreed endpoint for the arrangement. With such a bailment, the owner – the bailor – can demand return of the chattel at any time. Could an implied term save Ms Lane? There are a number of hurdles which must be overcome before a court will imply a term into a contract. The leading decision is now that of the Supreme Court in Marks & Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd & Another [2015] UKSC 72 . The crucial issue in the present case was whether the suggested implied term would have been obvious to a reasonable observer when the agreement was entered into. The test is a stringent one: the starting-point, and usually the finishing-point, is what the parties have expressly agreed. The judge decided that the implied term did not reach the obviousness threshold. The charity was entitled to call for Sylvie’s return without regard to her welfare. Indeed, the trustees would be within their rights to put her to sleep ‘at a whim’ (it was not suggested that they intended to do that). However, he found for Ms Lane on the second issue. The district judge had wrongly failed to exercise her discretion, and he could therefore exercise his under Section 3 of the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977. He decided that Ms Lane should be ordered to pay damages rather than return Sylvie. He was influenced by the fact Sylvie was not the trustees’ pet – they simply wished to place her elsewhere. She therefore had no particular value to the charity. Damages could compensate. The most the charity could expect to get for Sylvie was their standard adoption fee of £255. However, Ms Lane had made an open offer of £2,500 – evidence of her commitment to Sylvie – and the judge decided that that should be the measure of damages. Commentary The judge recognised that, in law, Sylvie was a chattel, subject to the same incidences of ownership as, say, a book. That clearly influenced him in applying the obviousness test. That test is largely a matter of impression: it would not be surprising were people to disagree on what is obvious with any given contract. However, the judge made an interesting comment about animals’ status as property. He said that perhaps animals should not be regarded as such: ‘they play a large part in our emotions and our lives, they breathe, they feel pleasure and pain. Maybe the law should recognise this, but it does not’. In other words, perhaps it's time for reform of the law. Moreover, he recognised that Sylvie was both unique and sentient. Her market value was relatively small but she had ‘substantial emotional value’. Ms Lane was invested in her welfare. It would be surprising if Sylvie’s welfare needs did not influence the way the judge exercised his discretion. County Court judgments are not legal precedents, and this judgment does not represent revolution. But it is important in showing that what happens to an animal does not have to follow property rights. Sentiency and the animal’s best interests have an important role to play too. Legislative reform is always the gold standard. But cases can have an important, if incremental, role in moving the law in a more enlightened direction. It is hoped that future cases will build on Judge Godsmark’s approach in this case. Chesterfield County Court: 30 June 2020 Orton and others v Lane: E00HF536 Judge Godsmark QC Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

16 October 2020, Samuel March Judgment: [R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd) (Appellant) v Crown Prosecution Service (Respondent) [2020] UKSC 39 On 16 October 2020 the UK Supreme Court unanimously ruled against Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd ('the Appellants') in an appeal concerning the scope of the legal duties on business operators under Regulation 30(1)(g) the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 ('the UK Regulation'). The effect of this may be to leave the appellants with no defence to criminal charges. The facts Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd (the Appellants) operates a poultry slaughterhouse in Shropshire. The average daily throughput is 75 thousand chickens, equating to 19.5 million or so chickens every year. The birds have their legs shackled to a moving line and are then submitted to a number of sequential processes, including stunning, bleeding and scalding. On separate occasions in 2016, three chickens went into the scalding tank whilst still alive because their necks were not properly cut. The appellants were charged with two offences in respect of each incident, contrary to the UK Regulation. The UK Regulation is implementing legislation which gives domestic effect to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 (the EU Regulation). The offences concerned alleged breaches of Article 3 of the EU Regulation, which requires that animals 'shall be spared avoidable pain, distress or suffering' during their killing; and Article 15(1) of the EU Regulation, which sets out requirements for the bleeding of animals (including that 'in case of simple stunning[…] the two carotid [neck] arteries or the vessels from which they arise shall be systematically severed[…] Further dressing or scalding shall only be performed once the absence of signs of life of the animal has been verified'). The issues Two preliminary points of law were raised in the magistrates’ court. These two issues found their way to the Supreme Court after the appellants’ application for judicial review was dismissed by the High Court . The two questions raised were whether proof of an offence contrary to the UK Regulations requires the prosecution to prove mens rea on the part of the business operator; and whether the prosecution must prove a culpable act or omission on the part of the Appellants. Most criminal offences require not just an actus reus (guilty act) but also that a defendant has a mens rea (guilty mind). Depending on the offence, the mens rea could mean intention, recklessness, negligence or even just knowledge of the factual circumstances constituting the offence. There are, however, certain offences for which there is no need to show a 'mens rea'. These are called 'strict liability' offences. With strict liability offences, it does not matter what the defendant knew or intended, if the act is proved as a matter of fact, then the offence has been committed. The central question in this case was, therefore, whether the UK Regulation created offences of strict liability. The decision Giving the sole judgment, Lord Burrows ruled against the appellants, holding that both offences are offences of strict liability. Negligence by the business operator does not have to be proved. The Court considered that the UK Regulation is no more than the mechanism through which the EU Regulation is given effect in domestic law. It is solely the interpretation of the EU Regulation that matters. At [15] Lord Burrows held that 'if the EU Regulation imposes strict liability, the domestic regulation must (as a matter of EU law) do the same; and certainly, without a clear indication in the domestic regulation that the EU Regulation is being departed from, the best interpretation of the domestic legislation must be that it is merely the mechanism for implementing what has been laid down in the EU Regulation.' The court considered that both of the relevant sections of the EU Regulation were worded in such a way as to suggest strict liability. As regards the first offence, having considered that the use of the passive voice in providing that animals 'shall be spared' avoidable pain, distress or suffering 'leaves no obvious room for a requirement of intention or negligence' [39], the Court held at [53] that, 'Looking at the words used in the EU Regulation, in their context and especially in the light of the purpose of the regulation, it is therefore my view that, applying EU law principles of legislative interpretation and bearing in mind that imposing strict criminal liability is not contrary to EU law, the first offence […] is correctly interpreted as imposing strict liability.' Similarly, in respect of the second offence, the Court held at [33] that 'By article 15(1), business operators “shall ensure” that the operational rules are complied with. And the operational rules are specified in Annex III, point 3.2 in very clear and precise terms: “the two carotid arteries or the vessels […] shall be systematically severed”. There is no hint that business operators shall be liable only if the operational rules are intentionally or negligently infringed. If strict liability were not being imposed, words importing culpability could have easily been included; but they have not been.' The Court ended with some final observations, agreeing at [54] with the conclusions of the Divisional Court that '[T]he EU Regulation […] should be seen as setting forth a comprehensive code or rule-book which must be complied with by the business operator at all material times. On the facts of the present case, there was a strict obligation to sever the main arteries systematically and a concomitant strict obligation to spare these birds avoidable pain.' Commentary These issues were raised as preliminary matters, but they are of critical importance to the case. As noted by Mr Justice Jay at [55] of the High Court judgment on the matter, 'The practical effect of his ruling, if upheld […], may be that [the Appellant] has no defence to these charges; or, if [the Appellant] is right and Regulation 30(1)(g) requires proof of mens rea, the prosecution will be discontinued. In that sense, therefore, the rulings on the preliminary issues may be dispositive.' The Crown Prosecution Service, which was the respondent in this matter, will now be able to proceed with the prosecution. It may well be that the appellants now have no defence to the charges and will be convicted of criminal offences. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

24 November 2020 ,Samuel March Judgment: McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 19-1019 (4th Cir. 2020) On 21 November 2020, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a jury's verdict that a commercial hog 'producer' was liable for both compensatory and punitive damages. The facts Murphy-Brown, LLC ('the appellant') is a commercial hog producer who contracted with third-party 'grower' Kinlaw Farms LLC ('Kinlaw') to operate an industrial pig feeding facility in North Carolina. The operation at Kinlaw annually maintained nearly 15,000 of appellant’s pigs, who generated approximately 153,000 pounds of feces and urine daily. The appellant was sued by a group of Kinlaw’s neighbours ('the appellees'), almost all of modest means and minorities, who live in close proximity to Kinlaw. The appellees sought compensation in respect of odours, pests, and noises attributed to farming practices implemented by the appellant at Kinlaw. At first instance the appellees won, and the jury awarded damages of $75,000 in compensatory damages per plaintiff, along with a total of $5 million in punitive damages, which was subsequently reduced to $2.5 million due to North Carolina’s punitive damages cap. The issues The appellants appealed, raising a wide range of arguments, including points about joinder, limitation, admissibility of expert evidence, damages in private nuisance law and whether the issue of punitive damages should have been left to the jury. The decision The opinion was written by Judge Thacker. Finding for the appellees on all but one issue, the court affirmed the verdict of the jury in respect of liability for compensatory and punitive damages. However, the court vacated the jury's judgment as to the amount of punitive damages and remanded for rehearing on that issue alone without the potentially inflammatory or prejudicial evidence about parent company’s finances. Commentary On the face of it, this was an appeal on points of law pertaining to North Carolina law and civil procedure. It did not turn on laws that are explicitly animal protection laws, indeed the opinion is able to deal with the legal issues with no substantial thought given to the lived experiences of the 15,000 pigs per year at the centre of the claim. However, animal advocates internationally will be interested in the judgment of Judge Wilkinson who, as well as concurring with the opinion of the court, also wrote separately and in considerable depth analysing 'the full harms that the unreformed practices of hog farming are inflicting.' [p68] He prefaces this part of his judgment by acknowledging the centrality of hog farming to the state’s economy, but then goes on to deliver a judgment so scathing and impassioned that substantial passages of it bear reproducing in full. He writes at pp70-72: How did it come to this? What was missing from Kinlaw Farms—and from Murphy-Brown—was the recognition that treating animals better will benefit humans. What was neglected is that animal welfare and human welfare, far from advancing at cross-purposes, are actually integrally connected. The decades-long transition to concentrated animal feeding operations ('CAFOs') lays bare this connection and the consequences of its breach with startling clarity. Once, most hogs were raised on 'smaller, pasture-based hog farms.' […] Now, the paradigm has shifted: 'large numbers of hogs, often many thousands' crowd together in each of the many cramped 'confinement structures' that comprise the typical hog CAFO. […]. The following illustrates how Kinlaw, an endpoint of this pasture-to-CAFO transition, created serious ecological risks that, when imprudently managed, bred horrible outcomes for pigs and humans alike. The warp in the human-hog relationship, and the root of the nuisance in this suit, lay in the deplorable conditions of confinement prevailing at Kinlaw, conditions that there is no reason to suppose were unique to that facility. Confinement defined life for the over 14,000 hogs—all of which Murphy-Brown owned—that Kinlaw Farms had crammed into its twelve confinement sheds. […]. Consistent with Kinlaw’s role as a 'finishing' facility, hogs arrived at around forty pounds, to be fattened to over seven times their starting weight. […]. The one thing that never grew with the hogs, though, was the size of their indoor pens. Even though '[h]ogs grow bigger now,' id., the pens’ design has not changed a whit in twenty-five years. See […]. The sad fate of Kinlaw’s hogs was, therefore, to remain in these densely packed pens from the time they arrived to the time they were shipped for slaughter, straining in vain as their increasing girth slowly but surely reduced them to almost suffocating closeness.' Judge Wilkinson relies heavily on an amicus brief , filed by The Humane Society of the United States, along with several other organisations, highlighting how cruelty to animals and serious environmental harms and threats to human health are interconnected. He notes health risks to workers, the effect on air quality and water quality, and the risks of zoonoses and antibiotic resistance . He also recognises an 'uncomfortable truth', namely that 'these nuisance conditions were unlikely to have persisted for long—or even to have arisen at all—had the neighbors of Kinlaw Farms been wealthier or more politically powerful', noting that North Carolina’s ban on new systems implementing the same waste treatment methods arose after CAFOs threatened to expand into a General Assembly member’s home district of Moore County, a popular destination for golfers and tourists. [p79] Wilkinson’s judgment, although separate to the binding opinion of the court, can be cited by animal advocates as a persuasive and powerful reminder that 'The scale of industrial hog farming is no warrant to ride roughshod over the property rights of neighbors, the health of workers and community members, and the lives of the hogs themselves.' [p79] *In the UK, the 'appellees' would be called the 'respondents', and the 'plaintiffs' would be called 'claimants'. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

22 January 2021 Judgment: Federal Republic of Germany v Esso Raffinage and Others The facts Esso Raffinage (Esso) registered its chemical with the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), an EU agency, as it was required to do before it could sell it in the EU. This was under Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, known as REACH. Under REACH rules, given the volume at which it sold the chemical, Esso had to provide data about (amongst other things) its potential pre-natal toxicity. Normally, this would be done via an animal test - a pre-natal developmental toxicity (PNDT) study - but a non-animal approach method could be used instead if it gave the equivalent information. This is known as an ‘adaptation’. Esso argued that the weight of existing evidence, an alternative approach recognised by Annex XI to REACH, provided the equivalent information. However, ECHA disagreed and ordered the company to provide the animal data, using hundreds of rabbits. Esso nevertheless persisted and provided the available evidence instead. ECHA sent a ‘statement of non-compliance’ (SONC) to the French Government, which was responsible for issuing sanctions against Esso, since it is based in France. Under Article 5 of REACH, a company which has not provided required data is unable to sell its chemical in the EU. Esso applied to the General Court (the GC), the lower of the two EU courts, to annul the SONC. The case was against ECHA. A number of member states, including Germany, intervened. The GC ruled in Esso’s favour. ECHA accepted the decision, but Germany appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The European Coalition to End Animal Experiments (ECEAE) was given permission to intervene along with two companies. Other member states supported Germany, including France. The issues There were related procedural issues: was the SONC a justiciable decision under Article 263 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, and did Esso have the standing to bring the case? Only if both questions were answered in the affirmative should the GC have heard it. The substantive issue was whether the principle under Article 25(1) of REACH that animal tests should be a last resort continued to apply even after ECHA had made its initial decision. Linked to this, when considering whether a company had complied with that decision, should ECHA evaluate whether an alternative approach adopted by a company at that stage passed muster, and should it accord the company the same procedural rights (including the right of appeal to its Board of Appeal) as it had for the initial decision? The decision The CJEU held that the SONC was a justiciable decision. It had binding legal effect and changed Esso’s legal position. The company had standing to bring the case. On the substantive issue, the Court said that a registrant could propose an alternative approach even after ECHA had ordered it to carry out an animal test. Indeed, it was bound to do so, where it thought that such an approach was available. ECHA then had to consider whether information using that approach was equivalent to the animal data. Its role was not confined to considering whether a registrant had provided data in the form ECHA had required (as Esso clearly had not). As well as Article 25(1), the Court referred to Article 13(1) of REACH which says: ‘… information on intrinsic properties of substances may be generated by means other than [animal] tests, provided that the conditions set out in Annex XI are met’. Weight of evidence is one of the non-animal approaches recognised by Annex XI. The Court also cited recital (47) which says that ‘it is necessary to replace, reduce or refine testing on vertebrate animals’. The use of alternatives, the Court added, contributed to the attainment of the principal REACH objectives of the protection of human health and the environment. The GC had been right to hold that, save where a registrant was abusing the system in order to buy time, ECHA had to prepare a decision under Article 42(1) of REACH at this second stage with all the procedural safeguards for registrants contained in Articles 50 and 51. Commentary This is an important decision because it underlines the importance of the REACH principle that animal tests should only be carried out as a last resort. Companies and ECHA itself had to apply that principle at all stages, even after ECHA had decided that an animal test was needed. The last resort principle is no panacea for animals because, in many cases, companies are unable to show that there is an alternative approach. Millions of animal tests have taken place under REACH. Animal protection organisations complain that the principle is honoured more in its breach than the observance. But the CJEU’s decision puts the principle firmly at the centre of decision-making. The Advocate-General, who advises the Court, said that it would be a ‘devastating result’ if animal tests were carried out in these circumstances when there was an available adaptation. In fact, ECHA did eventually accept Esso’s weight of evidence approach, underlining just how important the company’s persistence was. Advocates for Animals acted for ECEAE. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

17 March 2021, David Thomas The facts These were 14 joined appeals brought by companies manufacturing chemicals known as ZDDP, which are used in hydraulic fluids. The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) is the principal regulator of chemical safety in the European Union under Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (known as ‘REACH’). Under REACH, companies wishing to manufacture in or import into the EU chemicals (‘substances’) in quantities over one tonne a year have to register them with ECHA. They must provide a significant amount of data relating to the potentially hazardous nature of the substances. The precise nature of the data depends on the tonnage at which a substance is marketed in the EU (there are bands between one and 10 tonnes, 10 and 100 tonnes, 100 and 1000 tonnes and over 1000 tonnes). At Annex IX and X levels, registrants have to make a testing proposal if they wish to use animals. That applied here. ECHA can run a compliance check at all tonnages. Many of the ‘endpoints’, as they are called, involve animal tests. However, there is a key principle under REACH that animal tests must only be carried out as a last resort, and registrants have a duty to provide equivalent data via non-animal approaches (or approaches which involve fewer animals or less suffering than the stipulated test). One of these approaches is known as read-across: where the registered substance has a similar chemical structure to another substance and is expected to have a similar toxicological profile, one can read across data from the other substance to the registered substance and thereby avoid having to carry out another animal test. Animal protection organisations believe that ECHA places the similarity bar too high. The animal tests in the present appeal were (i) a subchronic toxicity study (90 days) in rats; and (ii) a pre-natal developmental study in either rats or rabbits. The first study could involve around 1400 animals and the second around 11,200 (with a further 37,000 animals in additional tests which could be indicated by the initial studies). Considerable suffering was to be expected given the nature of the tests and the substances the animals would be forced to ingest over considerable periods. The history of the present appeals was long and complicated. In essence, however, the lead registrants in the ZDDP group argued that they should be allowed to carry out the animal tests on four of the substances and then read across the results to nine of the others (the final substance was in a special category). They made testing proposals accordingly. ECHA disagreed. Hence the appeal to the Board of Appeal which is attached to ECHA. The companies complained about the process ECHA had undertaken, its assessment of the read-across and the fact that ECHA had only addressed its decisions to the lead registrants, not also the other registrants of the substances who assented in the testing proposals. Advocates for Animals’ client Cruelty Free Europe was given permission to intervene in the appeal. The decision The Board of Appeal allowed all the appeals (save with regard to the final substance). The Board rejected most of the companies’ arguments. In particular, it said that ECHA had not followed an unfair process and had not prematurely moved from informal discussions to the formal parts of the process. ECHA had been entitled to reject the read-across based on its scientific assessment. However, the Board decided that the decisions should indeed have been addressed to all the registrants. The other registrants had been deprived of the benefit of Article 53, which sets out data and cost-sharing rules. Under Article 93(3) of REACH, the Board of Appeal, if it allows an appeal, can either remit the case to ECHA (with guidance about how it should approach its reassessment) or make a decision afresh. The Board will only remit a case if there is doubt about the eventual outcome. In the present case, the Board said that the outcome might have been different had the other registrants had a chance of contributing to the assessment of the substances. Commentary In one sense, this was a standard Board of Appeal decision, in that it accorded ECHA considerable deference in its assessment of the read-across and the testing strategy the ZDDP group had proposed. The decision to remit is interesting, however. Having ruled firmly that ECHA was entitled to reject the read-across, it might be thought unlikely that the other registrants could have achieved a different outcome. In addition, the Board only said that ECHA’s decision should have been addressed to all registrants, not its draft decision and it is therefore not obvious what the other registrants could have contributed. As it is, all the registrants now have another opportunity of improving the read-across argument, and thereby avoid at least some animal tests. The Board may have been influenced by the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Federal Republic of Germany v Esso Raffinage and others C-471/18 P (21 January 2021) (Esso Raffinage) , in which Advocates for Animals also acted. The Court emphasised that the last resort principle had to be applied even after ECHA had made a decision that a registrant must carry out animal tests. The Board rejected CFE’s argument that Article 77(2)(j) of REACH, which requires ECHA to ‘provid[e] advice and assistance to manufacturers and importers registering a substance … ’, imposed a duty on the Agency to provide assistance at all stages, in particular so as to avoid unnecessary animal tests. The Board said that the wording indicated that the duty to assist was limited to providing technical assistance for the submission of registration dossiers. With respect, this is a misreading of Article 77(2)(j) and out of step with the CJEU’s ruling in Esso Raffinage. Registration is not simply a one-off process, and there seems to be no policy reason why ECHA’s duty should be limited in this way. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

14 May 2021,Sam March [R (The Electronic Collar Manufacturers Association and Petsafe) v DEFRA [2021] EWCA Civ 666] ( https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/666.html ) Dismissing an appeal brought by The Electronic Collar Manufacturers Association and Petsafe, the Court of Appeal ruled on 11 May 2021 that the proposed ban on electronic shock collars was neither irrational nor violated property rights. Background For many years, animal welfare groups have campaigned for shock collars to be banned, on the grounds that they are cruel and unnecessary. On 27 August 2018 DEFRA decided to implement a ban on the use of remote-controlled hand-held electronic collar devices (shock collars) for cats and dogs in England. This is to be done by way of secondary legislation under powers contained in s.12 Animal Welfare Act 2006 . The first appellant is an unincorporated trade association. It represents those who make and sell shock collars and other electronic training aids for dogs in the United Kingdom. The second appellant makes and sells shock collars. The appellants had challenged DEFRA’s decision by way of judicial review, which was dismissed at first instance. The appeal There were five grounds of appeal in the claim, which the court at paragraph [5] considered could be better be dealt with as two grounds of appeal, which related to whether DEFRA’s decision was 'Wednesbury' irrational (meaning so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have come to it); and whether the decision was disproportionate to the appellant’s property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1 ('A1P1') to the European Convention on Human Rights ('the ECHR') and by Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ('the TFEU'). Irrationality The appellants alleged that DEFRA’s decision was outside the range of reasonable responses open to it in the circumstances. This rested on two main arguments: first, it said that there was an irrational inconsistency between the Secretary of State's approach between shock collars and containment systems (such as electric fences); and second it was alleged that an abrupt change of position on the matter by the Secretary of State was irrational. Neither of these arguments found favour with the court. In ruling that that the Secretary of State was rationally entitled to decide to treat shock collars differently from containment systems, Laing LJ (with whom Henderson LJ and David Richards LJ agreed) held at paragraph [97] 'The evidence before the Secretary of State overwhelmingly suggested that containment systems are set up by professionals who provide training and ensure that the system is appropriate to the animal and its environment. There was no such evidence about e-collars.' In 2013, DEFRA’s position had been that the report before them, known as 'Lincoln 2', did not provide evidence of a 'significant risk of harm to animal welfare' and that, for a ban to be justified, it was necessary to show that e-collars were 'harmful to the long-term welfare of dogs'. However, between 2013 and 2018, the government’s criteria for necessity changed to the following: the Government would need to be satisfied that a ban was both in the public interest and supported by considerations of animal welfare; There was evidence that electronic aids could have a negative impact on the welfare of some, but not of all, dogs. The evidence was not 'strong enough' to support a ban; Nevertheless, the use of electronic aids should be limited; they should only be used as a last resort, on the recommendation of a professional, and used by competent operators. However, at paragraph [101], Laing LJ ruled that this change of position was not irrational. There were reasonable reasons to impose a ban and reasonable reasons not to. Where both decisions were within the band of reasonable responses, it would be 'very difficult to see how it can be irrational for a decision maker to change his mind, even if the underlying evidence is the same.' Property rights The appellants argued that the judge had erred in two stages of his assessment of whether the ban was a proportionate infringement on the right to property for two reasons: first, that less intrusive measures could have been imposed, and second, that a fair balance had not been struck between the competing interests and rights at play. In order to succeed, the Court held at paragraph [102] that any less intrusive means must be capable of achieving the legitimate aim which was at issue, namely animal welfare. There was no evidence before the court, one way or the other, about whether systems of regulation in other jurisdictions worked or not in achieving this aim. Laing LJ, added: 'Finally, the concern about e-collars is that, if they are not banned, no system of regulation will prevent a cruel owner from using one to inflict unnecessary suffering on an animal. These factors mean that whether regulation is preferable to a ban is essentially a policy judgment.' The court also doubted whether there was really an interference with the appellant’s property rights at all in the context of proposed but unenacted legislation which has practical, but no legal, effect. Laing LJ considered that there was 'much force' in the argument that 'The evidence in this case did not establish an interference with the As' possessions for the purposes of A1P1. At its highest, the evidence showed no more than a potential effect on future income. That is not enough.' Commentary We welcome this common sense judgment from the Court of Appeal. Defra has the power to promote animal welfare via regulations under the Animal Welfare Act, which is exactly what is intended with the ban. The nature of the challenge was entirely transparent, this being the pursuit of commercial interest. Edie Bowles, Advocates for Animals. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

R v Hankinson 2021 (Judgment: https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/r-v-hankinson/?fbclid=IwAR0BTO-nX9S5FyhV-j0egl9sfHfTlwXNob8P8k0ggS_4Z-iNdPsddNk1B9M ) Mark Hankinson, director of the Masters of Foxhounds Association, on 15 October 2021 was found guilty at Westminster Magistrates’ Court of encouraging or assisting others to commit an offence under the Hunting Act 2004. The facts Mark Hankinson was the director of the Masters of Foxhounds Association, one of the governing bodies for hunting in the UK. On 11 and 13 August 2020, Hankinson spoke at webinars organised by the Hunting Office (which runs the administrative, advisory and supervisory functions of the Hunting Associations) and attended by over 100 hunt masters. Other speakers at the webinars, obtained by the Hunt Saboteurs Association and made available online in November 2020, included: Lord Mancroft – Conservative Peer, Chair of the Masters of Foxhounds Association and former Chair of the Countryside Alliance. Phil Davies – ex-Police Inspector and Police Liaison Consultant to the Countryside Alliance. Richard Tyacke – Chairman of the Association of Masters of Harriers and Beagles, Hunting Office Executive Director and former Master and Huntsman of the Wynnstay Hunt. Paul Jelley – Master of the Chilmark and Clifton Foot Beagles from 1990-2013 and a police officer for 30 years. Richard Gurney – former Master of the Old Surrey and Burstow Hunt Fox hunting was banned in 2005, when the Hunting Act 2004 (the 'Hunting Act') came into force. Traditionally, fox hunting involves the use of a pack of around 30-40 hounds who, under the control of the huntsman, seek out, chase, and kill foxes. The huntsman and hounds are usually accompanied by members of hunt staff, hunt masters, and riders who pay to attend for the day. Trail hunting, which started after the Hunting Act came into effect, involves the use of an artificial trail, usually fox-based, which the huntsman and hounds seek out and follow. Anti-hunt activists claim that trail hunting does not exist and that it was invented to subvert the Hunting Act. The argument is that by using a fox-based scent, it is possible for the hounds to chase and kill a real fox, meanwhile the hunt can claim that it was an 'accident' and avoid prosecution. At Hankinson’s trial, the prosecution argued that, during the course of the webinars, the defendant offered advice on how to hunt illegally, behind a smokescreen of trail hunting. They said that his advice was aimed at making it difficult for anyone watching or filming to know whether they were witnessing a trail hunt or an illegal fox hunt, and therefore to reduce the likelihood that a member of the hunt would be prosecuted or convicted of illegal hunting. In particular, during the webinars, Hankinson made the following statements, among others (emphasis added): '… it’s a lot easier to create a smoke screen if you’ve got more than 1 trail layer operating , um, and that is what it’s all about, trying to portray, um, to the people watching that you’re going about your legitimate business.' '…I think the most important thing that we need to bear in mind is that if you’ve got saboteurs out with you in any shape or form, we need to have clear, visible, plausible trail laying done throughout the day.' 'Um, it’s probably just as well to have something pretty foul smelling on the end of their, end of their drag just in case an anti leaps out from behind a gateway and grabs hold of it and says this is just a clean silk hanky or something.' 'Um, a lot of people in the past have tried to say oh we laid trails earlier, or we lay them the day before. In a situation where you’ve got saboteurs out, or antis or whatever, that’s not really going to work too well. We need to have clear and visible trail laying going on, on the day, and it needs to be as plausible as possible .' 'Um, I always love Will Day who might be joining us on Thursday, when he lays trails for the New Forest he has emblazoned on the back of his sweatshirt "TRAIL LAYER NO. 3".' 'Some people say well what’s the point in laying trails? Well I think it’s fairly self-explanatory. Er, if you haven’t you’re not going to be covered by the insurance. ' 'Um, obviously we also need it um, if we’re going to get any support from the Police, particularly when they’re dealing with saboteurs and the like, if you haven’t got any viable trail laying evidence, how on earth are we going to refute these allegations ?' 'Um, so coming back to the, to the sort of modus operandi of the day, um, the trail layers, in my view, you need to have at least 1 trail layer out there, particularly if you’ve got the presence of undesirables .' The decision In giving judgment, Deputy Chief Magistrate, Judge Tan found Hankinson guilty of an offence under section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, namely committing an act capable of encouraging the commission of the offence of hunting a wild mammal with a dog, and that he intended to encourage its commission. Judge Tan rejected the defence’s suggestion that Hankinson’s choice of words was 'bad language' or 'clumsy'. In reference to Hankinson’s repeated statements about trail laying needing to be 'plausible' or 'credible', the court’s position was 'Why would you need to try to portray anything as legitimate if you were in fact engaged in legitimate business?' In relation to Hankinson’s statement that laying trails is required so that the hunting is covered by insurance, the court held that 'Trail laying is essential if that is what is genuinely going on. It is a simple answer and an unnecessary question. This was clearly a warning of the risk to those watching on if they could not show trail laying going on. It was a clear statement that in order to hunt illegally, there would have to be trail laying as a cover or smoke screen to be protected through insurance'. In relation to Hankinson’s statement that 'you need to have at least 1 trail layer out there', the court held that 'If it were genuine trail hunting, it goes without saying that there would be at least 1 trail layer for it simply couldn’t happen with one. There would be no need to suggest one was necessary unless it were a sham and a smoke screen.' In concluding, the court held: 'I am sure that the defendant, through his words was giving advice on how to illegally hunt. This was through the pretence of laying trails which it could be said the hounds were following. As he himself said, he was speaking to ‘like-minded people’ and could therefore speak freely. He did not expect his words to be recorded and released into the public domain. It was clearly advice and encouragement to commit the offence of hunting a wild mammal with a dog. I am sure he intended to encourage the commission of that offence.' Hankinson was fined £1,000 and ordered to pay £2,500 as a contribution towards costs. Commentary The conviction has been met with celebration and relief from members of the anti-hunt community, who for many years have sought to expose trail hunting as a smokescreen for illegal hunting, which has continued despite the ban. As director of the Masters of Foxhounds Association, Hankinson is a senior figure in the hunting world; there are 170 packs registered with the Masters of Foxhounds Association in total. The other speakers were similarly senior figures in the hunting fraternity. The webinars were attended by over 100 hunt masters from across the country. The webinars ran for several hours across multiple days, with no one attempting to question or correct any implication that illegal hunting could take place. Following this conviction and the damning conclusions of the court, one would struggle to conclude anything other than that trail hunting is used as a smokescreen to cover for illegal hunting. If it is true that trail hunting has been used as a smokescreen for illegal hunting since the ban, it begs questions about how many other criminal offences have been committed during that time. Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .

21 October 2021 by Samuel March Order: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/ohio/ohsdce/1:2021mc00023/261265/2 On 15 October 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio made an unprecedented order which, in a specific and limited context, recognised a community of hippopotamuses as having legal personhood. The facts The applicant was a community of hippopotamuses living in the Magdalena River in Colombia ('the Community'). The Community are the feral descendants of animals originally imported into the region by the infamous drug dealer Pablo Escobar. After Escobar’s death, animals escaped from his property and built their home in the Magdalena River. They have since reproduced at such a rate that some biologists have expressed concern over their environmental impact and threat to human safety. A group of scientists and government officials have proposed that the animals be killed. This led to litigation in Colombia when local lawyer Luis Domingo Gómez Maldonado filed a claim on behalf of the Community. One of the central issues in that litigation is the safety and effectiveness of possible contraceptives as a means of population control. This sparked satellite litigation in Ohio when the Animal Legal Defence Fund (ALDF) filed an application to depose two Ohio-based wildlife experts, Dr. Elizabeth Berkeley and Dr. Richard Berlinski ('the Witnesses'), both of whom have expertise in nonsurgical sterilisation. The ADLF believes that the Witnesses’ testimony could bolster support for a particular type of contraceptive, which could allow the population to be controlled without slaughter. The law The highest constitutional authority in Colombia, the Constitutional Court, has previously recognised that animals have standing to file a lawsuit in that jurisdiction [ Ruling C-666 of 2010 ; see also Rulings C-123 of 2014, T-445 of 2016, C-225 of 2017 and C-032 of 2019]. Relying on these authorities, the Community has brought a claim in Colombia. The case found itself before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio by way of an ex-parte application filed by the ALDF pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 ('Section 1782'). Section 1782 authorises '[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found [to] order him to give his testimony or statement . . . for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. . . .' The applicants argued that the application met the statutory requirements for a Section 1782 application because the witnesses each 'reside' in the relevant district and the discovery sought was 'for use' in foreign proceedings in which the Community are plaintiffs and therefore 'interested persons' for the purposes of Section 1782. The applicants also detailed the various discretionary factors that apply in determining whether to grant an application under Section 1782, and why these militated in favour of making the order. The decision On 15 October 2021, Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz ordered that: '1. The application is granted. 2. Counsel for the applicant is authorised to issue subpoenas […]. 3. This Court shall retain such jurisdiction as is necessary to effectuate the terms of such subpoenas'. Commentary There is a long history of cases seeking to establish animals as legal persons with standing to bring cases in their own right in the United States. Dr Joe Wills touched on some of these cases in our previous blog . Since 2013, the US-based Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), have filed lawsuits on behalf of animals such as chimpanzees and elephants, seeking to release them from the facilities where they are detained. NhRP’s approach has been to petition for writs of habeas corpus on behalf of chimpanzees and elephants. Habeas corpus is a centuries-old means of testing the lawfulness of one’s imprisonment before a court and was used extensively in the 18th and 19th centuries to fight human slavery. Unfortunately, despite increasingly sympathetic comments from judges, as of yet, no US courts have recognised any of the NhRP’s clients as legal persons for the purpose of their lawsuits. Clearly the right enshrined in Section 1782 is far more limited and technical than habeas corpus and does not touch on the sorts of fundamental rights to freedom or bodily integrity raised in the NhRP cases. The recognition that the Community could be applicants for the purposes of Section 1782 depended on their standing in Colombian proceedings. Colombia remains a progressive and unusual jurisdiction in this regard, and so the case does not in and of itself establish a wider free-standing right for cases brought on behalf of animal communities to be heard by US courts. As Animal Law Program Director and Visiting Associate Professor at Vermont Law School, Delcianna Winders explained on Twitter : 'The statute gives the court broad discretion to order such discovery and doesn't require the court to make a finding re "interested persons". The court's order makes no reference to 'persons' much less explicitly find that hippos are persons. But it effectively recognises at least limited legal personhood for these hippos.' With this in mind, this case is nevertheless a historic one. For the first time, a community of non-human animals has successfully applied for a court order in a US court without being dismissed for lack of standing. It may provide a useful precedent in convincing future courts that there is no fundamental difficulty with US Courts hearing cases brought by animals. Animal Legal Defense Fund Executive Director Stephen Wells said : 'The court’s order authorising the hippos to exercise their legal right to obtain information in the United States is a critical milestone in the broader animal status fight to recognise that animals have enforceable rights.' Getting advice This post is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If you require legal advice on animal protection laws, please contact info@advocates-for-animals.com .